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## LENIN'S THEORY OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 2-4

[Unattributed lead article: "Lenin's Theory of Socialist Revolution"]

[Text]

Human society develops according to objective laws. In its development it passes through a series of socio-economic formations—primitive commune, slave-owning, feudal, capitalist and communist societies. One antagonistic society is replaced by another as a result of social revolutions. The main cause of a social revolution is the conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production, when the latter fetter the development of the productive forces instead of promoting it.

In exploiter society the purpose of revolution is to overthrow the ruling class which uses the state machine, the legal system and means of coercion to preserve the outdated relations of production, its economic and political domination. A revolution cannot "be made to order." It "matures" in the process of historical progress in the context of objective and subjective conditions. Earlier social revolutions replaced one ruling exploiting class with another—slave-owners with feudal lords, feudal lords with capitalists—and one form of private property with another.

Socialist revolution is the highest type of social revolution, because it abolishes all forms of private ownership of the means of production and all exploiting classes and ultimately leads to the elimination of class distinctions altogether.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels proved and scientifically substantiated the necessity and inevitability of the socialist revolution. In the epoch of pre-monopoly capitalism they advanced the proposition that a socialist revolution

could take place simultaneously in all the capitalist countries or at least in the more developed ones. They proceeded from the fact that, if a revolution were to take place in a separate country, it would be suppressed by the joint efforts of the capitalist countries.

Basing himself on the fundamental theses of Marxism and the new historical experience in

the development of society at the turn of the century V. I. Lenin produced a comprehensive doctrine on the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.

First, Lenin showed that under imperialism the capitalist system was objectively ripe for socialist revolution. The material preconditions for regulation of economic life by society had matured. The monopolies had socialised production on a vast scale. This paved the way for planned reorganisation of production and of distribution. In his work "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It" V. I. Lenin proved that state-monopoly capitalism had built up in the main an elaborate mechanism for social management of the economy. Once the working class took over power it could use this mechanism for building socialist society.

Second, Lenin discovered the law of uneven development of capitalism in the epoch of imperialism. The uneven economic and political development of capitalism sharpens the contradictions between the imperialist countries. The acuteness of contradictions between labour and capital, and between the people and the monopolies varies from one country to another.

Centres of acute contradiction take shape in the system of imperialism, and in them favourable conditions for revolution appear earlier than in other places. These centres of contradictions, i.e. weak links in the chain of imperialism, need not be the more advanced capitalist countries. In October 1917, for example, Russia proved to be one of the nodal centres of contradictions in the system of imperialism. V. I. Lenin wrote:

"Hence the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone."

In the epoch of imperialism socialism cannot triumph in all countries simultaneously.

In addition to the economic conditions, V. I. Lenin examined the objective social conditions, i.e. the revolutionary situation, and the role of the subjective factor. For a revolution to succeed the political power of the ruling class must be in a state of a crisis, the balance of class forces should be favourable and the masses must be politically active. What is needed is a revolutionary situation indicating that the ground has been prepared for the revolution. However, a revolution might not take place, if there are no organised political forces rallied by a single will and unity of action, conscious of their aims and prepared to join actively in the struggle. If there are no such forces, the tension of the social contradictions, having reached its peak, will drop, the contradictions will be covered up and the opportune moment for action will be let slip. In the period of transition to the highest phase of the revolutionary situation, i.e. in the period of the national crisis, it is the subjective factor which plays the decisive role in the outbreak and triumph of the revolution.

It should be mentioned that both the objective and subjective conditions for the revolution are in dialectical unity. This is a fundamental law governing all great revolutions. Capitalism objectively produces the forces that bring about its destruction. To carry out their historical mission of grave-diggers of capitalism these forces have to be politically conscious, i.e. they have to be aware of their class aims, and must be organised.

Marxism regards the working class as the core and leader of these forces. Its position in the system of social production makes it the most revolutionary class which is bearer of the new social system free from private ownership and exploitation. Economically and politically the working class expresses the interests of all working people. It is capable of leading to socialism the semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois sections of town and countryside, in the first place the peasants. These sections are the allies of the proletariat, because they are interested in profound socio-economic changes, such as a radical agrarian reform, nationalisation

of the property of the big monopolies and democratisation of social life. These measures are the functions of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because they do not abolish the capitalist system, though they strike at the monopolies and extend democratic freedoms. V. I. Lenin produced a theory on the growing over of the democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. The fight for democracy in the epoch of imperialism is inseparable from the class struggle of the proletariat for the socialist reorganisation of society. Unless the domination of the monopolies is abolished, it will be impossible to introduce democracy completely and consistently. The general democratic movement in turn creates the objective and subjective conditions for socialist revolution. By uniting the various democratic movements which put forward partial

demands not involving the abolition of capitalism and by directing them on to the path of socialist revolution the proletariat sets them on the only right road leading to complete and consistent realisation of their democratic aims. Thanks to its leading position in the democratic revolution the proletariat is able to carry the revolution through to the end. After the democratic revolution is completed, the political forces regroup themselves around the working class for the transition to socialist revolution. The internal cohesion and consolidation of the general democratic movement against imperialism and of the proletarian movement for socialism is a law of proletarian social revolution discovered by Lenin.

Among the components of the subjective factor the role played by the Marxist working class party occupies a special place in Lenin's theory of socialist revolution. The working class needs a revolutionary political party as the bearer of scientific theory, as a political educator and as an organiser of the practical struggle of the working class and all other working people for their immediate and ultimate aims. The party acts as the main centre preparing the political forces of socialist revolution, coordinating and directing the actions of the workers in the various parts of the country, and organising various forms of united action with other social sections and their parties in the fight for common aims. The party alone can ensure unity of action of the working class, stability and continuity in its struggle.

The main sign of a socialist revolution in the scientific sense and in terms of practical politics is the take over of power by the proletariat



from the bourgeoisie, the breaking down of the bourgeois state machine and the establishment of proletarian dictatorship. The bourgeois state is specially adapted to defend the interests of the exploiters. In order that the state should serve the revolution and introduce socialist changes, the content of its work, its structure and class composition must be changed.

The forms and methods used in breaking down of the bourgeois state machine depend on the concrete historical context and the acuteness of the class struggle. In Russia the class struggle was particularly fierce. Therefore, the system of the old state institutions and organisations was replaced practically in whole by a new system known as the Soviets. In the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and other European socialist countries some of the elements and forms of the old state were purged of bourgeois elements and were included in the system of proletarian dictatorship.

In some of the capitalist countries today the working class and its allies enjoy better possibilities for exercising an influence on some elements of the bourgeois state, above all the representative elective bodies and the local government bodies. There is now a possibility for the working class to use some of the state institutions for the defence of working people's interests. However, this does not mean that the question of the need to break down the machine of class domination of the bourgeoisie has been removed from the agenda. If the repressive machine of the old state is not broken down, it will ultimately become the bulwark and weapon of the counter-revolutionaries. This is evidenced by the tragic experience of the Chilean revolution.

The dictatorship of the working class is only an instrument for achieving the aims set by the socialist revolution, a means for paving the way to real government by the people, it is the first stage of government by the people. Its main function is constructive. As distinguished from bourgeois revolutions socialist revolution begins and does not end with the take over of power. The working class uses the power it has taken to transform the capitalist economy into socialist economy, to organise socialist management, to work radical changes in spiritual life and to build a classless society. When the USSR had built mature socialist society, proletarian dictatorship developed into the state of the whole people.

The founders of Marxism attached great importance to the forms in which the proletariat should take over power. They maintained that transition from capitalism to socialism could be peaceful or non-peaceful, pointing out that the least painful way of such transition was in the interests of the working class.

The choice of the concrete forms depends on the balance of the class and political forces and the resistance put up by the exploiting classes. A peaceful war is possible, when the ruling class is compelled to give up political power under pressure of the objective political situation, i.e. when all armed resistance is hopeless. Depending on changes in the concrete historical circumstances one form of transition may be replaced by another at any moment. In this connection V. I. Lenin wrote:

"Marx did not commit himself, or the future leaders of the socialist revolution, to matters of form, to ways and means of bringing about the revolution. He understood perfectly well that a vast number of new problems would arise, that the whole situation would change radically and often in the course of revolution."

At present radical changes have taken place in favour of socialism in the world. This has created in several capitalist countries favourable conditions for a peaceful transition to socialism. This point is mentioned in the Programme of the CPSU, in the programmes and documents of party congresses of a number of Communist and Workers' Parties.

Socialist revolution is the result of the ex-

treme acuteness of contradictions in the entire system of imperialism, although in each separate country it operates as an independent link in the chain of world revolution. The first link in this chain was the socialist revolution in Russia. V. I. Lenin wrote:

"The Russian revolution is but a single link in the chain of world revolution."

The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 ushered in a new era in world history whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism. The countries of triumphant socialism are becoming the main motive force behind the world revolutionary process. They are shouldering the main burden in the struggle against imperialism and reaction. They are combining in a single stream the three basic revolutionary forces—the world socialist system, the international communist and working class movements and the national-liberation movement. Given the support of the socialist countries it has become possible for some countries to advance from feudalism directly to socialism, bypassing capitalism, as was, for instance, the case with the Mongolian People's Republic.

With the advance of the world revolutionary process new forms and new possibilities have appeared for the development of socialist revolution. These are conditioned by the regrouping of and shift in the balance of class forces. V. I. Lenin wrote:

"All nations will arrive at socialism — this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its



own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life."

Peace is a vital condition for the development of socialism. Therefore, socialism has become a source and bulwark of peaceful relations between peoples. Lenin's service consists in the fact that he substantiated the theory of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Socialism does not need war or the export of revolution. It is exercising a revolutionising influence by its scientific, economic and cultural achievements. V. I. Lenin wrote:

"Any peace, therefore, will open channels for our influence a hundred times wider."

Lenin's theory of socialist revolution is a component part of the all-conquering doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Just like any revolutionary theory it lives and develops, it is a potent ideological weapon in the hands of all revolutionary forces today.

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## FIRST SOVIET DEFENSE COUNCIL'S ACTIVITIES REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 5-7

[Article by Maj Gen N. Pankin, D. Sc. (History): "At the Head of the Defence Council"]

[Text]

**A**fter the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the young Soviet Republic had to defend the gains of the working people against foreign and internal counter-revolution. During the Civil War (1918-20) the inspirer and organiser of the Soviet people's struggle was the Communist Party headed by V. I. Lenin.

During that period V. I. Lenin proved to be not only a brilliant theoretician and political leader of the working masses, but also a great soldier and strategist, a leader and organiser of the military defence of the Socialist Homeland.

The principle of unity of political, state and military leadership was clearly embodied in the activities of V. I. Lenin as Chairman of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence. As leader of the ruling party and head of the Soviet Government he also assumed during the hard times of the war the extraordinarily complicated responsibilities for the defence of the country.

The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was formed by decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee (ARCEC)\* of November 30, 1918, at a time that was exceptionally trying for the Soviet Republic. At that time, as Lenin put it, "the whole question of the Russian socialist revolution has been reduced to a question of war." The young Soviet Republic

was surrounded by a fiery ring of hostile forces. To hold out against and defeat the ruthless enemies, who were numerically and technically superior, it was necessary to stir the masses of working people to action, mobilise all the country's reserves and resources, and unite the efforts of the front and rear.

The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was organised for the purpose of quickly

transforming the country into a single fighting camp living under the slogan: "Everything for the front, everything for victory." The Council's decisions were absolutely obligatory for all central and local departments and institutions, as well as for all citizens of the Soviet Republic.

The Defence Council was the instrument that carried into life the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party, the ARCEC and the Council of People's Commissars—the Government of the Republic. This extraordinary body of the dictatorship of the proletariat united and directed the efforts of the Party, governmental, military, economic, trade-union and other organisations in mobilising all the country's forces for defence.

The Council comprised the chairmen (or their deputies) of the Revolutionary Military Council

\* ARCEC — All-Russia Central Executive Committee — until 1937 the Supreme Legislative, Administrative and Constitutional body of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

(RMC)\* of the Republic and the Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Committee for Supplying the Red Army, the People's Commissars (or their deputies) of the People's Commissariats of Food and Transport, ARCEC and All-Russian Trade-Union Council executives. Later it was also joined by representatives of the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Labour.

Although the Defence Council had wide powers, it exercised them strictly within the bounds of the Soviet Constitution, on a truly democratic basis. It carried all its decisions into effect with the aid and through the intermediary of the corresponding state institutions, Party and public organisations, supported by the vast masses of the working people.

The Defence Council had no permanent employees or administrative and technical staff. Its members worked simultaneously at their regular jobs and had to combine their work with their new duties. All the business correspondence was conducted by the few members of the staff of the Council of People's Commissars. In cases where it was necessary to solve some problem quickly, temporary committees were formed of executives of the corresponding departments, specialists and workers. In especially important cases the committees were formed jointly with the Party Central Committee.

The activities of the Defence Council showed remarkable features of the Leninist style of work, i.e. revolutionary scope, high organisation, efficiency, ability to single out what was

most important and concentrate all efforts on quickly solving the problem, effective control over execution, completion of work once undertaken, democratism and creative initiative.

Sittings of the Defence Council were usually held twice a week, sometimes more often, depending on the situation and the importance of the questions on the agenda. The leaders of the People's Commissariats and departments directly concerned with the questions on the agenda were, as a rule, invited to the sittings which were conducted in a businesslike and creative atmosphere, in a well-organised, efficient and concrete manner. The speakers had to

keep to a 5-min time limit because the agenda of a single sitting usually contained a few score questions. The decisions passed by the sittings were handed to the executors on the next day, not later than 1600 hours.

V. I. Lenin took great pains to prepare each sitting of the Defence Council and participated very actively in its work. He outlined the agenda and nominated the speakers, drew up and edited the draft decisions, and summed up the discussion.

In its work the Defence Council strictly observed the principles of free expression and defence of one's opinion, of collective elaboration of decisions and no pressure was brought to bear from any quarter. All decisions were adopted by a majority vote. If the opinions on some question differed essentially or the proposal proved inadequately worked out, the question was postponed till the next sitting. Even in emergency cases, when an urgent order had to be issued, V. I. Lenin discussed it with the members of the Council over the telephone, after which confirmation at the next sitting was mandatory.

**T**he activities of the Defence Council embraced practically all aspects of organisation of the armed struggle. During the period from December 1918 to March 1920 the Council dealt mainly with problems of industry aimed at supplying the front with weapons, ammunition, equipment and clothing. Many a time it also discussed problems of supplying foodstuffs and fuel, the state of the transport, military medicine and control of epidemics.

The Defence Council was concerned not only with mobilising all the country's economic resources for the defence of the Soviet state. At its sittings it also considered questions of strategic and even operational struggle against foreign interventionists and the forces of counter-revolution. The minutes of its sittings show how consistently, with due regard for the country's potentialities, the task of having an army 3 mil-

lion strong set by V. I. Lenin at the end of 1918 was carried out. The members of the Council delved into all details concerning the formation of new divisions—from selecting army commissars to organising the transportation of troops.

At nearly every sitting the Defence Council heard reports of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on the situation at the fronts and promptly adopted

\* Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic — Board of the People's Commissariat for the Army and Navy of the USSR in 1918-1932. It exercised supervision of the Armed Forces and their construction, and elaborated instructions for the defence of the country.

the appropriate measures. The High Command of the Red Army and the front commanders repeatedly received directives signed by V. I. Lenin, Chairman of the Defence Council, concerning the tasks and character of military operations depending on the situation in the country and at the front.

When, for example, at the end of 1918, the 3rd Army, finding itself in difficulties, abandoned Perm, a committee of the CC of the Party and the Defence Council was immediately sent to the area of operations. The committee did a great deal of work and its conclusions helped to improve the situation. Another example was in the autumn of 1919, when the army of the White-Guard general Denikin was approaching the city of Orel and was aiming to attack Moscow. The Defence Council then decided to organise a defence area to protect the capital in the south-west. Numerous fortified lines were built in a very short time.

In addition to organising the military defence of the country the Defence Council devoted considerable attention to problems of peaceful construction. By the spring of 1920 the Red Army had gained decisive victories at the fronts of the Civil War. A peaceful respite ensued. The Land of Soviets was in a position to start the reconstruction of the national economy, reorganising it for peaceful construction.

In these conditions the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence was renamed the Labour and Defence Council at the end of March. From February to April 1920, the Council decided questions of reconstructing the transport, overcoming the fuel crisis and improving the food situation. However, the interruption of the peaceful respite by the imperialists forced the Council to devote its principal attention to military problems again.

Under V. I. Lenin's leadership the Defence Council did immense titanic work during the Civil War. From December 1, 1918, to December 1, 1920, the Council held 170 sittings at which more than 4,000 questions were discussed and settled. The sittings, with exception of a very few, were presided over by Lenin.

At the end of the Civil War the emergency powers of the Labour and Defence Council

were exhausted and by decision of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets—the supreme government body of the Republic—it began to function as a committee of the Council of People's Commissars. However, its membership increased. V. I. Lenin remained Chairman of the Council.

After the war the Labour and Defence Council concentrated its activities mainly on restoring the national economy and on peaceful socialist construction—development of industry, transport, agriculture, trade, supplies, finances, labour organisation, accounting and control, education, public health, social security, the problem of nationalities, international relations, etc.

In 1921-1922, owing to the deterioration of his health, V. I. Lenin was not always able to attend the sittings. But even in these conditions he continued to direct the work of the Council through his deputies until the end of 1922.

V. I. Lenin's activities as Chairman of the Defence Council constitute one of the most vivid manifestations of his greatness as a brilliant theoretician and unsurpassed practitioner of the revolution. The work of the Defence Council under his guidance yielded the most valuable historical experience of utilising the military potential of a socialist state in the struggle against the aggression of imperialism and is a striking illustration of the advantages of the socialist economic system. M. V. Frunze, a Soviet military leader and theoretician, wrote: "The experience of the Civil War testifies that if the Labour and Defence Council had not been an agency embracing all aspects of our Soviet life, we would hardly have been victorious in the clash to which we were driven by the course of our revolution."

The multifarious experience of work done by the Leninist Defence Council was widely utilised by the Communist Party at various stages of its activity, especially during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. The State Defence Committee organised in the very beginning of it played an important role in transforming the country into a single armed camp, in mobilising all the country's forces to defeat the enemy.

Major-General N. PANKRATOV,  
D. Sc. (History)

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## WARFARE: NEED FOR INITIATIVE AND CREATIVITY DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 12-14

[Article by Lt Col V. Gorbunov, Cand. Sc. (Philosophy): "Initiative and Creative Approach in Warfare"]

[Text]

Military history teaches us that initiative and creative approach are highly important for victory over the enemy. The side possessing these factors has a better chance to secure victory. Generalising the facts of seizing and holding the initiative in a creative approach to the solution of military questions Frederick Engels, a distinguished proletarian military theorist, arrived at the conclusion that "this means a lot in war."

In Frederick Engels' opinion, to seize and hold the initiative requires above all resolute offensive action. However, he pointed out, the side in defence is not always completely deprived of the possibility to display initiative and a creative approach in action. By exhibiting initiative the side in defence may compel the attacker to fight at a time, in a place and by methods which are disadvantageous to him.

In organising the defence of the working people's revolutionary achievements the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always attached and continues to attach primary importance to enhancing the activity of the whole people in solving problems bearing on military development, building up the Soviet Armed Forces and strengthening the defence of the Socialist Homeland. The Party has invariably pointed to the need to rely on the "daring, initiative and resourcefulness inherent in our people."

In practice the term "initiative" is frequently used in two meanings. In the broad sense, initiative (strategic, operational and tactical initiative) means active offensive operations of forces with a view to impose one's will on the

enemy. In the narrow sense, initiative stands for independent actions of servicemen designed to accomplish their combat or training missions.

It should be mentioned that the initiative of privates, sergeants and officers promotes the preparation of combat operations in much less time than normally required, increases speed and improves the results of operations on a tactical, operational and even a strategical scale. Initiative is based on profound knowledge of the military art and of the enemy's views on the conduct of military operations, understanding of the superior officer's intention, one's own mission, the mission of one's neighbours, and all-round analysis of the situation. It consists in making a creative use of the conditions that have taken shape, vigorous action, readiness to assume responsibility for a decision adopted independently.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 showed the importance of cultivating in servicemen the ability to display initiative and a creative approach to operations in combat. For instance, lack of initiative in officers adversely affects their actions at the beginning of an operation, in the event of unforeseen changes in the situation and at all other stages of the armed struggle. Referring in his memoirs to the initial period of the war, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, a distinguished Soviet military leader, wrote that some commanders failed to display an independent approach in appraising the situation. They tried to adhere to the views of their superiors and this doomed them to passivity in the conduct of military operations. In the main, however, al-



though the general strategic initiative was with the Nazi army in the early period of the war, the Soviet forces fighting on certain sectors of the front seized the tactical and even operational initiative. Displaying unprecedented endurance, heroism and selflessness and exhibiting a creative approach to the solution of the most difficult problems in the first period of the war, Soviet forces would undertake counterattacks to force their will on the enemy and foil his plans. All the defensive battles the Soviet forces fought in that period were characterised by staying power, creative activity, inventiveness and resourcefulness of the men.

The actions of an infantry division commander in 1941 provide a case in point. The army commander had ordered two divisions to seize a strongly fortified enemy locality near Mikhailov. One division was delayed on the march. Seeing that the enemy did not expect the Soviet attack, the commander of the other division decided not to wait for his colleague. Taking into account his advantageous positions and the enemy's unpreparedness for night action in a fierce blizzard, the divisional commander decided to launch a surprise attack.

The lack of contact with the superior commander and the commander of the cooperating formation could have prompted the divisional commander to wait. But the circumstances called for independent initiative in action not foreseen by the superior commander but designed for the fulfilment of his order. Preparation for and execution of night action called for a new approach to artillery support and the employment of all forces and means available. The intention of the action prompted the officers and men to exhibit resourcefulness, mobilised them to act independently in surmounting the difficulties they faced.

The enemy strong point was taken in a brilliant night assault. The Soviet division killed over 500 Nazi officers and men and captured the documentation of three regiments of a motorised infantry division, and a lot of equipment. The Soviet losses were negligible. If the division commander had let slip the favourable moment, he would have had to carry out the mission by means of a prolonged assault involving heavy losses. Though the divisional commander departed in part from the initial plan, he carried out the orders with better results.

Initiative is not an advantage secured once and for all by one side, even the attacker. It may pass over from one side to another. The history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany fully corroborates this thesis. The Soviet Army had to fight

hard for nearly two years before it wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy. The decisive phases in this war were the great battles at Moscow and Stalingrad. Later, having routed a very big grouping of Nazi forces on the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet Armed Forces firmly held the initiative till the end of the war.

To wrest the strategic initiative from the enemy in the course of the war the Soviet Union had to strain its economic potential and mobilised its moral strength, and also the combat capabilities of its army. The concept of every engagement, battle and operation had to be imbued with the spirit of activity and creativity. Experience accumulated over a period of many years has shown that victory is largely dependent on the ability of the commanders to devise new methods in using manpower and weapons, to adopt original decisions, to avoid standard methods and their repetition, to make use of new combinations and new manoeuvres. The way the Soviet forces organised and executed their offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War was a graphic illustration of this. Among other things the Soviet Command exhibited a creative approach by its flexibility in altering battle formations according to the character of the enemy defences. In 1942 the most effective combat formations from platoon to division were single-echelon formations (in attacks on single-line strong point enemy dispositions). In 1943 the Soviet Command had to employ multi-echelon combat formations, because the Nazi forces switched over to multi-zone defence dispositions with uninterrupted systems of trenches.

Creative command thinking produced new methods of using artillery in offensive operations. In 1942 the artillery offensive was devised as a new method of combat support for attacking infantry and tanks. In supporting the attackers the artillery would put up before them a barrage up to a depth of 1.5 kilometres. In 1944-1945 the Soviet forces frequently went into the attack following a double barrage to a depth of 2-2.5 kilometres.

It should be mentioned that the very character of war and the laws governing it call for a creative approach to organisation of battle and its control. In the course of military operations the Soviet side made broad use of deception of the enemy. In actual fact this is a concrete manifestation of creativity in one combat situation or another. Thus, in the Berlin operation to secure the element of surprise the Soviet forces resorted to a totally unexpected method. First the enemy was confused by a reconnaissance in force: he thought it was the beginning

of the attack. But the main surprise was still to come. In his memoirs Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov wrote:

"During the war the enemy became accustomed to our artillery barrages starting normally in the morning, because infantry and tank assaults were confined to daylight. That was why he did not expect a night assault. We decided to take advantage of this."

When it was still dark, the Soviet side carried out powerful 30 minute artillery bombardment. After that 400 powerful searchlights at a distance of 200 metres from one another flooded the battlefield with light. The infantry and tanks went into the assault and captured the forward defence zone. This was a totally new method for achieving tactical and operational surprise, and it ensured success.

As the Soviet Armed Forces develop in the postwar period the personnel display creative initiative in various ways and forms. Today initiative and creative approach play a far more important role in warfare. This is conditioned by the increasingly rigorous requirements of combat readiness of the forces, by scientific and technological progress, the extensive introduction of scientific achievements into army practice and changes in the character of modern warfare.

In keeping with the requirements of the Oath of Allegiance, laws and military regulations the Soviet serviceman must exhibit reasonable initiative in pursuit of his duty, daily obligations, combat training missions, servicing and use of weapons and other equipment and the fulfilment of orders received from his superiors. Commanders and superiors are required to support and encourage initiative displayed by their subordinates and to rely on the experience and abilities of the latter.

The scientific and technological revolution is increasingly affecting the improvement of weaponry and other combat equipment. It has set the personnel the task of primary importance of mastering this weaponry and finding the most effective ways for its combat employment. New equipment and weapons present much higher requirements to those in charge of them. Creative thinking, profound and versatile knowledge, excellent professional training, and high cultural standards are now essential conditions for effective employment of the new technical facilities.

Modern combat is characterised by such features as the employment of new weapons, special methods in the conduct of military operations, high speed of development of operations, frequent and sharp changes in the situa-

tion, rapid appearance of critical situations and of new missions and the need to switch over quickly from one form of action to another. As a result, officers and men must exhibit intellectual mobility, independence and resolve. An officer will be unable to effect control over a subunit, unit or formation, unless he has developed such qualities.

The very mode of life and work in the Soviet Army and Navy and purposeful educational effort develop creative thinking in commanders and initiative in all servicemen. One way of developing creative thinking and initiative in servicemen is to give them the necessary freedom in choice of methods for fulfilling the mission assigned. In the process of combat training and especially during exercises and manoeuvres it is necessary to devise a difficult, really critical situation, when unexpected narratives require the personnel to strain their mental and physical faculties to the extreme. The employment of unexpected tactical methods, such as altering the direction of the main effort, complicating the work of the commander in troop control, etc. plays a big role in this.

The military theorists of imperialist armies have expressed highly contradictory views on initiative and creativity. They vigorously promote the idea of the "robot soldier." They say that a soldier need not develop any ability for independent creative action or display initiative. Other authors, on the contrary, argue that such activity is necessary. But they deplore the "passive nature" of people and their unwillingness to display enthusiasm and initiative in acute situations.

The diverse views on the problem are conditioned by the sharp contradiction between the need for soldiers with initiative (which stems from the character of modern warfare) and the limited possibilities offered by capitalist society for moulding such qualities in servicemen. As V. I. Lenin put it, you cannot lead men to predatory war and hope that they will display enthusiasm.

Among the fundamental distinguishing features of the Soviet Armed Forces as armed forces of a new type, initiative and creativity of personnel occupy a prominent place. An army which is a product of revolution and of the creative effort of the masses embodies in maximum degree revolutionary spirit, enthusiasm, daring, creative approach and initiative of officers and men. The varied character of the combat creativity of the masses and the initiative of the commanders are vital factors contributing to the combat capability and combat readiness of the forces.

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## COMBAT TRAINING: METHODS OF ACHIEVING SURPRISE REVIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 15-17

[Article by Maj Gen L. Korzun, Cand, Sc. (Military): "Achieving Surprise"]

[Text]

Surprise in warfare means actions unexpected by the enemy and directed at achieving success in battles, operations and the war as a whole. Surprise consists in choosing the time, ways and methods of combat actions which make it possible to strike a blow at the enemy when he least of all is ready to beat it off and thus to paralyse his will for organised resistance.

While paying great attention to the surprise factor, Soviet military art, at the same time, never made a fetish of it. It considers that to achieve victory in military operations, besides surprise it is necessary to observe other most important principles of military art, to take into account the real correlation of forces of the sides and all other elements of the situation when defining purposes and tasks of combat operations; to make competent choice of the direction of the main blow (concentration of the main effort in the defensive) and create the necessary superiority in manpower and equipment; to provide cooperation, activity and persistence in achieving the set aims, etc.

It is characteristic of bourgeois military art, particularly the strategy of the imperialist aggressors, to overestimate the role and possibilities of surprise in achieving victory in war. We know that when they unleashed war Hitlerite Germany and imperialist Japan staked on the surprise element. This promoted success to a considerable extent in operations against enemies known to be weaker. Success was also achieved in the beginning of the war against a stronger enemy as in the case of Nazi Germany's perfidious attack on the Soviet Union in summer of 1941 or when Japan delivered a surprise blow at Pearl Harbour in December 1941. But this success was a temporary one. Germany and Japan not only did not achieve their aims, they suffered the severest defeats in their history because the aims set by the ag-

gressor were not backed by economic, political and military potentials.

The Israeli aggressors when attacking the Arab states also staked on surprise. And they scored definite successes. But these successes were due, first of all, to the insufficient combat readiness of the armed forces of the states — victims of the aggression and to serious miscalculations in the use of the armed forces and control over them.

When preparing for new aggressive wars, the political and military leadership of the imperialist states attach particularly great significance to achieving a surprise attack. Works of bourgeois military theorists and official documents, manuals and instructions of the armies of the USA and other NATO member-countries emphasise that the surprise element must be used always and everywhere, whenever and wherever possible. Particular stress here is laid on surprise use of the nuclear weapon.

It is but natural that under such conditions extremely great vigilance and constant combat readiness of the armed forces are required of all states, threatened by imperialist aggressors. D. F. Ustinov, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU, Minister of Defence of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, pointed out: "The importance of high combat readiness has particularly increased nowadays when the development of nuclear-missile weapons and other powerful striking means create a real danger of their sudden use by the enemy."

Depending on the scale of combat operations, the character and content of missions and the results achieved, surprise may be strategical, operational and tactical. During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Armed Forces demonstrated many brilliant examples of achieving strategical, operational and tactical surprise.

Complete strategic surprise was achieved in the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and in the Byelorussian operation which exerted a decisive influence on the course of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). In these and other strategic operations the enemy was completely misled as to the real intentions of the Soviet Supreme Command GHQ, the direction, time of delivery and scales of blows.

Naturally, examples of achieving operational, and more so, tactical surprise were far more numerous.

It goes without saying that the achievement of strategic, operational and tactical surprise has its own peculiarities. But there are ways common to all of them though they differ from one another in scale as well as in the character and content of the measures carried out, and in the peculiarities of their organisation and realisation.

The main ways of achieving a surprise include: keeping the intentions of forthcoming actions secret and misleading the enemy as regards one's plans; sudden use of new means of warfare or methods of action by the forces; choice of the direction of the main blow (concentration of the main effort in defences) and of the time of launching the offensive or delivering counterblows (counterattacks) so that they are unexpected for the enemy; skilful utilisation of the peculiarities of the terrain, time and weather; high speed of operations; broad use of manoeuvre, etc.

Let us deal at length with these factors in achieving surprise.

Keeping the intentions of forthcoming actions secret and misleading the enemy in respect of one's own planned actions were distinctive features of all large-scale operations of the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War. For example, the launching of the counter-offensive by the Soviet forces at Moscow in December 1941 and at Stalingrad in November 1942 were a complete surprise for the Nazi Command. Other offensive operations also took the enemy completely by surprise.

This was achieved thanks to the fact that only a limited number of men were informed of the intention of the forthcoming actions. The same applied during the planning of operations. Only those officers and generals who according to their functional duties were to know this were successively called in for the elaboration of plans. And they were acquainted with the intentions only to the extent necessary for them to carry out their duties. It was absolutely forbidden to talk about the actions planned through technical means of communication. The planning documents were worked out, as a rule, by hand in one copy.

Particular attention was paid to ensuring surprise regroupings and concentrations of forces. All regroupings were mainly carried out at night with strict observance of camouflage measures. Large forests and various natural covers were used for the concentration of troops. Redeployment of the 1st Guards Tank Army on the

Rava-Russkaya direction late in June 1944, during preparations for the Lvov-Sandomir operation, is a case in point. Tanks and other heavy equipment were transported by rail while the bulk of the motor-transport with personnel carried out a march. Marches were performed with observance of all camouflage rules. The regrouping took place at a distance of nearly 100 km from the forward line. The new concentration area was located at approximately the same distance. In order to mislead the enemy several tank subunits and a small quantity of radio equipment were left in the old area. The tankmen continued field exercises while radio equipment maintained radio communication as before. All these measures made it possible to keep the Nazis in the dark as to the regrouping of the tank army and the creation of a strike grouping on the Rava-Russkaya line of advance.

So as to achieve surprise in operations of the Great Patriotic War, active operations against the enemy air, ground reconnaissance and secret service were carried out and there was a whole complex of measures to misinform the enemy. But special emphasis was laid on camouflage.

In contemporary conditions the possibilities of all kinds of reconnaissance with the use of new technical means have substantially increased. Therefore skill in misleading the enemy as to the true intentions acquires still greater significance.

Combat experience shows that the use of new weapons or new methods of action by the forces have proved very effective for achieving surprise. The first use of the Soviet field rocket mortars and the Il-2 attack planes during the Great Patriotic War was convincing proof of this. A salvo by Captain Flyorov's single battery of only 5 BM-13 rocket mortars on July 14, 1941, inflicted heavy losses on the Hitlerites and raised panic among them.

However, entirely new weapons and combat equipment do not appear very often. More often new ways and methods of the operations by the forces can be used. It is widely known what an important role was played by the powerful artillery counterbombardment carried out on July 5, 1943, on the Central Front in frustrating the plans for a Nazi offensive on the Kursk Bulge. It was a complete surprise for the Nazi Command and forced them to postpone the beginning of the offensive for several hours.



During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet forces frequently practised reconnaissance in force. It was carried out a day or two before the offensive. The Hitlerites got fairly used to such tactics. But in some operations, in Lyublin-Brest operation in July 1944, for example, the forces of the 8th Guards Army carried out a reconnaissance in force only 2 hours before the beginning of the offensive by the army's main forces. After a short, but sudden and powerful artillery attack the subunits carrying out a reconnaissance in force captured the Nazi FEBA. Exploiting their success the main forces of the army passed over to the offensive and during the

very first day of the operation broke through the first enemy defence zone and in some sectors penetrated the second defence zone.

Commanders' initiative, their ability to assess the situation quickly and correctly, to use an enemy blunder to their own advantage, to deliver a blow at the right time and to exploit success was of particularly great significance in using methods of action which were unexpected for the enemy. In the Vitebsk-Orsha operation on June 23, 1944, Major Fyodorov, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 61st Guards Infantry Regiment, 39th Army, established during the artillery preparation that the Germans had begun to withdraw from the first trench. When only 30 minutes remained before the end of the artillery bombardment he launched his battalion into the attack and immediately reported his decision to the regimental commander. On receiving this knowledge, the army commander ordered the artillery bombardment to be stopped and gave the attack signal to all divisions of the 5th Guards Infantry Corps. The infantry units with the support of tanks and self-propelled guns and artillery fire captured the first and second enemy trenches on the move and began to press home the attack in the depth of his defences without stopping.

During the last war false shifts of fire during artillery bombardments, various diversionary actions, ambushes, etc. were frequently used.

Choice of a direction of the main blow and time of launching the offensive which are unexpected for the enemy is one of the most important means for achieving surprise. L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, vividly showed in his book "Malaya Zemlya" (Small Land) what an important role this factor played in the Novorossiisk operation. He wrote: "A special feature of our tactics was flexibility.

One of the reasons why we decided to break the enemy's lines of defence right at Novorossiisk was the surprise factor."

In the Byelorussian operation of 1944 the enemy was misled as to the real direction of the main strategical blow. By skillfully organised and accurately carried out

misinformation measures with simultaneous camouflage the Soviet Command managed to convince the Nazi High Command that in the summer of 1944 the Soviet Army would deliver the main blow in the direction of Balkans. Therefore the very beginning of the operation, the directions of the fronts' blows and its real scale turned out to be a complete surprise for the enemy.

For the time of launching an offensive to be a surprise for the enemy it is very important to know not only his composition and grouping but also how he is behaving on the given sector of the front, the peculiarities of his combat actions and even the psychology of the Command. All these factors were taken into consideration when breaking through the Leningrad blockade in January 1943. The Soviet forces assumed the assault position on the night of January 10. In the night of January 11 powerful air blows were struck at the enemy control points and artillery fire positions. The Hitlerites expected the offensive at dawn. But dawn passed and the Soviet forces did not display any activity. And when the enemy had completely regained calm at 0930 hrs on January 12, a powerful artillery and air bombardment of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began. The preparation proper and the blow of infantry formations that followed it were a complete surprise for the enemy.

Very frequently the Soviet forces, particularly mechanised and tank units and formations passed over to the offensive from the move, advancing from the departure areas or directly from the march. Such a passing over to the offensive was unexpected for the enemy.

Other factors such as peculiarities of the terrain, weather, time of day, combat actions by night, high speed of advance, skilful manoeuvre with manpower and equipment were also used to achieve surprise.

Of no small importance were also effective measures against enemy reconnaissance.

In modern conditions the possibilities of achieving surprise in combat have undoubtedly changed considerably. Much depends on the skill of commanders and staffs. Therefore a profound study of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and its further creative development are of both theoretical and practical importance.

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## COMBAT TRAINING: DEVELOPMENT OF OFFENSIVE TACTICS REVIEWED

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[Article, based on "experience of the Great Patriotic War," by Col A. Sidorenko: "Development of the Tactics of Offensive Battle"]

[Text]

**O**ffensive battle during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) was the main type of combat actions of the Soviet Armed Forces. The complete rout of the enemy and the liberation of the territory seized by him was achieved only by decisive offensive. The tactics of offensive battle and the most effective methods of routing the enemy were developed in the course of the war.

The breakthrough of enemy defences at high speed was an important problem. After the defeat at Stalingrad the Nazi forces changed over to deep-echeloned positional defences. The main defence line 4-6 km deep and the 2nd defence line 2-3 km deep were usually organised 8-10 km from the forward edge. These two lines made up the so-called tactical defence zone. Up to 80 per cent of all forces and weapons of formations in defence were concentrated there.

To break through such defences it was necessary to reliably neutralise the enemy by fire, deliver a powerful first blow at him and accumulate efforts in time and quickly develop the tactical success into operational.

During the war the system of fire strikes at the enemy was continu-

ously improved. Tactical densities of artillery on breakthrough sectors were increased. For example, from 40-70 guns and mortars per 1 km of frontage in 1942 they increased up to 200-250 and more in 1944-45. The depth of a simultaneous neutralisation of enemy defences increased from 1.5-2 km to 8-12 km, the power and effectiveness of a fire blow during artillery bombardments and air raids became greater. From the counteroffensive at Kursk onwards, the main method of an artillery support of infantry and tanks in the offensive was a single and since summer 1944 a double fire barrage in combination with subsequent concentration of fire. The depth of an artillery support increased from 1-1.5 km to 3-4 km and more by the end of war, which practically secured continuous support of advancing troops in the entire depth of the 1st and partially 2nd main enemy defensive zones. The aviation passed over from episodic to continuous support of troops in the course of the offensive.

The increased effectiveness of fire against the enemy directly influenced the rates of advance. In the Orul operation in 1943 the 11th Guards

Infantry Division of the 11th Guards Army broke through the main zone of heavy positional enemy defences by the first day of the offensive though their depth was double that at Moscow and the saturation with fire weapons far greater. This was to a considerable degree due to the fact that the offensive was preceded by a powerful artillery bombardment and an air raid lasting two hours 40 minutes. Fire density was 200 guns and mortars per 1 km of frontage. Support of the attack was carried out in the form of a fire barrage and air raids.

Following the neutralisation of the enemy in the tactical defence zone by fire a powerful blow by infantry and tanks was dealt. This was secured by a decisive massing of forces and weapons on narrow breakthrough sectors, skilful formation of battle orders of forces, thorough preparation of departure areas, sudden passing over to the offensive, close combination of fire and movement of the troops.

In the Battle of Moscow in 1941 divisions' zones of offensive were 6-10 km wide, forces and weapons were distributed evenly. This made it impossible to deliver a powerful

first blow. From 1942 onwards divisions in the main directions were given more narrow zones of advance and breakthrough sectors. In the counteroffensive at Kursk they were 2-3 km and in the operations of 1944-45 usually 1.5-2.5 km. This made it possible to create greater densities of forces and weapons, achieve a decisive superiority over the enemy and break through his defences at high rates. The depth of a combat mission increased from 4-6 km in 1942 to 15 km and more in 1944-45. From summer 1943 onwards the division's combat mission was subdivided into initial, next and day missions. This made it easier to organise cooperation and increased reliability of troop control.

Battle orders of forces were also considerably changed. The experience of combat actions in the first period of the war proved that the echelonment of troops when enemy defences, consisting of centres of resistance, were not deep, deprived the advancing troops of the possibility to use a considerable part of the infantry fire weapons while attacking the forward edge, led to unnecessary losses and hindered troop control. Battle orders, therefore, in 1942 from an infantry company to a division began to be formed in one echelon with the reserves. But when in 1943 the Nazi army changed over to deeper positional defence, there appeared a possibility of switching over to a deeper battle order which could ensure not only delivering a powerful blow while attacking, but also a continuous accumulation of efforts in the course of the breakthrough. In units and formations, therefore, second and sometimes third echelons again began to be formed. One-echelon formation was also used. In 1944 instead of artillery groups formed according to the missions assigned there began transition to artillery groups based on the organisational-tactical principle—regimental, divisional and corps. Artillery-antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments became more powerful.

In general, the experience of the war proved that there should be no stereotyping in the forms of battle orders. Consideration must be given to all-sided assessment of the concrete situation, the concept and missions of the forthcoming battle.

The increase of densities and perfection of methods of combat employment of tanks in close support of the infantry played an important role in delivering a powerful first blow. With the increase in production of tanks, their density from 3-12 per 1 km of frontage in 1941-42 was increased to 30 and more by the end of the war. From 1944 onwards tanks were directly attached to infantry regiments and then to battalions which secured their closer cooperation with the infantry. On the main lines of advance tanks were employed massively.

A decisive concentration of efforts on the main line of advance, coordinated actions of infantry and tanks with powerful artillery and aviation support made it possible to break through fortified enemy defences. But already in the course of fighting for the 2nd and especially for the 3rd position the enemy's resistance increased. In these conditions success was mainly determined by timely accumulation of efforts by committing to action second echelons of regiments, divisions and corps. To complete the breakthrough of the main and second tactical zones of defences tank corps and armies making up mobile groups of armies or fronts, were often committed to action partially or in full.

The perfecting of the tactics of offensive battle was an important factor in increasing breakthrough rates. If in 1941-42 they were 2-2.5 km a day, in 1944-45, despite the strengthening of enemy defences, they were already 8-16 km a day. In some operations (Byelorussian,

Jassy-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder) the entire tactical zone of enemy defences was broken through on the first day of the offensive.

After the breakthrough formations and units passed over to decisive pursuit of the enemy, fought fierce meeting engagements with his re-

serves being moved up, forced various water obstacles on the move, encircled and annihilated enemy groupings. During the advance in the depth of the enemy defences advance detachments were widely employed; they occupied the enemy's withdrawal routes, seized certain stated objectives, in the first place crossings and road junctions, forestalled the enemy in seizing advantageous lines and, in most cases, overcame them on the move.

The victory in offensive battle was achieved by combined efforts of all fighting arms. Therefore, unabating attention was paid to organisation and maintenance of close cooperation and its forms and methods were constantly improved. At the beginning of war not all commanders and staffs could successfully cope with this task. Sometimes commanders limited themselves only to assigning missions to units and subunits. And they did that not on the terrain but on maps in headquarters. The missions for attached and supporting units were sometimes assigned without sufficient knowledge and assessment of their combat capabilities. Control posts were equipped at a considerable distance from the troops. Commanders of the supporting and attached units had their CP-OPs separate from those of combined-arms commanders.

As experience was gained all these shortcomings were got rid of. Combat missions were assigned to forces taking into consideration their combat capabilities, the character of enemy defences, his grouping, presumed strength of counteraction, terrain conditions. The plan of a forthcoming battle was thoroughly

worked out on maps or terrain mock-ups reproducing the enemy defences. Cooperation was organised, as a rule, on the terrain and in the entire depth of the day mission.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War in the tactics of offensive battle has in the main retained its meaning in modern conditions too. The breakthrough of enemy defences today also remains the main problem and the basic ways of its solution are reliable fire neutralisation of the enemy in the entire depth of his defences, delivering of a powerful first blow, timely accumulation of efforts, quick development of tactical success into operational.

Despite big, radical changes in armaments and technological equipment of forces in recent years, the massing of forces and weapons on breakthrough sectors to create a decisive superiority over the enemy and deal a powerful blow at him is still a most important condition for achieving success in an offensive battle. The effective form of massive fire destruction of the enemy by artillery and air attacks, worked out during the war is worthy of close attention. The principles of surprise actions in battle, close combination of fire and movement, wide manoeuvring with forces and weapons, deep echelonment of battle orders, maintenance of high rates of advance by timely commitment to action of second echelons and reserves and forestalling the enemy in accumulation of efforts in the directions where a success can be achieved, retain their importance.

The combined-arms character of offensive battle in modern conditions is more clear-cut than during the Second World War. Therefore, the experience of organising and maintaining of cooperation, coordinated efforts of the different fighting

arms and weapons while fulfilling combat missions, as also continuity and stability of troop control find a wide usage in the combat training of troops.

The rich combat experience acquired by the Soviet forces in the difficult and long war is a priceless achievement and an inexhaustible source of further development of Soviet military science. Profound study, creative mastering and implementation of this experience, taking into consideration the high level of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and their technological equipment, is one of most important means of improving the quality of training of command cadres and combat readiness.

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## NAVAL TRAINING: CONDUCT OF SEA EXERCISES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 22-23

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Germanovich: "Sea Exercises"]

[Text] A tactical exercise is the concluding stage of a definite training period of a ship or group of ships, at which the skill of the personnel, the achieved level of combat readiness and quality of combat training are checked. For exercises to meet these aims they must be thoroughly prepared. Irrespective of the scale and composition of the forces participating in them, new questions in tactics and method and in mastering of ships, weapons and equipment are worked up.

How must a commander prepare an exercise so that it will be most useful and help the ship's crew to ascend one more rung in military skill?

The volume of demands and measures to be carried out while preparing exercises are indicated in the corresponding official instructions. This article will deal with only some questions affecting most of all the efficiency of combat training.

The first and perhaps one of the main points in preparation of exercises is correct definition of their purposes and clear wording of the desired final results.

If the purpose of exercise is formulated exactly and concretely this gives the possibility to check one

or two training elements thoroughly, to concentrate the effort on the main questions and to ensure that they are completely mastered. The task of the exercise director is to carry out the planned exercise so that it will produce certain quantitative indices providing a basis for analysis of the results achieved.

As a result of the analysis it is important to get an answer to a question: To what extent has the

training standard been raised and what is the level of training achieved by the crew?

The second to which serious attention must be paid in planning is correct and complete definition of the conditions best calculated to secure achievement of the aims set. These include a whole complex of elements. Assuming that the purpose of the exercise is to check the readiness of ships' crews to search for a submarine in an extensive region, the conditions making it possible to estimate the level of their skill will be: size of the area, its geographical peculiarities (depth, current, nature of the bottom), hydrometeorological characteristic, weather, time of the day, type of submarine designated as the "enemy," the elements of its movement at different stages of the



exercise, character of manoeuvres, permissible (depending on the level of the crew's training) activity of operations, use of weapons, etc.

Measures for securing secrecy of the sides' preparations and mutual safety of the forces, and a situation in which the exercise director will be able, when necessary, to interfere in the course of the exercise are also included in these conditions.

If the purpose of the exercise is to determine the possibilities of weapons and equipment, then besides a real tactical situation conditions must also be envisaged allowing accurate fixation of the concrete parameters of the equipment to be checked.

In defining the purpose of the exercise and the conditions in which it will be carried out the command proceeds from the concrete results to be obtained by its completion so

as on their basis to analyse the results correctly, draw conclusions and make recommendations.

Finally, about preparation for the exercise. First of all it is necessary to establish exactly what measures are to be carried out separately with the personnel and the officers prior to the exercise, what is to be worked up on trainers, in study rooms. And though the relevant documents and rules on combat training deal with this each exercise has its peculiarities which it is important to take into consideration. These include the training of the supporting forces, installation on the ships of additional means of collecting information, receiving of ammunition, material and technical supply, etc.

Analysis of the results of the exercise and the critique with the participants are also of paramount importance.

The main shortcoming of some exercises is that their results are not thoroughly analysed. But it is the

analysis of the results that makes it possible to estimate the exercise objectively and to ascertain what new contribution it has made to enhancing combat readiness and training of the personnel; whether some tactical method is worth adopting; whether the combat skill of the crew or combat station been raised, which tactical conditions of battle are most advantageous for the ship. Statistical data and previously acquired experience are used for this analysis so that the conclusions are grounded and comparable with the results obtained.

Without analysis there won't be any qualitative critique of the exercises. External impressions and speculative judgements do not always prove to be objective and correct. Nor do assessments based only on observation always correspond to the actual state of affairs. This may lead in the future to shortcomings in planning, to assigning missions which the ship cannot fulfil. The benefit of a thorough objective analysis is that valuable quantitative data

accumulated, being worked up by methods of the mathematical statistics, make it possible to draw deeper conclusions about the methods of enhancing effectiveness of the ways of combat use of a ship, about the necessity to perfect armament and equipment, about changes in methodical regulations and maintenance rules.

Naturally, analysis of the results and conclusions is the main material for critique and one of the most important and effective elements of combat training.

When an exercise is over and the critique carried out, bringing to light all the strong and weak points, the important thing is to generalise all the new elements brought out and to spread the positive experience. Commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol organisations see to it that the results of the

exercises are made known to all ships and in the case of the large tactical measures (the most important themes) to other fleets. With this aim the results, conclusions and recommendations on the exercises are sent to the sister-ships and formations. Without waiting for special instructions the ships' commanding officers independently regularly inform each other of the most important and resultative innovations.

In conclusion it must be said that the striving to carry out a maximum number of exercises does not justify itself. It is the quality, not the quantity which is important here. When exercises alternate too often conditions cannot be provided for thorough preparation for them and therefore they may be merely formal.

All-round preparation of tactical exercises, analysis, generalisation and adoption of advanced experience in the practice of combat training is the most important condition for enhancing its quality and effectiveness and therefore for increasing combat efficiency of ships and formations as a whole.

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## AIR DEFENSE: MISSILE BATTALION TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 24-25

[Article by Col V. Garnov: "Fighting High Speed Targets"]

[Text] According to the concept of the forthcoming exercise, of which only umpires and senior commanders had been informed, the subunit was to engage the "enemy" immediately after its arrival at the firing range. The missilemen had no sooner arrived than they were signalled to be on the alert. Soon the command "Action!" followed.

The crews of the missile battalion quickly took their action stations. They checked the condition of the equipment and adjusted all the systems for operation within optimum tolerances. A radio-controlled target which appeared all of a sudden was detected by the missilemen in good time. Still there was a moment when the target made a manoeuvre and its blip disappeared from the screen.

The seconds seemed to pass more slowly than usual. The crew reckoned that at that moment the target was moving towards the defended objective at low altitude. All were waiting for its blip to appear on the screen again. At last the firing officer saw it on the limb of the remote plan position indicator (PPI). The guidance-control officer was immediately ordered to begin target search. In a few seconds the target was detected. It was travelling at

low altitude and high speed. The next moment it was crosshairs by the electronic sights.

To begin automatic tracking as soon as a target has been detected is a complicated task involving a

certain risk. However, thanks to his experience and intuition and largely due to his confidence in the high combat capabilities of the AA guided missile system, the guidance-control officer could make a daring and correct decision under the circumstances. He set the switch at the automatic tracking position and immediately reported the target parameters to the commander. The command "Launch!" ensued... The target was destroyed.

It was not by mere chance that the missilemen scored a success. It was the result of strenuous daily training and an original approach to solving the problems of training and educating all specialists. In this connection the commander's ability to concentrate on what is most important when training his subordinates should be stressed. Thus, he conducted tactical and special training to help the missilemen master the sequence of actions when dealing with low flying and surprise targets. As a result the trainees' knowledge was deepened and their skill improved.

When the missilemen were working up the technique of fighting low altitude and surprise targets the battalion command directed its efforts at convincing them of their ability to destroy this type of targets in any situation. The missilemen worked on trainers to polish up the technique of repulsing attacks of "enemy" aircraft performing course and vertical manoeuvres.

A military-theoretical conference held in the unit allowed the leading specialists to exchange their experience, which was beneficial especially for firing officers, guidance-control officers and manual tracking operators.

Wide use of trainers facilitated the problem of keeping combat equipment in perfect condition throughout the period of its service life, while simulating combat situation and combining it with reality enabled the trainees to realise more fully the specifics of real battle and prepare for it psychologically.

At this conference it was suggested to equip the CP with one more PPI since the use of two indicators (one connected to the recce radar and the other to the nearest radar station) would considerably increase the flow of information. Then the firing officer would receive information from the remote PPI and his assistant from the other.

Tactical exercises with field firing proved that success in fulfilling a combat mission depends to a large degree on whether the data on the air situation is exhaustive, authentic and supplied in good time. Besides radar and other technical equipment the CP used other channels to obtain the information necessary to repulse "enemy" air attacks. The CP was also provided with a special illuminated panel on which all targets detected were shown. The azimuths of these targets were transmitted by selsyns

to a pointer instrument. The battalion innovators fitted the CP with a special information device which helped the commander to estimate the situation better, adopt the optimum decision and determine the angle of overlap for the relevant target altitude. Assume target altitude as equal to 500 m. The illuminated columns of the device indicate the angle of overlap at the given target altitude for each crew. This makes it much easier for the commander to choose the appropriate crew for firing at the target.

The missilemen used one more innovation which allowed them to do without selectors. Whenever the radio operator was informed that a low altitude target had appeared he cut in a tumbler switch to light up the inscription: "Attention! Low Altitude Target!"

In working out an exercise plan the battalion commander makes it his aim to check the CP crew's readiness to cope with the set mission. For this purpose he thinks up beforehand new narratives introducing abundant new elements. This helps the servicemen to improve their tactical knowledge and raise their vigilance. At each training period the commander introduces narratives taking into account the common mistakes made by his subordinates during the previous exercise in order to eliminate them.

In the battalion much attention is paid to the firing officer's training since the outcome of a battle largely depends on his professional skill. In a complicated combat situation a firing officer has to operate in a strictly limited time. This means that in his haste he may easily violate the sequence of his actions. To avoid this, the innovators produced a device showing the operations priority on the illuminated panel. Thus the firing officer can control his actions.

The missilemen acquire professional and psychological steeling dur-


ing complex exercises when they train in carrying out their tasks in full scope. As a result the missile battalion specialists (firing officers, guidance-control officers and operators)

develop the ability to act independently when detecting targets and to change over quickly to a new source of information whenever necessary.

The results of the exercise with field firing showed that the missilemen were proficient in tactics and possessed high firing skill and lofty moral qualities.



The commander assigning a mission to missilemen



Routine training of the men of a launching battery proceeds with precision and rhythm. The missilemen have arrived at the assigned area.

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## AIR FORCE: TACTICAL TRAINING OF PILOTS DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 26-27

[Article by Maj Gen Avn N. Prikhodchenko, Military Pilot 1st Class: "Pilot's Other Weapon"]

[Text]

**A**t the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 the Nazi hordes were thrown back hundreds of kilometres from Moscow. The Hitlerites regrouped their forces and brought in reserves, building up reserves of combat equipment, ammunition and fuel.

They set up a large concentration centre of supplies and technical equipment near the town of Staraya Russa. An air unit under Lieutenant-Colonel Savchenko was given the mission to destroy this ground target disclosed by reconnaissance.

This was no easy task. All the installations of the concentration centre were well camouflaged and protected by heavy AA fire. The mission was assigned to the regiment's most experienced pilots headed by the commander.

The sortie was thought out to the slightest details. The pilots' actions were thoroughly coordinated, all the duties distributed between the flying groups and the flight itself was rehearsed on the ground.

A diversionary group consisting of six Il-2 aircraft was headed by the commander. Flying at medium altitude, the attack planes appeared close to the target from the north to draw the enemy fire while the strike group was approaching the target from the rear in a low-level flight.

The attack was so unexpected that the enemy was unable to fire a single aimed shot. His camouflaged installations were pounded, the

flames of explosions rising to hundreds of metres. After destroying the enemy reserves the attack aircraft left the area without any losses.

The clear-cut tactical concept combined with the pilots' high moral qualities and flying skill allowed them to cope with this difficult task without a hitch. Tactical superiority over the enemy and skill in using various tactical methods are indispensable for success. The famous air ace, three times Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Pokryshkin wrote that one can have an excellent and well-armed machine, be strong physically, possess high flying technique, be a good shot and still fail to gain victory for lack of tactical skill.

Pilots' all-round training, above all tactical, including lectures, seminars, practical training, briefings and exercises, contribute substantially to develop their combat skill and the necessary qualities.

When drawing up tactical training plans much importance is attached to the appointment of instructors, who are usually selected from among commanders, their deputies and experienced pilots. When instructors are appointed, their personal qualities must be considered. For instance, officers selected as lecturers must have aptitudes for research and be able to analyse facts thoroughly. Besides being highly competent in his subject, such an officer must also be a good speaker capable of arousing the interest even of listeners with a rich flying experience.

In planning pilots' tactical training the correct sequence must be strictly observed. Ill-assorted topics or a change-over to a new theme before the previous one has been mastered lead to waste of time and give poor results in combat training.

Seminars in tactics, group exercises and tactical briefings are carried out to familiarise pilots with advanced experience and develop their tactical thinking. It is advisable to deal with a narrow range of questions pertaining to the subject studied so that the trainees can assimilate the material most effectively. Some topics likely to be of interest to the trainees are: "How to close in with the enemy unobserved and attack him," "Ways for the attacker who has been detected to manoeuvre in combat," "Specifics of individual low-altitude combat."

During operational and tactical group exercises each trainee discharges definite duties and works up questions of organisation, support and conduct of military operations. Before a tactical air exercise there are training periods to prepare pilots and staff workers to fulfil their combat missions and to develop in them operational and tactical thinking, the ability to assess the situation quickly, take competent decisions and exercise uninterrupted control.

While the purpose of group exercises is to train junior commanders and staff workers in organising and directing operations, tactical briefings are practised to work up separate elements and tactical methods. Such training is usually carried out before flights under the supervision of the immediate commanders or chiefs familiar with the individual qualities and abilities of their subordinates. Thereby attention is paid to mastering tactics planned to be used in the forthcoming flight.

When the airmen work on training facilities provided in special classrooms it is advisable to combine tactical training and practice in organising cooperation between pilots, air control officers and aircraft controllers.

Lectures, seminars, practical lessons and individual work are the essential forms of pilots' tactical training on the ground. In other words, theoretical training is interspersed with practical elements. Flights serve as a real school of pilots' practical training. When in the air a pilot has to apply different tactical methods either

occasionally or continuously throughout the whole flight. Of great importance are tactical air exercises when the airmen operate in conditions closely approaching real combat. During these exercises the pilots gain practical skill in searching for, attacking and destroying targets according to variants elaborated in advance.

They learn firing and bombing in different conditions. Commanders and staff do their best to make the utmost use of this kind of training to improve the pilots' knowledge of tactics.

The following instance may prove the importance of tactical air exercises. Being assigned the mission to destroy a ground target from a high altitude during an exercise, a fighter-bomber pilot decided to attack it at a pitch-up angle of 45°. Performing a previously calculated manoeuvre and going by the data received from the CP he flew straight to the attack point. However, when he seemed sure of a direct hit, the pilot found himself in conditions of poor visibility which deprived him of the possibility to attack the target from the preset altitude at the estimated range. Obeying commands from the ground to fly lower, the pilot concentrated on visual target search. The situation was still more aggravated by the necessity to carry out antilak manoeuvres.

All of a sudden the target came in sight at some distance off the pilot's course. Quickly performing a tactical manoeuvre which he had thought out in advance, the pilot made a bombing attack with great precision. He could hardly have done this if he had failed to foresee various ways to counteract the likely complications of the tactical or weather situation.

All this shows that a pilot must thoroughly prepare for his training flights in order to perform them successfully and improve his practical skill in tactics.

## WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT: THE KALASHNIKOV SUBMACHINE GUN

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 28-30

[Article by Col N. Yelshin: "A Famous Submachine Gun"]

[Text]

Today every draftee, let alone soldier, knows the name of designer Mikhail Kalashnikov. Back in 1949, however, the appearance of his name on the list of the USSR State Prize winners, 1st Degree, was a great surprise, even a sensation. "To Kalashnikov Mikhail Timofeyevich, senior sergeant, for developing a new type of armament," ran the decree. People read it and couldn't help being surprised. And it was surprising, indeed, for outstanding designers of weapons and combat equipment had high military ranks, scientific degrees and government awards, while Kalashnikov was only a noncom.

Before the forces received the new weapon, many conjectures and suppositions were made. But when the soldiers took the light, convenient and unusually looking submachine gun and tested it in action they understood that they had received a reliable weapon for fighting the enemy. Kalashnikov's submachine gun immediately brought fame to its maker and won indisputable acclaim in the forces.

Weapons are not produced by a brainwave: they are always a result of strenuous labour over many years, sometimes a whole lifetime. Although Kalashnikov's submachine gun was the best one from the very beginning and for a long time to come, his climb to the peaks of fame was not so dizzy as it might seem. The designer's road to recognition was neither easy nor short.

Kalashnikov was born sixty years ago, on November 10, 1919, in the village of Kurya, in the

Altai Mountains. After finishing secondary school he went to Alma Ata (Kazakhstan) to work as a railwayman. A year later he was drafted into the army. And it was in the army, namely in the tank driver-mechanics school, that his designer's abilities came to light.

Shortly before the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) broke out there was a competition for the best tank engine hourmeter. Mikhail Kalashnikov designed an instrument working on the principle of the tachometer (rpm counter). The instrument attracted the attention of the military district commander. The inventor was sent to a munitions works to finish his hourmeter and put it into production. But the Great Patriotic War prevented the implementation of this plan.

Kalashnikov began fighting as commander of the famous T-34 tank. In a battle for a height near Bryansk an armour-piercing projectile hit the tank's side. A deafening crash and excruciating pain struck Mikhail unconscious. When he came to, he realised that he had been hit in the shoulder.

Overcoming the pain, Kalashnikov remained at duty for several days more. He only went to the medical company when he felt very weak after an attack. The wound proved serious, and he was immediately taken to hospital.

The vehicle which carried the seriously wounded to the rear stopped at a village. Kalashnikov and another man went to reconnoitre and ran into an ambush. They rushed back to warn their comrades. Suddenly Mikhail saw a

scene which became imprinted in his memory for life: the hitlerites had driven the wounded from the vehicle and were beating them up; when the Soviet soldiers tried to fight back they were mowed down with submachine guns.

"If I only had a submachine gun," Kalashnikov thought, "the nazis would never have escaped the punishment they deserved."

Mikhail also remembered very well a wounded sapper at a hospital where he was taken after he had broken out of the encirclement.

"Have you seen Germans attacking? Have you? They press their guns against their bellies and fire. Try and come near then," the sapper said excitedly.

Yes, Kalashnikov had seen it. He also knew that we had submachine guns in our army, but very few of them. And the fighting men needed them so badly! Mikhail began working secretly on his submachine gun. He did not realise at the time what it would look like, but he knew that it was to be light, small-size, convenient to handle and reliable.

He read a lot of books on small arms and made hundreds of drawings, first at hospital and then in Alma Ata where he went on a six months leave for final recuperation. He worked doggedly to achieve his goal. In Alma Ata he was given the possibility to make a submachine gun at an enterprise in the city.

Then followed days of tedious waiting. Finally a letter with a merciless answer came. It said that Kalashnikov's weapon was not superior to those already in service. But this was not defeat, for the note attached to the letter said: "Comrade Kalashnikov, you must study and go on working; if you work with persistence you will undoubtedly produce something good." The note had been written by Academician A. A. Blagonravov, a prominent small-arms specialist.

Kalashnikov achieved his goal. On the firing range where he was posted after his leave he met many well-known Soviet small-arms specialists and took part in improving certain models of previously made arms. For instance, he submitted a draft of a self-loading carbine for a

new cartridge of 1943 model. Four copies of it were made, but the carbine made by Simonov, a more experienced designer, proved better.

All this time the senior sergeant had not given up the idea of a submachine gun of his own making. It had to be adapted not for a pistol cartridge, but for a more powerful one which had appeared during the war. Kalashnikov was faced with a difficult problem: what kind of automatic system to adopt? Should it be the old one, as in the PPSH and PPS submachine guns, where the lock returned to the initial position due to blow-back? But damping the blow-back using the new cartridge would entail a more massive lock and a larger receiver. And that meant an increase in the weapon's dimensions and weight. No, the old principle would not do. Something new was required. But what?

The question worried Kalashnikov. But eventually he found the way out: he would bypass some of the gases into the gas cylinder through an opening in the lock. The gases would press against the piston connected with the lock frame and the lock.

...Submachine gun bursts were rattling at the firing range. Bullets were flying at the screen, holing it in close groups and raising spouts of dust. The tests were still in progress, but everybody had realised that this was a victory.

The submachine gun successfully withstood the tests for durability, reliability and easy servicing. It was thrown on a cement floor and taken back to the firing line, submerged in a swamp — and again to the firing line, covered with dust and sand—and to the firing line again. The weapon did not let down its maker. It got the name: "Kalashnikov 7.62-mm submachine gun, 1947 model," abbreviated AK.

Kalashnikov's weapon combined to advantage the best qualities of a carbine and a submachine gun. The great sighting range (up to 1,000 m) allowed firing (both automatic and single-shot) at considerable distances. Combined with high practicable rate of fire (up to 100 shots per minute) this made it possible to concentrate fire from 800 metres. Its small size and weight (3.6 kg) and knife bayonet permitted successful use of the submachine gun in close combat.

Summing up experience in the use of different service weapons in Vietnam, the American "Newsweek" admitted that the Soviet-made short automatic carbine AK-47 proved more reliable than missiles and mortars, and far more reliable than the erratic American rifle M-16.

According to the magazine, the AK-47 was so good that the American soldiers who had been lucky to capture it continued to use it relying on captured ammunition.

No further comment is needed. But the designer himself did not think his work completed. A collective of designers under Kalashnikov created a number of small-arms models based on the AK. They are the modernised submachine gun AKM, light machine gun RPK and their AKMS and RPKS versions with collapsible butts, the more powerful PK and PKS machine guns, and also machine guns for tanks (PKT) and for armoured personnel carriers (PKB).

Thus, for the first time in world practice a whole series of standardised models of small arms, similar in principle and with a unified automatic system was designed and successfully tested.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government assessed the designer's effort at its true worth. Kalashnikov has been twice honoured with the title of Hero of Socialist Labour, he is a Lenin and State Prize winner and Doctor of Technology.

Besides the Order of the Red Star which he received for courage and heroism on the battlefield, he has been awarded three Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner of Labour and numerous medals. He has been repeatedly elected deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet and was a delegate to the 25th CPSU Congress.

Designer Kalashnikov is continuing his creative search to enhance the Soviet state's defence capability, giving this cause all his talent and sparing no effort.

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## MARINES: TASKS AND CAPABILITIES SUMMARIZED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 31-33

[Unattributed article: "From the Sea Into Battle"]

[Text]

The Marines... They were born during the Civil War when nearly 75,000 seamen were formed into detachments, battalions and brigades which were fighting the White Guard forces and foreign invaders on the land fronts.

During the Great Patriotic War the nazis called the Soviet Marines "Black Death."\* The Marines inscribed the brightest pages of valour and heroism in the annals of the selfless defence of the Hero Cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Odessa, Stalingrad, Novorossiisk and Kerch.

Modern Marines besides infantry include tank, artillery, engineer and other units. Landing as a tactical force the Marines are able independently, or when necessary with the support of special naval subunits, to capture islands, naval bases and ports, coastal aerodromes and also sectors of a sea coast.

In large-scale landings, including units and formations of the Land Forces, the Marines can operate as part of advance detachments or as the first echelon of an amphibious force, and when landing in ports—as assault detachments to capture beachheads.

The Marines are armed with amphibious tanks, APCs and IFVs and powerful means of fire support. Special landing ships are designed to deliver landing parties.

Our photo correspondent was present at an exercise including a landing of Marines and photographed episodes of the practice battle.

[photo caption]

The Marines — the main force of a sea landing party. For a Marine the battle begins before he sets foot on the beach. He must be a marksman and a good swimmer, physically steeled and resolute. In a word, a Marine is a fighting man of all-round skill

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\* As a rule, the Marines wore a black uniform.

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## GROUND FORCES: MOUNTAIN TRAINING EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 34-35

[Article by Sr Lt O. Falichev: "Flank Blow"]

[Text] When the second attack had petered out too it became clear that it was impossible to capture the pass by a frontal attack. The battalion CO decided to scale undetected with a subunit force a difficult height not controlled by the "enemy" and deliver a surprise blow from it at the flank.

He assigned this mission to the company of Senior Lieutenant Ablov.

**T**he company commander studied the terrain in the direction of movement and marked on the map the most difficult sectors of the route and well-observed reference points. The personnel prepared their weapons, storm-suits and other mountain equipment.

At the appointed time Ablov formed up the subunit. Many of the men were taking part in an exercise for the first time. "How will they make out?" the commander thought.

Ablov felt that this was the moment to give his men a special "off the record" talk.

And suddenly to his own surprise he said: "Today Private Kirilenko is 19 years of age. Let us wish him to stand the test with honour. I think that capture of the pass will be the best present for him."

The company began the ascent along a narrow, winding path. After the 30 degrees temperature down below, it was cold up there. They did not feel the rarefied air at once, but as the speed of movement increased breathing became difficult. However, the fighting men felt confident. Prior to the exercises, during an acclimatisation period in a mountain camp, they had received good training. Under the supervision of the company commander and a mountaineering instructor, they had learnt to cross mountainous rivers and carry out aimed fire in complicated terrain conditions, to organise shelters and to cook meals.

The landscape changes before the servicemen's eyes. Instead of thick grass they see now sparse bushes and stunted eglantine. More and more often they are faced with rocky ground and boulders. Sometimes they clatter treacherously under the feet — the only noise that breaks the silence. The men go their way without a word or a rattle of weapons.

**2,700 m above sea level.** The first halt. Lieutenant Velichko's platoon sends out security elements and organises a bivouac ensuring concealment of the disposition and safety from snow-slips and stone-falls. One third of the route the company has covered successfully and on time.

Again they go forward. Now the climb is through a solid white shroud. The rarefied humid air makes itself more and more felt. The men's storm-suits are wet through.

**3,600 m above sea level.** The air temperature has dropped sharply. More and more frequently the servicemen encounter rocky sectors covered with a new-fallen snow on the northern side. The slope becomes steeper. The company advances using ice-picks, the soldiers help each other. But the most difficult sector lies ahead.

One more halt. Simple but calory-rich food is prepared on fires. Free and easy conversations start. The company commander tells how courageously the Soviet soldiers fought in the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War, how skill of operation in complicated conditions and on difficult ground helped them to gain victory over the enemy.

"My father also fought in mountains," says Ablov. "The company he served in was assigned the mission to forestall the foe in capturing a pass and to hold it till the arrival of the main force. The men were forced to storm sheer rocks though they had no necessary mountain equipment. And yet the order was carried out."

The servicemen are all ears. It is evident that the officer knows not only to show the example himself but also to speak the ardent word of the Party.

**The peak.** Impatient and innerly keen as the servicemen were to reach the peak, it was unexpected when they got there. A light breeze dispersed the scrappy clouds and a majestic picture opened before their eyes. The neighbouring mountain peaks glittered with snow in the bright sun rays, a lake of melted snow caressed one's eyes with its azure blue. But the men have no

time to admire this beauty. Descending to a saddle they were but a stone's throw from the "enemy" positions. Senior Lieutenant Ablov specified the mission and reported his company's readiness over the radio to the battalion CO.

The company attacked simultaneously with the subunits advancing from the front. In a single rush, rapidly and noiselessly the men negotiated the remaining distance and hurled grenades at the "enemy" trenches.

A victorious hurrah from many throats rang over the mountains. The surprise blow from two directions had forced the "enemy" to withdraw. The pass was captured.

The excited soldiers and sergeants were still discussing the recent battle when the company commander and Yefreitor Pabula, the secretary of Komsomol organisation, came up to them. A small bunch of edelweiss showed white in the Komsomol secretary's hand.

"You have grown a bit older today, Volodya," Pabula handed Private Kirilenko whose birthday it was the bunch of flowers. "Many happy returns!"

The sun sat slowly behind the distant mountain ridges and the conquered peak turned pink in its rays.

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## NAVAL FORCES: ARMAMENT INSPECTIONS ON ASW SHIPS DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 36-37

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank A. Galkin: "Combat Readiness of Weapons"]

[Text]

**T**o fight enemy submarines in coastal waters, use is made of small antisubmarine ships equipped with sonar systems and rocket launchers.

Success of these small antisubmarine craft in carrying out combat missions largely depends on the condition of weapons and equipment and on how well the personnel know them and are able to service and operate them.

This in turn depends on the commanding officer's knowledge of the functioning and interaction of the ship's antisubmarine weapons, on his ability to impart his knowledge to his subordinates and to supervise their servicing of weapons and equipment.

Constant combat readiness of antisubmarine weapons is ensured by daily, weekly and monthly inspections. Besides, a number of measures stipulated by special instructions on checking the materiel are taken before going to sea.

During the preliminary preparation and visual inspection of the rocket launcher due attention is paid to serviceability of bomb pawls in the barrels. To check the pawls for proper functioning, one must make sure that the spring is tight and there is no water in the housing, because these faults may affect the launcher's performance. If the front pawl spring is slack, the bomb may not be held fast, and will slip forward. This means that when the launcher is switched on there will be no electrical contact

with the bomb. As a result, it will not leave the barrel when a salvo is fired. Even if the bomb is held by the front pawl, it will tear it off and fail to develop the necessary jet thrust. As a result, it will leave the barrel at a reduced initial speed, which will cause its trajectory to deviate from the prescribed one. Should water get into the body of the same pawl and freeze there, the bomb will not leave the barrel at all.

Care should be taken to see that the warning system contacts sink easily when pressed and return to the initial position when spring loaded. The following episode testifies to the importance of doing this.

The ship was going to sea for an exercise. The CO received the sonarman's report that an "enemy" submarine had been detected. The antisubmarine crew determined the elements of the submarine's movement. The CO gave the order to fire a salvo at the submarine. The next moment the report came that some bombs had failed to leave the barrel. This could have been caused by a loose ignition unit clamp, faulty front pawl or bomb ignition unit, or some other reason.

Analysis of the fault revealed that the warning unit contact in the barrel had not returned to the initial position while the control panel pilot lamp signalling the presence of bombs in the launcher had not gone out. This was due to lack of maintenance of the inside of the barrel. As a result, precious minutes were lost and the next salvo was not fired. Such are the consequences a seemingly innocent incident may have.

Reliability of weapons and equipment largely depends on the condition of the insulation of the rocket launcher's electrical equipment and sonar stations.

Insulation resistance is affected by temperature and air humidity, aggressive media (fuel, oil, sea water) and microorganisms. In equatorial waters, particularly in the tropical zones of the Pacific with an outside air temperature of 25-30°C, a sea temperature of up to 30°C and a relative air humidity of 90-100 per cent, the insulation resistance in certain cable lines may drop to tenths or even a hundredth. Besides, mould fungi and putrefactive bacteria tend to develop in darkened and poorly ventilated premises, where they can damage the insulation and even cause a short circuit.

In southern latitudes, particular attention should be paid to ventilation so as to prevent the growth of fungi and bacteria in these places. Ventilation is also indispensable for the instruments, whose working temperature may sharply rise and their cooling insufficient.

If the daily inspection reveals a drop in the insulation resistance of weapons and equipment below the permissible limits, and if this resistance does not rise even with the electrical circuit energised, the damaged place must be located. Most likely it will be either in the terminal or junction boxes. It should be remembered that a drop in insulation resistance below the permissible limits in these places may be caused by current-conducting bridges or some other fault which must be urgently removed. They may even require a whole unit or block to be replaced.

Taking the prescribed measures during daily, weekly and monthly inspections of electrical circuits and timely cleaning of the electrical equipment will preclude the formation of current-carrying bridges and, consequently, a drop in insulation resistance.

In northern latitudes with low air and water temperatures prevailing for 6-7 months a year and average annual air humidity being 80-90 per cent, insulation resistance and insulating materials are greatly influenced by sharp fluctuations of relative air humidity and tempera-

ture, and sudden changes of weather in the course of the day. All this calls for a careful approach to protecting and operating the equipment, particularly the electrical equipment. In such conditions condensate and then ice may form in junction boxes and instruments. If moisture repeatedly penetrates into the minute pores of the insulating material, oxidising the control panel switch contacts, the weapons and equipment may fail to operate.

Reliable operation of weapons and equipment of small antisubmarine ships is inconceivable without good special training of personnel, competent and resolute actions of specialists in the most complicated situations and without deep knowledge of the design and functioning of the instruments and mechanisms.

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## COMBAT TRAINING: PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONING OF SERVICEMEN

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 37-39

[Article by Lt Col V. Aidarov: "Daring and Courage"]

[Text]

**P**eople are not born fearless. In varying degree they all experience fear in the face of danger. But man can be taught to overcome this feeling. What are the main ways, forms and methods for developing daring and courage in the Soviet Armed Forces?

Moulding in the men a Marxist-Leninist scientific world outlook, devotion to their people and ideals of communism and ideological steeling constitutes an important precondition for developing lofty moral and combat features in them.

Familiarisation of the men with the physiological and psychological basis of various emotions, including negative states such as lack of confidence, hesitation and fear is of paramount importance in training and education. Special instructors deliver popular science lectures and conduct talks in units and ships, in which they explain to the men the causes of fear, the forms in which it is manifested and the ways to overcome it. At the same time they show the harm that can be caused by cowardice and faint-heartedness in war.

Such explanations form an important element of education. However, lectures and talks are not sufficient to educate a daring and courageous man. The well-known Soviet pedagogue A. S. Makarenko used to say:

"Unless you place a man in conditions which enable him to display his courage, you will be unable to educate a courageous man."

A distinguishing feature of military service is that it objectively creates conditions requiring the men to exhibit courage and daring. In peacetime this occurs in most cases during field drills and exercises if they effectively simulate real combat conditions. Here situations often involve an element of risk which is normally controlled by the commander. Operations at night, in bad weather, and on unfamiliar ground, work in "emergency" situations and negotiation of water barriers gradually strengthen the mind of the soldier and prepare him to endure nervous stresses of this kind.

Soldiers taking part in tactical exercises do not learn straight away to retain their poise and self-control. Some of them take time to acquire the ability to act calmly and with daring. However, thanks to constant drills, fear and hesitancy are gradually overcome and the men develop self-control and the ability to carry out their missions in any circumstances. Young soldiers being "driven over" by a tank for the first time experienced fear and uncertainty. This adversely affected their actions. Sitting in slit trenches they were ordered to let the "enemy" tanks drive overhead and then to hurl hand grenades at them. All the men of the first group failed to carry out the drill. Not a single grenade scored a hit. Some failed to hit the tanks because they were nervous, others got out of the trench too late when the tanks were already out of range.

The men of another group were watching the actions of the first group from the side. They saw that no actual risk was involved in being "driven over." So when they were sent to the trenches, they showed better results. When the exercise was repeated several days later both groups showed a good performance.

As the men repeat such drills they acquire daring and confidence. A pilot trains while flying, a paratrooper while jumping, a driver-mechanic while driving his tank in difficult conditions and a missileman while launching live missiles. These drills form elements of combat training to develop professional skills in men of various specialities. They also develop daring as a personal quality in the men.

Physical training exercises and sports, especially such types as diving, ski jumping, boxing and sambo (judo-type) wrestling, are an effective means for the development of daring. Physical exercises help develop fearlessness, self-control and poise. As a result, daring becomes an inherent quality and brave behaviour a habit. Applied military sports are also an effective means of combat training. Some exercises are designed to develop a correct response

in conditions typical of certain military specialities. Loping exercises, trampoline net jumping for pilots and paratroopers and skin diving for tankmen are exercises of this kind.

In the face of danger fear is a manifestation of man's instinct of self-preservation. A man has to display will power to suppress this instinct. However, there are people who experience fear even if there is no actual danger at all. Some experience fear of height, others of water or even the report of their own weapon. This fear is overcome with relative ease in the course of drills which enable the man to become accustomed to such stimuli as height, water, a gun report.

Some men experience fear of "missing the target" before marksmanship practice. This makes them feel nervous and quite often they show a poor performance. In such cases the commander will try to give them confidence. To this end he will give the man a chance to fire at a target at close range. Then the range will be gradually increased. When the man hits the target at a gradually increasing range he acquires self-confidence which enables him to hit the target at a rather long range. When he fires at the range all men fire at, he is able to carry out the drill with satisfactory results.

The personal example set by the commander, comradely mutual assistance and support produce a powerful educational effect. A closely-knit collective imparts strength and confidence to all its members, and helps the men suppress fear and overcome confusion in difficult situations.

Acquainting the men with the experience of veterans is of great educational value. For instance, in airborne units evenings of talks are practised. Masters of parachute jumping, experienced soldiers and sergeants tell the young draftees about the daring actions of paratroopers during the war and exercises, the reliability of parachutes and the need for mutual assistance during landing operations. They acquaint the young soldiers with the methods of work on trainers and various sports apparatus, demonstrate special exercises and drills that enable the paratrooper to develop the qualities he needs, including such qualities as daring. The older men help the commander to prepare the young soldiers for their first jump, the most difficult jump in their lives. These measures produce effective results.

Courage is the supreme manifestation of will power, moral staunchness and ideological conviction. It combines daring, poise, persistence and resolve. Courage is not a condition of brief duration, not an impulse. It is a permanent quality needed by the soldier to enable him constantly to overcome serious difficulties in accomplishing important assignments. A courageous man will never lose his presence of mind or ability to control his actions in any situation. Even in the face of mortal danger and in a state of powerful emotional excitement, he is able to control his feelings and desires, he is able to retain clarity of thought, to display resourcefulness, the ability to make a sound appraisal of the situation and to find a way out of the most difficult conditions.

In the Soviet Armed Forces the men develop courage and will power in the course of general development of the personality under the impact of army life in general. In the beginning the commanders try to establish the degree in which such qualities have already been acquired by their men. Then, in combat training the commanders try to consolidate these qualities, to develop them and to enable the men to acquire experience in behaviour requiring will power. To this end they create conditions in which a man has to exhibit his will power. They

do not miss a single case when a man could display daring, persistence and initiative.

Setbacks in training and execution of duties often exert negative effect on the men's behaviour. If the commander or political worker analyses their causes, he can prevent cases of negative behaviour. When a man sees his blunder, he will spare no pains to overcome the difficulty and to secure success in future. If the accomplishment of a mission requires a long time the commanders will set the men intermediate missions which are easier to fulfil. The accomplishment of a mission thus inspires the men to achieve success in fulfilling more difficult tasks.

While urging the men to exhibit will power, an officer knows that an impossible task might give rise to a sense of hopelessness, might lead to violation of military discipline and failure to carry out an order. That is why he takes care to avoid this. It is necessary to develop in the soldier a desire for self-improvement. Proceeding from this the commander sees to it that the soldier constantly works on self-improvement in a definite sequence. To this end the officer will teach him to make a critical analysis of his behaviour, urging him to follow a positive example set by another soldier. As a result, two mutually complementary processes begin to operate, namely education (influence exercised by the commander and comrades in the unit) and self-education.

"Preliminary tuning" enables the man to overcome hesitancy and fear of danger. "Modelling" his behaviour in an expected difficult situation helps the man achieve "preliminary tuning." For instance, a tank driver-mechanic covers the route in advance in his mind and thinks of how to surmount every obstacle. As a rule, this is very helpful in practical action. It helps remove many "surprises."

Colonel V Romanyuk, Hero of the Soviet Union and a well-known test parachute jumper, used to say:

"To carry out a parachute jump a man must know not only the technique of leaving the plane, the turns, etc. A beginner soon masters this. It is far more difficult to prepare the man

psychologically, to inspire him with confidence in his parachute, in himself, to galvanise his will power and spiritual strength for the jump."

And this is really so. In an airborne subunit Captain Goncharov had to work a lot with Private Niyazov to help him overcome his fear of the jump and acquire self-confidence. Captain Goncharov patiently developed in the boy a sense of love for military service, for his "trade" of paratrooper. He explained that if he tried long enough and hard enough, he could become a man of daring and will power. The officer worked with him on trainers and tried to place him in conditions which would urge him to display resolve and initiative.

In the beginning Niyazov simply refused to jump. He thought he just could not approach the open hatch of the aircraft. When the officer finally persuaded him to make the jump, the soldier, after safely hitting the ground, felt that he was a man of daring. As a result of the commander's persistent effort and the support of the other men in the unit Private Niyazov acquired self-confidence and began to perform one jump after another. By the end of the year he achieved excellent results in combat training and political education.

You cannot grow in a hothouse a plant capable of enduring the cold and the wind. Unless you place a soldier in conditions that make him display fortitude and physical endurance, you will not be able to steel him. It is possible to mould in a man the lofty moral, psychological and combat qualities he will need in combat to secure victory only by making him surmount one difficulty after another in a situation that resembles actual combat conditions in maximum degree.

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## WARTIME COMBAT TACTICS: STALINGRAD RAID OPERATION DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 41-43

[Article by Col A. Popov, Cand. Sc. (Military): "Raid Operations"]

[Text] Raid operations are a special kind of manoeuvre, aimed at rapid penetration by mobile units into the enemy rear to provide favourable conditions for a quick rout of the opposing enemy grouping and achieve high rates of advance by the main forces operating from the front.

Actions at a considerable distance from the main forces demanded of officers and men great moral and physical tension, high combat skill, initiative and resolution. The Party-political work conducted before and during a raid played an important role. Commanders and political workers explained to the fighting men the peculiarities of combat actions in the enemy rear, urged them to act swiftly and boldly. As a rule, in each tank, artillery crew, and subunit there were experienced men able to lead their comrades in action at difficult moments of the battle.

Thorough working out of the plan of a forthcoming raid, proper preparation of the personnel and skilful troop control made it possible in most cases to carry out the assigned missions successfully.

The actions of the 17th Separate Guards Order of the Red Banner Tank Regiment during the counteroffensive of the Soviet forces at Stalingrad in December 1942 is a case in point (see Sketch No. 1).

On December 18, the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps, including that regiment, reached the line Belavin-Visloguzov-Bokovskaya and, together with other units, threatened the enemy with encirclement. The latter started to withdraw to Kruzhilin counterattacking and under cover of powerful rear guards.

To prevent the enemy's withdrawal and complete the rout of his Kruzhilin grouping, the Commander of the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps, the main forces of

chinese gunners and artillery men of the attached subunits were instructed as to the methods of mutual assistance and cooperation with tank subunits during the action.

On December 19 at 1430 hrs the regiment began to carry out the mission. It approached the area occupied by the enemy while it was still dark.

The reconnaissance operated ahead of the main forces. Tanks and motor cars moved with switched-off headlights. All security measures were strictly kept.

The regiment carried out the raid undetected without firing a single shot. At 2400 hrs when a separate reconnaissance patrol approached the state farm, the enemy soldiers occupying it were asleep.

The advance party and then the main forces attacked the enemy on the move and after a short battle dislodged him out of the settlement. The Hitlerites fled in the direction of Nizhne-Yablonovsky. A tank platoon, pursuing the retreating enemy, rushed into and captured Nizhne-Yablonovsky.

Simultaneously a tank detachment sent to the cross roads in the area of Hill 217.0, detected a large column of enemy motor transport and carts. The night tank attack took the enemy completely unaware. The column was routed. Then the detachment commander organised a tank ambush in the area of Hill 217.0 to prevent the withdrawal of other enemy columns in a southern direction.

The regiment's main forces and a battery of 45-mm guns concentrated in the "Krasnaya Zarya" state farm and organised perimeter defence. Separate tanks with groups of submachine gunners were on all the roads running from the north and east to the state farm.

Thus, by the morning of December 20 the enemy Kruzhilin grouping's withdrawal routes to the south were cut off.

In the morning of December 20 units of the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps, advancing from the front, drove the enemy out of Kargin'skaya and made him withdraw hastily in the direction of Nizhne-Yablonovsky and the "Krasnaya Zarya" state farm.



The first encounter took place in the area of Hill 217.0. An enemy column moving to Nizhne-Yablonovsky encountered a tank ambush. The confusion in the enemy ranks soon turned into panic. Giving the enemy no chance to come to himself, the Soviet tankmen launched the attack.

Enemy soldiers fled along the ravine to the "Krasnaya Zarya" state farm. Vehicles moving at the tail-end of the column, turned in that direction too. Other enemy columns, arriving from the north and north-east, also moved towards the state farm.

Stopped by the fire of Soviet tanks and having lost troop control, enemy units tried to bypass the state farm in the north-east. Then Soviet tanks passed over to the attack and completed the rout of the enemy.

Separate enemy groups which had broken through in a northern direction were intercepted by units of the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps.

Thus, the Soviet tank regiment successfully carried out the combat mission.


To perform more important combat missions tank and mechanised corps were detailed for raids in some operations of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, in October 1943, as a result of fierce battles, the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of

In the morning of October 24, after a short artillery bombardment the corps' first-echelon brigades passed over to the offensive. In three days of continuous fighting the tank corps advanced 55 km, forced the enemy Melitopol grouping to withdraw hastily and thus secured the successful pressing home of the attack by the front's main forces.

At dawn on October 28 the corps started a swift raid in the direction of Veseloye-Nizhniye Serogazy. The advance detachment, comprising a tank brigade reinforced by antitank artillery and mortar regiments, a battalion of rocket mortars and two AA artillery brigades, reached Nizhniye Serogazy by 1000 hrs. The corps commander decided to attack the enemy in Nizhniye Serogazy with part of his forces and bypass this large settlement in the south with the main forces. The battle for Verkhniye and Nizhniye Serogazy continued for a whole day.

Under the pressure of Soviet tanks the enemy began to retreat to the south-west. The 19th Tank Corps rushed in the same direction.



Sketch No. 1

General F. I. Tolbukhin, penetrated the enemy defences up to 8-15 km (Sketch No. 2) in some sectors. The Supreme Command GHQ ordered the front commander to deliver a swift blow and cut off the enemy forces in the Crimea from his grouping in the Ukraine.

On October 23 the front commander assigned General I. D. Vasilyev, Commander of the 19th Tank Corps, the mission to break through the enemy defences in the direction of Chekhograd and seize the Chekhograd-Akimovka line. Then, having deployed the corps to the north-west, to deliver a blow in the Novo-Nikolayevka-Matveyevka direction and reach the Melitopol to Kakhovka highway. Then to exploit the success in the direction of Veseloye with the aim of cutting off the enemy's withdrawal routes to Kakhovka.

After this the Soviet tankmen did not engage the enemy in long battles, but bypassed centres of resistance and by the end of October 29 were 80 km away from combined-arms armies' formations. On the next day the corps' advance detachment bypassed the settlement Shcherbina and began to advance to Chaplinka. The corps' motorised infantry brigade, which was operating 10-12 km north of Shcherbina, attacked Olgiyevka, destroyed an enemy garrison there and began to advance on Shcherbina. Soon it seized that settlement too.



The 19th Tank Corps, having repulsed enemy counterattacks, reached Perekop and by November 3 seized the road pass across the Turetsky Val.

In eight days of continuous fighting the corps advanced 250 km from Melitopol to Armyansk. It broke independently through enemy positional defences. Then, operating along the front in a northern direction, covered nearly 60 km in the enemy rear in three days and thus ensured a successful offensive by the front's main forces. In the next four days it carried out swift 180 km raid in the enemy rear—in operational depth at a considerable distance from the combined-arms armies. Having reached the Perekop, the corps cut off the enemy 17th Army in the Crimea on the land side, cutting it off from the 6th Army which had been driven back to the Dnieper by the front's forces.

The raids of the 17th Tank Regiment and the 19th Tank Corps were characterised by independence of actions, high manoeuvrability of the units.

The organisation of security and continuous reconnaissance, ability to avoid prolonged battles on intermediate lines and to bypass enemy centres of resistance were combined with extensive night actions, bold and swift blows at the enemy from the rear and flanks.

All this secured surprise and an uninterrupted advance of Soviet forces and deprived the enemy of the possibility of planned withdrawal and organised resistance. The precision and swiftness of the actions were also the result of precise and stable control of units and subunits by commanders personally and through liaison officers.

The role of raid actions in a modern battle has acquired still greater importance. The increased fire capabilities, high manoeuvrability and strike power of forces attach a clearly expressed manoeuvring character to a modern operation or battle. That is why it is necessary to persistently teach the troops this complicated type of combat action and to perfect their skill, taking into account the experience accumulated.

Sketch No. 2



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## WARTIME COMBAT TACTICS: OPERATION IN POLAR REGIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 43-45

[Article by Col A. Orlov, Cand. Sc. (History): "Blow in the North"]

[Text]

In September 1944, after Finland fell out of the war, the Soviet Command began to prepare an offensive in the Petsamo-Kirkenes direction. The aim of the operation was to liberate the Soviet Polar Regions and northern areas of friendly Norway from the Hitlerite invaders.

The 19th Mountain Infantry Corps of the 20th Mountain Army of the enemy was holding defences on that line of advance. The corps numbered up to 53,000 men and over 750 guns and mortars. It was supported by nearly 160 combat aircraft and considerable naval forces (1 battleship, 14 destroyers, over 30 submarines and more than 150 auxiliary vessels). The enemy had organised these powerful defences comprising three defensive lines to a depth of up to 150 km. The defences were based on resistance centres and strong points securing a perimeter defence. There were 15-20 pillboxes per 1 km of frontage.

The Supreme Command GHQ assigned the troops of the Karelian Front under the command of General of the Army K. A. Meretskov the mission to rout the enemy 19th Mountain Infantry Corps, capture the Nickel-Salmiyarvi area, completely clear the Petsamo Region of the nazis and reach the state frontier with Norway.

The operation was to be carried out by the 14th Army under the command of General V. I. Shcherbakov in cooperation with the Northern Fleet under the command of Admiral A. G. Golovko.

The Commander of the 14th Army decided to deal the main blow with three infantry corps on the left flank from the area south of the Chapr Lake in the direction of Luostari-Petsamo (see Sketch). Simultaneously two light infantry corps were to bypass widely the Nazi forces' right flank and come out in their rear. A special operational group (45th Division with reinforcing units) was formed on the army's right flank with the mission

to pin down the enemy and then advance together with the 12th and 63rd Marine brigades towards Petsamo.

The decision taken by the army commander ensured blows at the weakest sector of the enemy defences and

made it possible to direct the army's main forces by the shortest routes to the area of Luostari-Petsamo.

The army forces advanced in a two-echelon formation. The 131st and 99th Infantry corps, which were to break through the enemy's tactical defensive zone and the 126th Light Infantry Corps, covering the strike grouping from the south, operated in the first echelon. The second echelon, comprising the 127th and 31st corps was to exploit the success. Warships of the Northern Fleet were to block the ports of Petsamo and Kirkenes, disrupt the enemy's sea transport and cover the friendly communications. Marine units were assigned the mission to break through the enemy defences on the isthmus of the Sredny Peninsula with the support of fleet air arm and warships, capture the Titovka-Petsamo road and, having linked up with the 14th Army, press home the attack towards Petsamo. The Soviet forces were supported by nearly 1,000 aircraft of the 7th Air Army and the fleet air arm.

At the beginning of the offensive the 14th Army numbered 97,000 men; 2,103 guns and mortars; 126 tanks and SPGs.

On October 7, after a powerful artillery bombardment lasting over two and a half hours, the Soviet forces passed over to the offensive. In three days' fighting the formations operating on the main line of advance broke

through the tactical zone of enemy defences on a frontage up to 20 km and a depth of some 16 km. The 126th Light Infantry Corps, having bypassed the enemy from the south, arrived in the area 9 km west of Luostari by the end of October 9. The Nazi forces, having suffered considerable losses, started to withdraw to the west.

To prevent a planned retreat of enemy units, warships of the Northern Fleet landed a force consisting of the 63rd Marine Brigade (3,000 men) on the southern beach of the Malaya Volokovaya Inlet in the night of October 9.

The landing was carried out quickly and proved a surprise for the enemy. Moreover, his attention was distracted by a demonstrative landing in the Motov Bay.


Having mounted the offensive in the south-east direction, the Marines reached the flank of the enemy defences in the morning of October 10. Early in the morning on the same day, after an hour and a half of artillery bombardment, the 12th Marine Brigade launched the offensive from the Sredny Peninsula.

In conditions of snow storm and difficult terrain, sub-units of the 12th Marine Brigade broke through enemy defences by 1200 hrs, crossed the Musta Tunturi mountain ridge and linked up with units of the 63rd Brigade attacking the nazi positions from the rear. In the evening of October 12 the first Soviet amphibious force was landed in the port of Liinakhamari.

Increasing the rates of advance, the Soviet forces captured the Luostari road junction on October 12 and in three days liberated the ancient Russian town of Pe-

and Luostari-Nickel roads and light infantry corps covered their flanks. From October 18 to 25 the Northern Fleet landed forces on the Varanger Fjord coast. On October 22 formations of the 131st Infantry Corps captured the Norwegian settlement of Tarnet, a powerful nazi centre of resistance, and breaking the enemy's stubborn resistance, reached Kirkenes in a day.

In the night of October 23 units of the 45th Division forced Yar Fjord Bay and seized a beachhead on its western coast. By the end of the day the Soviet fighting men widened this beachhead and reached the eastern coast of Bek Fjord Bay. On October 25 at 0500 hrs, after a short artillery bombardment, the Soviet troops forced that bay and by 0900 hrs broke through to the outskirts of Kirkenes. Fierce fighting flared up for the town, end-



chenga (Petsamo)—an important naval base in the Polar Regions. The enemy hastily withdrew his units to Norwegian territory, hoping to stabilise his defences there and consolidate on a previously organised line.

In this situation the 14th Army was assigned a new mission: to press home the attack with the support of the Northern Fleet in the north-western and south-western directions so as to complete the liberation of the Petsamo Region, liberate the Norwegian towns of Kirkenes and Neiden and reach the area of Nautsi.

The army's second echelon corps were committed to action. Its main forces, having resumed the offensive on October 18, advanced along the Luostari-Akhmalakhti

ing by 1300 hrs in the complete defeat of the enemy garrison.

The defeat at Kirkenes forced the nazi troops to leave the towns of Neiden and Nautsi and retreat hastily deep into Norwegian territory. The 14th Army, having carried out the assigned missions, completed its offensive in the Polar Regions.

As a result of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation the Soviet troops advanced 150 km, liberated the Petsamo Region and Northern Norway. The enemy lost nearly 30,000 men in killed alone. The enemy fleet lost over 100 warships and vessels, 125 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

The strategically important Petsamo-Kirkenes operation was characterised by close cooperation of the land forces with aviation and naval forces. In the severe climatic conditions and difficult terrain of the Polar Regions the Soviet forces demonstrated endurance, ability to carry out a flexible and bold manoeuvre, and mass heroism.

For instance, men of the infantry platoon under Junior Lieutenant V. M. Ivanov (253rd Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division) displayed heroism and courage in capturing the settlement Tarnet. Having seized an important hill covering the approaches to the settlement, the Soviet fighting men during the night of October 21 repulsed several counterattacks by superior enemy forces. Ivanov was wounded but remained with his men. The staunchness of the platoon allowed other subunits of the regiment to bypass the enemy and completely rout him in night fighting. Junior Lieutenant Ivanov was honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet officers and men carried out their military duty with honour. For heroism and gallantry in fighting the enemy 51 units and formations were given the honourable titles of Pechenga and Kirkenes and 70 units and formations were awarded Orders.

By liberating the northern areas of Norway the Soviet forces fulfilled their international and allied duty. The Soviet Army's entry into Norwegian territory was fore-

seen by the relevant agreement between the Soviet and Norwegian Governments. The population of the liberated areas heartily welcomed the Soviet soldier-liberators. The newspaper "Slette-Nytt," illegally published in Southern Norway, wrote in those days: "...The liberators were welcomed with great joy. Most friendly relations were established between the Russians and the Norwegians." The local population willingly helped the Soviet troops to destroy the hitlerite invaders. In the course of the fighting for Kirkenes while the Soviet troops were forcing the Yr Fjord the Norwegians gave Soviet units all their vessels and boats and F. Must showed the passage through the mine fields of the fjord.

When our troops were crossing the Neiden-Elv River, Norwegian patriots, despite nazi fire, ferried Soviet soldiers in their boats. The Soviet people have not forgotten the names of E. Kaikunen, E. Labakhu, L. Sirin, W. Ladago, P. Hendrikson. Many other Norwegian patriots acted in the same way.

The Soviet fighting men did their best to liberate the friendly people quickly from the nazi yoke and helped the Norwegian population as much as possible. In their retreat the hitlerites destroyed towns and settlements, demolished electric power stations, industrial enterprises and food stocks. In Ser-Vringer 50 per cent of the buildings were demolished, in Vadsö, 65 per cent and in Varde, 85 per cent. The local population were deprived of their homes, food, fuel and transport. An epidemic of dysentery and diphtheria broke out. The Soviet friends came to the aid of the Norwegian population. Foodstuffs were allotted from army depots. Soviet soldiers shared their rations with the population of settlements where the delivery of foodstuffs was hindered.

The Soviet Command opened six additional hospitals to fight epidemics and illnesses; many Norwegians were placed in army hospitals. In demolished towns the Soviet troops did not occupy surviving buildings but left them for homeless Norwegians.

Quite a few Soviet officers and men risked their lives while saving peaceful inhabitants of Norway. Thus, in the course of the fighting for Kirkenes, some 3,500 inhabitants took shelter in a gallery at the Bjernevann railway station, near Kirkenes. While retreating from the town the hitlerites decided to blow up the gallery together with the people in it. The Soviet Command was informed of this. An infantry subunit was immediately sent to Bjernevann. It suddenly attacked the nazis and captured the station. The liberated inhabitants welcomed the Soviet soldiers with tears of thankfulness.

The Soviet Command did a lot to help the population organise a normal life. Engineer units restored demolished piers in Yakobsness, Tarnet, Vadsö and other inhabited coastal localities. Port buildings, water mains and the telephone exchange were restored in Kirkenes. While demining housing estates, piers and enterprises, Soviet sappers rendered harmless 15,000 mines.

In September 1945 the Soviet troops left the territory of Northern Norway. The Norwegian newspaper "Aftenposten" wrote in those days: "The Norwegians will never forget what the Russians have done for them and for the common cause of victory over the enemy."

The feat of the Soviet soldiers who liberated Northern Norway from the nazi invaders is immortalised in monuments erected in Norwegian towns. They are a symbol of the Norwegian people's deep gratitude to the Soviet Army and Navy.

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## MILITARY SPORTS: TRIATHLON COMPETITIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 60-61

[Article by Lt Col P. Salkov: "Military Triathlon"]

[Text]

The Soviet Armed Forces pay serious attention to applied military sports. When officers and men compete in them, they carry out various actions that are essential in regular combat.

Military triathlon is a variety of such competitions. Its programme includes firing a submachine gun, throwing hand grenades for accuracy and range and 400-metre steeplechase. The Armed Forces of the USSR hold regular individual and team championships in this sport in units and forces as a whole.

The contestants fire submachine guns at a range of 200 metres from prone, kneeling and standing firing positions. Grenade throwing is conducted for accuracy on the basis of five concentric circles. The distance from the throwing line to the centre of the circles is 40 metres. Every contestant is required to hurl 15 grenades, three for maximum distance. If a grenade falls within a corridor 10 metres wide the result is considered valid. While throwing the grenade the contestant must hold his weapon in his hand. The steeplechase is carried out as follows. The contestant first runs a distance of 200 metres, then surmounts various obstacles on the course, including a ditch 3 metres wide, a fence, a broken staircase, a brick wall, a demolished bridge, etc. and then runs another 200 metres.

The triathlon competitions are difficult. The men are required to exhibit strength, agility, endurance, ability to switch over from one sport to another and to overcome difficulties. For instance, firing is carried out in any weather, several contestants participating in the competition simultaneously. The firer has to fire a burst

at a target which appears briefly, several targets being shown one after another. Throwing hand grenades and surmounting obstacles have their specifics. Therefore, it is important to be well-trained physically, to be proficient in equipment and tactics. It is possible to secure success, only if these conditions are met.

Triathlon athletes are trained in their subunits at regular drills in marksmanship and physical training and also in hours free from service duties, on Saturdays and Sundays.

When a subunit is engaged in fire training a special place is provided for the men training for the triathlon competitions. The future contestants train in throwing hand grenades and negotiating obstacles at physical training lessons. Special attention is paid to concurrent physical training when the subunit proceeds to and from the combat training ground. Concurrent training includes walking, running, and negotiating artificial and natural obstacles.

Subunits hold individual and team championships both in biathlon (which includes throwing hand grenades and negotiating the obstacle course) and in triathlon. Such competitions kindle the men's interest in applied military sports and help select the most capable athletes.

Taking into account the further development of military triathlon, the Armed Forces need skilled coaches and the Military Institute of Physical Training is now training coaches in this sport.

Military triathlon competitions were first held at the Summer Sports Tournament of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1958. In subsequent years such competitions were held repeatedly.



This sport has become widespread not only in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Friendly Armies' Sports Committee decided to include military triathlon competitions regularly in the sports tournament programme and even to hold separate championships in it in the friendly armies.

For more than 20 years army triathlon athletes have been taking part in competitions to see who shows the best performance in submachine gun marksmanship, in

aimed hand grenade throwing and cross-country racing. (The Friendly Armies' Sports Committee has given preference to a 3 kilometre cross-country race with arms which has replaced the steeplechase at the Friendly Armies' championships.)

At the 16th Friendly Armies' Championship held in Kiev, capital of the Soviet Ukraine, military athletes from eight fraternal countries demonstrated their skill. Among them were experienced masters—champions and prize winners of earlier championships: R. Kuzmin, A. Musiichuk and Y. Shchekalev of the Soviet Armed Forces, Pedro Pablo Garcia of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba and Kan Yen Mo of the Korean People's Army.

After submachine gun marksmanship the judges summed up the results. In the individual contest Pedro Pablo Garcia took the first place. However, in the team contest the Soviet athletes took the lead.

The competition in hand grenade throwing attracted many spectators. They warmly applauded every time a hand grenade struck the metal disc covering the centre of the circle. Here too the Soviet team showed the best performance.

The cross-country race contest was exceedingly keen. In the beginning Ramon Castillo Domingues of Cuba took the lead, but he was overtaken by A. Musiichuk of the Soviet Union. Then the Hungarian L. Istvan outstripped A. Musiichuk. And several dozen metres before the finishing line Y. Shchekalev of the USSR was ahead of everybody, displaying excellent qualities of a fighter.

The Soviet team showed the best performance in the overall team result. In the individual competition, however, Kan Yen Mo of the Korean People's Army became the acknowledged champion of the Friendly Armies' Sports Tournament.

The winners of separate competitions in military triathlon and also of the team competitions were awarded prizes and medals.

The men who go in for applied military combined competitions generally show high proficiency, quick action, great will power, resourcefulness and persistence.

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## COMMENTS ON TV DOCUMENTARY: 'THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR'

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 79 pp 62-64

[Unattributed article commenting "on the release of the 20 one-hour programmes of the historico-publicistic film epic 'The Great Patriotic War': 'The Unknown War'"]

[Text]

A monumental film "The Great Patriotic War" was made under the artistic leadership of late film producer Roman Karmen, Hero of Socialist Labour, Lenin Prize Winner, People's Artist of the USSR, with participation of the US cinema and TV specialists. The Central Studio of Documentary Films began to work on this series on the order and with the participation of the US "Air Time International" company late in 1976. But already in the last months of 1978 the TV stations of more than ten cities of the USA broadcast 20 one-hour programmes of this unique epic series about the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against nazi Germany.

Millions of people have already seen this "unprecedented, stunning epopee" as the American press called it. In the opinion of the American observers the world cinema practice had nothing like that either by the scale or the depth of the theme development or the dramatism of the events depicted.

In the USA this epic was demonstrated under the name "The Un-

known War"—such was the suggestion of the American partners. Polls showed that over 80 per cent of Americans were unaware of the severe trials the Soviet people and its Army which liberated Europe from fascism, had to stand.

These film programmes will also be shown in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa.

While working on the films their authors examined over a million metres of historical cinema documents from Soviet and foreign archives. They discovered and used quite a few unique stills. Besides, there was two-year work to shoot at places of former battles and photograph their participants.

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, gave an interview specially for this film programme. It also included talks with A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and D. F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR.

The beginning of the Second World War and the forces that engendered it; the Battle of Moscow; 900 days of the Leningrad blockade; evacuation of peaceful citizens and industrial enterprises unseen in history; fighting in the polar circle; feats of arms of Soviet pilots and seamen; heroic exploits of partisans; the great victory at Stalingrad; the battle for the Caucasus; the liberation of the Ukraine and Byelorussia; the great liberation

mission of the Soviet Army in Europe; the strengthening of the anti-fascist coalition of the Allied powers; the Battle of Berlin; the rout of militarist Japan and, finally, the film crowning the entire programme — reflections on the results and world-historic significance of the Great Patriotic War — such is the thematic outline of the twenty films, each of which has its own name.

In the creation of the 20 one-hour programmes according to the screen script by R. Karmen, K. Slavin and I. Itskov were enlisted talented cinema-playwriters, journalists and composers, each with his own style

in depicting themes of different films. A group of military specialists under General of the Army P. Kurochkin carried out consultations on military-historical aspects of the epic.

I. Kleiner mann, producer-consultant, writer D. Lord, poet, singer and composer Rod McKuen took part on the American side. The prominent American actor Burt Lancaster was invited to play the role of narrator for "The Unknown War" (he introduces each series and gives behind-the-screen comments).

The natural but reserved manner of which Burt Lancaster comments, is matched in the Russian version by a simple, moving, unobtrusive behind-the-screen comment by Vasily Lanovoi, People's Artist of the Russian Federation.

By the way, Burt Lancaster was one of those who perhaps unexpectedly for himself realised the grandeur of the Soviet people's feat of arms. He was to the Soviet Union for the first time. He visited quite a few memorable places of the Great Patriotic War. Later he remembered how he listened to the ringing of bells in the small Byelorussian village of Khatyn on the site of burnt houses; how he stood by the well-preserved graves of Americans and Englishmen in polar Murmansk; how he looked at

marble plates to the victims of the Leningrad blockade in the Piskaryovskoye Cemetery. Meditating on the Nazi crimes, Lancaster clearly understood how important it was for the American people to see these 20 one-hour programmes of "The Unknown War" which passed sentence on the inhumane Nazi ideology, the policy of aggression and war, on all forces of reaction.

It should be noted that side by side with the predominant positive comments on the film in the US press, there were also attacks on it. Some people objected to the Second World War being shown to the US viewers for the first time from position of historical truth. In their attacks on the film such "critics" again attempt to falsify history, to belittle the role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the defeat of Nazi Germany. But by doing so they disgrace themselves once again in the opinion of the world public at large.

The human memory compares its own knowledge of historical truth with that of the picture painted by the memory of the century. The unprecedented exploit of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War is an eminent historical truth, destined to live for ever. The memory of humanity saved by the Soviet soldiers must know and preserve this historical truth in its en-

The entire cycle is permeated with this thought. The Soviet people displayed miracles of courage and staunchness in their sacred war against the invaders for the sake of creating a bright future on their land, for the sake of peace on the planet.

The words of L. I. Brezhnev, full of convincing truth and sincere concern read in part: "This war took away twenty million lives of Soviet people. Our people will never forget it. It will be remembered not only by those who, like me, went through the flames of the war from the beginning to the end, but also by new generations which only entered life in the postwar years. The memory of this war means a call for us to exhibit vigilance in relation to the intentions of any new intrigues of the aggressive forces and, what is most important, a call for tireless, consistent struggle for lasting peace, for stopping the arms race, for peaceful cooperation between states."

These words sound in the concluding 20th series, which bears the title "The Unknown Soldier."

truth and undistorted completeness. Fifty million people killed during the Second World War — this unpayable debt of the peoples for today's peace and progress demands this.

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#### MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PARTY'S ROLE DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 79 signed to press 18 Oct 79 pp 8-17

[Article by Colonel General G. Sredin, First Deputy Chief, Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate: "In Charge of Military Development"]

[Text] The world-historic achievements with which the Soviet Union is approaching the 62d anniversary of Great October is clear evidence of the correctness of the Communist Party's Leninist course. Naturally, as we progress toward communism the CPSU's guiding and directing role and the significance of its theoretical, political, and organizational activities grow. The reason for this lies in the growth of the scale and complexity of the tasks faced by the Soviet people, further development of socialist democracy, the growing significance of the theory of scientific communism, and the need for intensifying communist indoctrination of the Soviet people.

Now that socialism is approaching maturity in the USSR, the party's directing influence upon military development is intensifying as well. As we know, in the broad sense of this term, military development means the aggregate of economic, political, moral, and specifically military measures implemented under the guidance of the Communist Party and having the objective of insuring armed protection of the socialism against aggression by enemies of the Soviet state.

The party feels military development to be an inseparable part of the general task of communist development. "Development of our army," said V. I. Lenin, "could lead to successful results only because it was created in the spirit of general Soviet development..." ("Poln. sobr. soch." (Complete Collected Works), Vol 40, pp 76-77). Providing guidance to military development, the party heeds Lenin's doctrine of defense of the socialist fatherland. This doctrine enjoyed creative development in the CPSU Program, decisions of the party congresses and the CPSU Central Committee plenums, CPSU Central Committee decrees, the new USSR Constitution, and the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

Basing himself on the military history of the revolutionary struggle and on the experience of socialist construction, V. I. Lenin formulated the most important principles of Soviet military development implied by the objective laws of society's development, and the laws of war. Communist Party guidance of the armed forces is the fundamental principle of military development. The activities of the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee aimed at strengthening the USSR's defense capabilities and improving the Soviet Armed Forces are extremely complex and diverse. They include preparing the country for defense, developing and implementing the most important provisions of the Soviet government's military policy, determining the principal directions of armed forces development, taking care of problems associated with Soviet military science and logistical support to the army and navy, selecting, placing, and indoctrinating military personnel, and conducting party-political work with the personnel.

The CPSU constantly maintains within its field of vision the entire aggregate of mutually associated and mutually dependent military-political, socioeconomic, spiritual, and specifically military problems, and it solves them with a consideration for the presently evolving situation, the requirements of science, and the nature of modern warfare. The strength and effectiveness of the CPSU's guidance of military development lies in its purposefulness, in its adherence to class principles, in the scientific and creative nature of its approach.

The CPSU's indivisible guidance of the country's defense and the Soviet Armed Forces is an objective law that derives from the Communist Party's leading role within socialist society's political system on one hand and the purpose and unique features of the army of a socialist state on the other. The party is constantly concerned with the armed protection of the revolutionary achievements of the Soviet people. All of the most important issues concerning the country's defense, military development, and the training of commanders dedicated to their revolution were regularly discussed during the Civil War at party congresses and conferences, and at Central Committee plenums and meetings. V. I. Lenin noted in March 1919 that the problems of military development were on the agenda of literally every Central Committee meeting, and that there was no problem of strategy in relation to which the Central Committee or the Central Committee Bureau did not state an opinion or implement a decision.

During the era of peaceful development the party correctly evaluated the military danger harbored by the capitalist encirclement, and it continued to strengthen the country's defense capabilities and develop the Red Army and Navy. A military reform was conducted under its guidance in 1924-1925; during this time a network of military schools and academies was created to train officers, and the armed forces were rearmed with modern combat equipment. This insured a further rise in the combat capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces.



Military problems were at the party's center of attention on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Evidence of this can be found in decisions of the 18th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress (March 1939), the March Plenum of the Party Central Committee (1940), the 18th Party Conference (February 1941), and other party documents. Although history afforded us too little time to implement the extensive program of re-armament and organizational improvement of the Red Army and we were unable to totally implement the planned program, the steps taken by the party in the prewar years did justify themselves, and they served as a foundation for swift augmentation of our army's fighting power in the course of military activities.

During the war the party took charge of the fighting people. Under its guidance the country became a huge military camp unified by a single desire--to defeat the enemy, expel him from Soviet land, and annihilate fascism. Communist Party guidance was the most important factor in the victory of the Soviet people and their armed forces in the Great Patriotic War.

The fruitful results of the CPSU's concern for strengthening the Soviet Union's defense capabilities and of the guidance it provided to military development in the postwar era manifested themselves clearly in the greater fighting power of the Soviet Army and Navy which, owing to the daily attention of the CPSU and its Central Committee, possess everything they need to offer a decisive repulse to any aggressor, and which stand as a dependable guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and as the bulwark of peace among nations. The CPSU competently capitalizes upon the advantages and potentials of developed socialist society to strengthen the country's defense capabilities, and it is managing all of military development with a consideration for the evolving international situation, and the achievements of scientific-technical progress.

It was in accordance with the military-political situation in the world and with a consideration for the constantly growing economic and scientific potential of the USSR that the party formulated the Soviet military doctrine--a system of guidelines, of scientifically grounded views on the essence, nature, and means of conducting a war, were it to be imposed upon the Soviet Union, as well as of the views on military development and preparation of the country and its armed forces for repulsion of any possible aggression.

The content of prewar military doctrine was governed by the socialist nature of our social structure and the peaceful foreign policy of the USSR. It clearly spelled out that the Soviet Union, which had never pursued predatory goals, would defend, with all resolution, all that belongs to the Soviet people and all they created with their hands. Considering the nature of a probable war, the doctrine foresaw harmonic development of all arms and services of our armed forces, their close interaction, and decisive battlefield tactics.

The Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of Soviet military doctrine. It enjoyed further development in the postwar era. "Our intentions," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a speech to a solemn meeting in Berlin dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the GDR, "have never and will never include threatening any state or group of states. Our strategic doctrine has a purely defensive orientation." The provisions and conclusions of the Soviet military doctrine predetermine the nature of both military development as a whole and development and improvement of the armed forces in particular. In our doctrine, the humanitarian, deeply just goals of the USSR's peaceful foreign policy are organically united with concern for the country's security.

We are presently experiencing a continuous increase in the organizational and directing influence of the Communist Party upon Soviet military development. There are many reasons for this. Among the most important of them we can include mainly the action of the general law of communist development which, as we know, states that the greater the complexity of our tasks and the scale of the Soviet people's creative work become, the more significant the CPSU's guiding role becomes. Another reason is the complexity of processes occurring in the world arena. Being the ruling party of the Soviet Union, the CPSU bears considerable responsibility for correctly analyzing the military-political situation and taking prompt effective steps against possible aggression, no matter where it originates.

Being the bearers of a time-tested philosophy--Marxism-Leninism, communists believe their historic mission to be that of building a communist society that would have no need for war and which would be devoid of social and other causes of war. However, it has already become possible to prevent new world wars and eliminate predatory wars from the life of mankind today, now that the balance of forces in the world has tipped in favor of socialism. The Soviet people are vitally interested in this, since prevention of war is one of the favorable foreign political prerequisites necessary for communist development. The struggle for a secure peace, for relaxation of tension, for arms limitation, and for subsequent total disarmament has become the main foreign policy task of the CPSU and Soviet government. The party is actively waging a consistent struggle to implement the Peace Program developed by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses.

At the same time we know that universal peace has still not been guaranteed yet. There exist aggressive imperialist military-political alliances created for war against the USSR and countries allied with us. They have initiated extensive preparations for war. Their activities are a direct threat to peace. Rather powerful forces are operating in the imperialist camp, ones attempting to foil relaxation of tension, aggravate the international situation, and organize a new stage in the arms race. Attempts by reactionaries to block ratification of the SALT-2 treaty in the U.S. Senate, the decision to initiate production of the components of a neutron weapon, the USA's attempts at forcing its European allies in NATO to consent to placement of new medium-range nuclear warhead missiles on their

territory, and the new increases in the military budget are graphical evidence of the dangerous actions of these forces. China's Maoist leadership is aligning itself with these imperialist forces. The anti-Soviet course taken by Beijing's leaders and their attempts at splitting the socialist fraternity, aggravating the international situation, and undermining the world revolutionary movement are playing into the hands of world reaction and helping imperialists of the USA and other bourgeois countries in their struggle against the USSR, against countries of the socialist fraternity, and against world socialism. This is why the CPSU is constantly concerned, in these conditions of a persisting military danger, for armed protection of real socialism against possible aggression.

The need for armed protection of socialist achievements is one of the general laws of the proletarian revolution and development of a new society. This law owes its existence exclusively to causes external to socialism--the aggressive nature of imperialism. The propaganda organs of imperialist countries and their accomplices are vainly attempting to distort the historic purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces, and to breathe new life into the malicious myth of a "Soviet military threat." The slander being spread by our enemies is nothing more than a cunning trick having the objective of justifying, in the eyes of world society, the unprecedented growth in the preparations being made for aggression by imperialist states.

Together with their allies in the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Armed Forces stand as a powerful factor preventing a new world war, and as a bulwark of universal peace. Not a single army of an exploiting state performs or can perform such an honorable and noble function.

Protection of the great achievements of socialism is a common concern of all states in the socialist fraternity. Considering the aggressive nature of imperialist blocs and their accomplices, the countries of the socialist fraternity united their military efforts within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. The CPSU and fraternal parties of the Warsaw Pact countries provide coordination to efforts aimed at strengthening the defensive power of our fraternity, and improving combat cooperation among the allied armies. Expansion of the international tasks of protecting socialism is one of the factors responsible for growth in the CPSU's role in military development.

Growth in the CPSU's role in military development is also the product of the greater complexity of its tasks in the present era, which in turn is the result of a greater dependence of the army's and navy's fighting power and combat readiness on the level of the society's socioeconomic and cultural development, on the achievements of scientific-technical progress, and on the country's moral, political, and spiritual potential. The requirements imposed on the combat and political training of the personnel, and on the combat readiness of the armed forces are growing with every year. The need for intensifying communist indoctrination of

the soldiers is becoming more and more urgent in connection with aggravation of the ideological struggle between socialism and imperialism in the world arena.

Keeping the armed forces in step with sociopolitic changes in Soviet society is an important manifestation of the party's concern for improving the armed forces. The CPSU has come to the conclusion that creation of developed socialism in the USSR has intensified the socialist nature of our armed forces. They transformed out of an organ of a state of dictatorship of the proletariat into an organ of a whole peoples state. Having lost their internal function together with total victory of socialism, our army and navy now direct all of their efforts at dependably protecting socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state against external enemies. Their duty to the people, the USSR Constitution declares, is to dependably protect the socialist fatherland, and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor. The Soviet Armed Forces continue to maintain their class orientation today, since it is their job to oppose international imperialism and restrain its attempts at aggressive actions and exporting counterrevolution.

The fact that the existence of the armed forces is not associated with any internal needs of the society does not mean that the army and navy do not play a certain social role in the life of our country. The Soviet Army and Navy are part of the people, living one life together with them. They were not created especially for the purposes of indoctrinating the young. Their purpose is to protect the fatherland. At the same time the army and navy have a great influence on the young people serving within them. The 25th CPSU Congress made mention of the tremendous role played by the armed forces, in which the young people undergo a school of endurance and discipline, and in which they acquire technical and occupational knowledge, and political training. We may in this sense refer to the great educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Our army and navy participate in the sociopolitical life our country, and in solving some of the problems of economic and cultural development. The people view the armed forces as their beloved offspring, and they make sure that the soldiers have everything they need. The ties the army and navy have with the laborers are becoming closer, richer, and more diverse with every year.

Every army and navy collective--from the subunit, unit, and ship to the armed forces as a whole--reflects by its countenance the sociopolitical and ideological unity of the Soviet people, the friendship of the people of the USSR, the unshakable proletarian internationalism of our society, the humanitarian essence of the socialist structure, and the nobility of its goals and tasks. The constant improvement of sociopolitical relationships in our country, the continuing growth of the ideological-political, moral, and cultural level of the Soviet people, and the greater energy they are devoting to labor are having a beneficial effect on the social



countenance of the army and navy. Young people joining the armed forces have a high level of general education, they are politically developed, physically healthy, and prepared to surmount the hardships of military service and acquire military proficiency in a short time. The Soviet society's sociopolitical development is having a positive influence upon the quality of officer training as well. The armed forces now contain politically mature, highly qualified officers who are wholly devoted to the party and people and capable of executing complex missions in both peacetime and wartime. More than 90 percent of the officers are communists and Komsomol members. One out of every two officers, and in some branches of troup almost all officers, have a higher military or special education.

The Communist Party devotes priority attention to developing and strengthening the military-technical base of the Soviet Army and Navy. The essence of the party's military-technical policy may be expressed as follows: relying upon the country's economic and scientific-potential and taking account of the advantages of socialism, the party must ensure priority development of those directions of scientific-technical progress in military affairs which are necessary to the armed forces. Owing to the paternal concern of the party and the selfless labor of the Soviet people the fighting power of our army and navy has been strengthened. They are outfitted with all of the modern resources of armed conflict. Modern weapons and military equipment significantly increase the firepower, striking power, and maneuverability of the troup and naval forces, and they engender new forms of the troop organization and new tactics. We ensure continuous growth in the fighting power of the armed forces by utilizing, in military affairs, the achievements of scientific-technical progress.

The Communist Party and the Soviet people are doing everything necessary to support the material-technical base of the army and navy at the level of the leading achievements of science and technology. As was noted by USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, our country's economy, science, and technology are at such a high level that we are in a position to create, within the shortest possible time, any sort of weapon upon which the enemies of peace may wish to rest their hopes.

Qualitative changes in military affairs elicited by the scientific-technical revolution exceed, in their importance and consequences, all that history has known to date. The appearance of nuclear missiles, and saturation of the army with modern, highly complex equipment have necessitated a new approach to development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The complex problems of improving the organization of the army and navy, of controlling them, of manning them, of improving troop training and indoctrination methods, and of developing military science have been solved and are continuing to be solved in integrated fashion under the party's guidance.



The most important means for reinforcing the combat readiness of the troops is to upgrade the quality and effectiveness of the combat skills of the personnel. The CPSU Central Committee asks the Soviet people to deeply study weapons and combat equipment, to be proficient with them, to raise the field, naval, and aerial skills of the units and ships, to master modern methods and resources of controlling the troops and naval forces, to prevent laxity and simplification in training, to achieve high coordination among military collectives, and to raise the discipline of the personnel and their political awareness.

Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the new USSR Constitution, and the successes enjoyed by the Soviet people in reaching the targets of the 10th Five-Year Plan elicited a great upsurge of activity and initiative among Soviet soldiers. Socialist competition, which has become an inseparable part of combat training and a powerful factor that mobilizes the soldiers to constantly raise the combat readiness of the subunits, units, and ships, and the armed forces as a whole, now plays a larger role. A movement for the best formation title has taken shape in the troops and fleets. Many other useful patriotic initiatives are also coming into being.

We know that growth of the party's role in communist development, which is an objective law, does not proceed automatically, spontaneously. This growth is a result of conscious, purposeful activities of the party itself. In order that it could remain true to the ultimate of its historic purpose, the CPSU displays constant concern for strengthening its ranks, for improving the social composition of its membership, and for bettering relationships within the party, the style and methods of party leadership, and organizational and political work among the masses; the CPSU is also encouraging its members to be more active, and it is raising their organization, efficiency, and responsibility. This concern can be seen in the decisions of the 23d, 24th, and 25th party congresses and the plenums of the Central Committee, and a number of the most important decrees of the CPSU Central Committee are the direct product of this concern. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's works and speeches, and particularly his books "Malaya zemlya" (The Little Land), "Vozrozhdeniye" (The Resurrection), "Tselina" (The Virgin Land), and "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" (Pressing Issues in the Ideological Work of CPSU), have tremendous significance to confirming a Leninist work style within the party and the norms of party life.

The army and navy political organs and party organizations are operating in accordance with the general party directives. They are intensifying the demands imposed upon persons seeking party membership, and they are complementing the party ranks with the best of the soldiers, ones representing the leading military specialties. The aggressiveness and initiative of the party members is developing, and the discipline of every communist and his responsibility for party affairs and for implementing party policy are rising. The unity of ideological and organizational

activity is growing stronger in the army and navy at all levels of party work. The role of primary party organizations is growing, their ties with soldier masses are becoming stronger, the significance of party meetings as a school of communist indoctrination is rising, and the collective nature of party leadership is becoming more obvious. Principled, open, and constructive criticism and self-criticism are developing more and more, and the effectiveness of control and execution of orders is rising.

Considering the complexity and special importance of the missions facing the Soviet Armed Forces, the party and the CPSU Central Committee constantly show concern for improving party-political work in the army and navy. This concern is clearly expressed, for example, in the CPSU Central Committee 21 January 1967 decree "On Measures for Improving Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," and in the new editions of the "Statutes on Political Organs" and "Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," approved in 1973. Important measures aimed at improving party-political work, ones affecting its content, its forms and methods, and the structure of the party-political machinery, have been implemented under the guidance of the CPSU Central Committee. In particular we have reinstated the post of deputy commander for political affairs in companies, batteries, squadrons, and subunits equivalent to them. Higher military-political schools created by a decision of the CPSU Central Committee have now been actively training political officers for more than 10 years.

The political organs and the party and Komsomol organizations in the troops and fleets, and the forms and methods of their work that have jelled today are capable of supporting execution of the missions they face. As a result of the measures implemented, the party's political work in the armed forces is being structured more and more on a scientific basis, and it is being channeled more objectively toward solution of problems concerned with raising the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces, improving their field, aerial, and naval skills, and preparing the personnel morally and psychologically.

Party-political work is one of the irreplaceable foundations of Soviet military development, a powerful means for implementing party policy in the armed forces, and a mandatory prerequisite of the Soviet motherland's victory over its enemies. Through party-political work, the party explains its policy, it exercises party influence upon the soldier masses, it gives shape to their qualities as active builders and defenders of communism, and it mobilizes the soldiers for successful execution of the missions facing the army and navy.

Party-political work is a strong and effective means, in the hands of the party, for strengthening the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces, and it is one of the directions of the CPSU's guidance of the armed forces.

Marxism-Leninism and Lenin's doctrine on protection of the socialist fatherland make up the ideological and theoretical base of party-political work. Its content, forms, and methods are derived from the doctrine on the party, created by V. I. Lenin and developed by the CPSU. Party-political work makes creative use of the basic premises of Soviet military science, military psychology, and military pedagogics. It permeates the entire process of combat and political training, troop training and indoctrination, and all of the life and activities of the army and navy. This is one of the manifestations of the socialist nature of our armed forces.

The party and its Central Committee make an effort to see that party-political work in the army and navy would, first of all, be conducted in the spirit of general party work and, secondly, be directed at successful execution of the missions posed to the armed forces by the party and the government. These two aspects of the approach to party-political work in the armed forces are merged into a single unit in the activities of commanders, army and navy political organs, and party organizations.

Party-political work in the army and navy is typified by high communist ideals, good planning, concreteness, continuity, effectiveness, the unity of ideological and organizational work, and close coordination with the activities of party and soviet organs at the places of deployment of troops and naval forces.

The 25th CPSU Congress gave a high assessment to party-political work being conducted in the armed forces. This evaluation obligates political organs and party organizations to raise its effectiveness and improve its forms and methods. The efforts of political organs, commanders, and party organizations--the full-time disciples of party policy and the organizers and indoctrinators of Soviet soldiers--must be aimed at raising the fighting power of the army and navy, and their combat readiness.

The Congress pointed out the need for all communists to master a Leninist work style. A Leninist work style presupposes a scientifically grounded approach to all social processes and to solution of all problems, high exactingness toward oneself and toward others, and the unity of word and deed. It is founded on collective leadership in party work, and on close ties with the masses. A Leninist work style is a creative style, one devoid of subjectivism, one that excludes self-satisfaction, and one that opposes all manifestations of bureaucratism and formalism. The extremely intense and diversified activities of the CPSU Central Committee and personally of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of USSR Defense Council, Marshal of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev are a model of a Leninist work style, of the ability to organically unite theory with practice and attain goals without fail. L. I. Brezhnev's speeches and works teach us to work and live in a Leninist style.

It is validly said that the human spirit is the battlefield of education, the place where the struggle to persuade the individual and win him over goes on. Only those who possess deep knowledge, including in military pedagogics and psychology, have the power to conduct this struggle competently. Mindless improvisation is impermissible when it comes to educating people; what we need is a scientific, integrated approach. Experience has shown that an integrated approach to all educational affairs in the armed forces, maintenance of close unity of ideological, political, work, military, and moral indoctrination with a consideration for the unique features of all categories of servicemen, and influence upon all spheres of life and activities of personnel in the army and navy promote greater effectiveness in our ideological work, as well as formation of an active life position in the Soviet soldier, manifested mainly in his responsible attitude toward his patriotic military duty, the military oath, and the military regulations, in his faultless discipline and diligence, and in his active participation in the socialist competition.

Commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations accepted the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" as a battle program of action. In this document the CPSU Central Committee emphasizes the need for intensifying the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces and multiplying the glorious traditions of the army and navy, service within which is a remarkable school of labor and military training, of moral purity and courage, and of patriotism and comradeship. Soviet soldiers are obligated to deeply recognize their duty of protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and protecting peace and socialism, and to maintain a clear impression of the military threat which exists as a serious reality in our times. The decree poses a number of concrete tasks to the Soviet Armed Forces in this connection. The main one, recalled Comrade M. A. Suslov in a report to the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers, is to nurture, in the young generation, a feeling of historic responsibility for the fate of socialism, for the flourishing and security of the fatherland.

Implementing the directives of the CPSU Central Committee, the military councils, political organs, commanders, political workers, the ideological institutions of the army and navy, the military press, our propaganda officers, and active party members have concentrated their efforts to attain a higher scientific level in their propaganda and agitation, to make it effective and concrete, and to tie it in with life itself, with the missions facing the armed forces; they are making our propaganda and agitation more aggressive. A special concern is being shown toward the indoctrination of army and navy youth. Today's young people have a broad spiritual and cultural outlook, their needs and desires are based on high aspirations, they possess a highly developed sense of personal worth, and they are especially sensitive to injustice and hypocrisy. This is why they require greater attention and deeper understanding.



This is all the more important considering the present ideological struggle, in which bourgeois propaganda services are increasing their attempts at corrupting the consciousness of Soviet military servicemen by the most sophisticated means. The growing intensity of the ideological duel in the international arena demands that we make our class positions especially clear in relation to all issues that arise in the struggle against bourgeois ideology, revisionism, Maoism, and Zionism. Nurturing high political alertness in the personnel in relation to our class enemies, and a feeling of social responsibility, is the forward edge of all party-political work. Development of a scientific outlook in Soviet people and in army and navy soldiers, and infusion of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, of a spirit of selfless devotion to the party's affairs and communist ideals, and a love for the socialist fatherland and proletarian internationalism has been and continues to be the backbone of ideological and political indoctrination.

All-forces political days have recently been enjoying increasingly greater acceptance as a means for ideological and political indoctrination in the army and navy. District, group of forces, fleet, major formation, and formation executives and political workers simultaneously speak, during hours devoted to political indoctrination, to the personnel of the companies, batteries, and subunits equivalent to them and, when necessary, to individual categories of unit and ship servicemen. All-forces political days make it possible to effectively study public opinion and the mood of the people. Discussions are conducted with the soldiers in an atmosphere of mutual trust; concrete material from the life of the subunits is the topic of discussion; the affairs of the collective and the shortcomings, difficulties, and the ways to surmount them are examined in a spirit of sincere dialogue. Questions and suggestions from the servicemen are generalized and analyzed. Concurrently the personnel are informed of practical steps being implemented for their benefit.

The armed forces possess all of the necessary prerequisites for adequate political indoctrination of the personnel. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev had the following to say in this regard: "Perhaps there is no place offering better possibilities for organizing party-political work than the army and navy. Well trained communists--commanders, engineers, and technicians--who have undergone a school of party indoctrination and combat training are concentrated here and a well organized party-political machinery has been created. All of the conditions for thorough analysis of the people and for maintaining a daily political influence upon each serviceman are present here.

"The task is to make good use of these conditions, such that party-political work would proceed every day, purposefully with all categories of personnel " ("Leninskim kursom" (Following Lenin's Course), Vol 2, p 51).



Army and navy party organizations keep the problems of improving party-political work at the center of their attention. These and other problems in the life and activities of army and navy party organizations are being discussed with new force in the course of the continuing election campaign of communists in the armed forces and in the entire party. The elections will go a long way to promote further activation of party-political work and intensification of party influence upon all of the life and activity of the army and navy.

Army and navy communists are the power which firmly cements together the military collectives; they are a dependable support to commanders in matters concerning combat and political training, reinforcement of military discipline, and improvement of combat readiness. Army and navy communists are a tested advance guard of all the personnel in the struggle for greater effectiveness and quality of military labor. The influence communists and party organizations have on all aspects of life and activities of the subunits, units, and ships is growing from day to day.

And, as USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov points out, this influence serves as a dependable guarantee of our successes, as one of the persuasive manifestations of the party's growing role in the armed forces under the conditions of developed socialism (See "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" (Selected Speeches and Articles), p 503)

Soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy are striving for high results in combat training and in their socialist pledges in honor of the 62d anniversary of Great October. The names of the best students of combat and political training, the classed specialists, and the masters of subordinate training and indoctrination will be announced at celebrations dedicated to this holiday of the Soviet state. And without a doubt communists will be the foremost among those who excel. It is through their will, their efforts, their selfless military labor, and their effective party-political work that the Leninist course of the CPSU and its guiding role in military development are being transformed into something alive, into a reality of army and navy, into the high combat readiness of our armed forces.

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## PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF COMBAT TROOPS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 79 signed to press 18 Oct 79 pp 35-39

[Article by Colonel V. Bystrov, Senior Instructor, Propaganda and Agitation Section, Political Directorate of the Ground Troops, and Colonel R. Dukov, Senior Officer, Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Troops: "Nurturing Psychological Stability in Soldiers"]

[Text] The tank moved toward the foxhole occupied by Guards Sergeant I. Milyutin. The steel giant was just a few meters away when its flame-thrower exploded into action, hurling tongues of flames from the ignited incendiary mixture in all directions. One of them reached Milyutin. One would think that this would be the very time to cry to a comrade for help, to roll over and beat the flames out. But the junior commander did none of this. He continued his duel with the tank. The sergeant raised himself up and confidently threw a grenade. Then, allowing the vehicle to pass over him, he dispatched another antitank grenade into its engine compartment with a precise toss. Only after this did he attempt to extinguish his burning clothing with the help of comrades coming to his rescue.

How would we assess the sergeant's act in the training battle? Bravado? A desire to show off his bravery? No! The motives of his act lay in his understanding of his military duty, his knowledge of his weapons, and his sense of responsibility for his assigned work. These are precisely the factors that have the decisive significance to insuring a soldier's high psychological stability--that is, a state in which he would perform reasonable and conscious acts in any situation, both on his own and as part of a military collective, at the same time manifesting initiative, creativity, decisiveness, and the will to win over the enemy. As we know, these capabilities do not appear spontaneously; they are shaped through competently organized political indoctrination, by the entire bent of army life. Soldiers are made, not born. "And the higher the quality of training and indoctrination and the more the conditions under which exercises, flights, and sea cruises proceed resemble those of real combat," emphasizes USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade D. F. Ustinov, "the faster the soldier is made."

The self-sacrificing actions of Soviet soldiers have their spiritual roots in deep communist conviction as to the justice of the work they are called upon to defend. A high alertness, complete surrender of the self to duty, and true proficiency in maintaining and using top-class combat equipment and weapons are required of each of them. People who are persistent and purposeful, and who are able to continually improve their combat proficiency can be brave and steadfast and possess irreproachable special skills and all that is needed for victory over the enemy.

As A. S. Makarenko wrote, we cannot nurture a courageous individual without placing him in conditions within which he would be able to display courage. This alone is enough to explain the objective of combat training--teaching every armed defender of the motherland the science of winning over a strong, well equipped enemy and acting proficiently in both offensive and defensive combat, day and night, in a complex ground, aerial, and electronic situation, with a consideration for combat capabilities and local factors.

Developing spiritual and physical steadfastness and stubbornness in attaining a goal in the soldiers is one of the priority concerns of all organizers of training and indoctrination. The problems are broadly discussed in political lessons, lectures, discussions, thematic evenings, and in the course of other purposeful functions of educational nature; they are at the focus of attention of commanders and personnel combat training leaders, whose special role in this work is spelled out by the regulations, the combat training program, and the teacher's manuals on exercise organization. Complying with the guidelines and manuals, officers try to practice combat in critical dynamic situations that encourage subordinates to do what they must do in combat. They also practice using their organic weapons against the combat formations of advancing troops, "rolling over" soldiers with tanks, creating zones of fire and destruction in the path of the advancing "enemy," and forcing water obstacles by improvised means. Airmen harden themselves well by surmounting zones of intense antiaircraft fire, submariners do so by forcing their way through strong antisubmarine lines, and antiaircraft gunners do so by repelling aerial attacks from different altitudes and directions. Integrated use of various trainers and stimulation resources is highly beneficial. Let us turn to instructive episodes of the current training year for confirmation of this.

A tactical exercise was going on. The motorized rifle battalion commanded by Captain S. Tamantsev, which was in the forward detachment, came to a narrow but fast and full mountain stream. The mission of the subunit included capturing the opposite bank and helping the main forces of the attackers to cross the water obstacle. But the only bridge was demolished, and the retreating "enemy" was trying to dig in on the opposite bank. Analyzing the situation, the battalion commander gave instructions to cross by improvised means--with ropes, poles, and homemade rafts. Despite the "enemy's" desperate resistance the training mission was completed.

Attainment of the goal was promoted, first, by the ability the officers and sergeants had for making the correct decisions quickly and controlling their subordinates constantly and, second, by the high psychological stability of the personnel, their conviction in the need for executing their mission and for displaying high professional skill.

Psychological training was also an important factor in the field exercises in which the battalion commanded by Guards Captain V. Kurdyukov participated. In addition to performing their gunnery missions, the gunners surmounted "contaminated" terrain and marched cross-country through marshy forests, under simulated enemy fire.

Motorized riflemen under Guards Captain M. Shul'gan displayed great stubbornness and persistence in fighting for their training goals. In their 100-kilometer route of march the Guards troops engaged the "enemy" in combat several times, surmounted areas of "contaminated" terrain, obstructions, and "minefields," and they successfully completed their mission.

The subunits named here differ somewhat from one another in purpose and in the equipment they have. Despite all of this, they do have many things in common in terms of the forms and content of the effort made to nurture high volitional qualities in the soldiers. One of these common factors is the purposeful activity of training organizers directed at improving the combat skills of the subordinates in a situation close to that of real combat. It was not without purpose that the soldiers were placed in complex conditions for their missions; these conditions did more to multiply the strength of each soldier than to cause a lack of confidence.

Commanders deserve considerable credit for insuring success in the actions of the personnel. During training exercises, they do everything to see that one of the fundamental principles of Soviet military pedagogics would be constantly and most fully satisfied: "Teach the troops that which they will need in war," proceed from the simple to the complex, continually upgrade the quality of training and indoctrination, and wage a decisive struggle against stereotypy and simplifications. Officers possess deep military knowledge, and they have the ability to surmount difficulties, to nurture stubbornness, purposefulness, and discipline in their subordinates through personal example, and to encourage them to perform their functional responsibilities without reproach. High military-pedagogical skills, tactfulness, and a good knowledge of the psychology of a soldier's personality and the military collective, when incorporated with a knowledge of the nature of modern warfare, permit them to properly instill high psychological steadfastness in their subordinates during daily combat training.

Commanders display constant concern for improving the training material base, and they see to it that diverse, complex training situations are created. Apparatus reproducing the sound effects of combat and the visual

attributes of explosions, fires, artillery strikes, and so on is created through the efforts of local handymen.

An effort is made in training and indoctrination to have communists and Komsomol members serve as the example. Party and Komsomol organizations thoughtfully discuss the pressing problems of their day-to-day activities and plan all their measures with special care. Indicative of this is the work of the party organization in which Guards Major A. Lyashchenko is the party committee secretary. During their regular meeting before the personnel set off for a field exercise the active party members meticulously examined the things the communists were to do to insure that the forthcoming exercise would proceed with high quality. Opinions stated in the meeting were reflected in the adopted resolution, which the party committee members began implementing right away. Following their example in all phases of the exercise, the communists explained to the personnel the training missions, the requirements of the manuals and regulations, and the tactics to be employed, and they publicized the experience of the best soldiers. They insured that the subunits would engage in active competition in pursuit of their missions and standards; emphasis was placed during the competition on doing individual work with every crew, squad, and detachment.

We know that when soldiers assimilate the norms and rules of behavior in a particular concrete situation, they develop an entire system of needs, motives, and social attitudes encouraging them to persistently master political knowledge and their combat specialty, to temper their will, and to surmount the difficulties, deprivations, and dangers accompanying military labor. Important in this regard are systematic exercises that temper the mind in high-risk situations, and intense activities in special trainers, in training camps, and in tactical exercises maximally close to real battle.

In order to make sure that every serviceman would master the equipment and weapons fully and quickly, we study the most sensible ways and means of performing combat missions. We thoroughly analyze the content of problems such as advancing to a deployment line, surmounting contaminated terrain, and repelling counterattacks, and the order of performing such missions. Soldiers in different specialties participate in individual and group discussions on the nature of actions to be taken in combat.

The process of shaping the personality is complex and multifaceted. It proceeds within the collective, though at the same time it is deeply individual in relation to each person. When conducting mass functions, we must consider the moods, needs, and interests most typical of the personnel, their training level, and the general and particular tasks, both current and long-range. The individual approach requires a knowledge of the soldier's character traits, his biographical information, and his individual features and properties. The best results are achieved when we combine mass functions with individual work, when we make extensive use of



oral political agitation and lecture propaganda, and when we permit the soldiers to engage in lively communication with the bearers of advanced skills.

The best results in shaping the necessary volitional qualities and psychological steadfastness are achieved wherever the work is organized with a consideration for the unique features of the personnel's military activities. In motorized rifle subunits we concentrate our attention on differentiated exercises for soldiers in different combat specialties--automatic riflemen, sharpshooters, gunner-operators, antitank rocket launcher crews, grenade throwers, antiaircraft crews, drivers, and other servicemen--with the goal of developing an offensive spirit, and stubbornness and steadfastness in defense. These goals are also successfully served by training exercises, by competitions for the best specialists, and by demonstrations of the best methods and procedures with the use of actual combat equipment and weapons.

Experience shows that good equipment and a competently used training material base have extremely important significance to shaping the necessary moral-political and psychological qualities in the personnel. Thus the subordinates of Captain S. Tamantsev, referred to earlier, do all of their practicing on the fire training ground, where they successfully learn to fight tanks using incendiary resources, and to coordinate their actions with tanks. This subunit makes use of tactical training fields offering conditions that permit the soldiers to learn to surmount water obstacles, trenches, pillboxes and emplacements; it also has at its disposal an engineering training ground containing mock-ups of bridges, bunkers, and other structures.

The tank troops have accumulated a good deal of interesting experience in instilling high psychological steadfastness. The organizers of this training devote special attention to explaining the role and purpose of tanks in modern combat, and they describe the ways, methods, and means of making the fullest use of tank equipment and weapons. Systematically conducted crew training exercises in underwater driving, in flooding a tank and abandoning it while under water, performing the necessary repairs, conducting rescue operations, and crossing water obstacles while under water produce a significant positive result in terms of shaping the volitional qualities of the tank crews.

The psychological training experience of motorized riflemen operating in armored personnel carriers is instructive in the company commanded by Yu. Turyanik. On seeing that the driver-mechanics were having their greatest training difficulties in surmounting antitank ditches, the officer began devoting the most persistent attention to revealing the possibilities afforded by an armored personnel carrier. The soldiers practiced the concrete ways to surmount an obstacle element by element, right on the terrain. This was followed by practice in a trainer. This method makes every specialist confident of his strength, and it produces success.

The benefit provided by the lessons grows even more when they are coordinated with get-togethers of soldiers with participants of previous exercises and with experienced driver-mechanics.

There are also some unique features in work with gunners. Adding to what we have said about the artillery battalion commanded by Guards Captain V. Kurdyukov, this subunit devotes the most persistent attention to teaching the soldiers to be responsible for the quality of their work, and for constant readiness to act boldly and decisively in all gunnery practices and in all work with the equipment. The decisive, fluid, and the dynamic nature of modern combat, and the role played in the outcome of combat by artillery and by coordination of artillery fire with missile strikes are deeply revealed in the course of the subunit's training. The destructive properties of modern weapons, the dependability of personal resources that provide protection against them, and the importance of maintaining self-control and the ability to fight in the complex conditions of modern combat, in massed air raids, in the face of artillery and mortar fire, and in response to the effects of mass destruction weapons are demonstrated.

There are many unique features to the efforts made to develop high psychological steadfastness in missilemen. As a rule this effort is differentiated: in exercises conducted for combat crews, command post personnel, and communication center personnel. As an example the training of specialists in launcher batteries accounts for the key factors in their activity such as replacing training missiles by live ones, the individual elements of making a launcher and missile combat ready, and the launching of a missile.

The individual displays his volitional qualities in his behavior. In this connection we should turn attention to the fact that some servicemen fail to display adequate exactingness toward themselves; they are deeply mistaken when they reason that they could take it easy in day-to-day service, because when the time comes they will be able to "prove themselves." The following training episode will allow the reader to evaluate the sort of negative consequences such an erroneous position might lead to. As soon as Captain M. Gorizin's subordinates reached the line occupied by the "enemy" the motorized riflemen found their targets and made ready to fire. But the "enemy" forestalled them and was able to deluge them with fire first. His decisive action and his broad use of diverse forms of combat (mines, tank traps) caused confusion in the ranks of the attackers. Because exercises had previously been conducted in simplified conditions, most of the soldiers found themselves facing too much that was unknown and unexpected; this caused some of them to lose confidence in their strength, and to panic. To the credit of Captain M. Gorizin and his subordinates, this incident did serve as a lesson to them for the future. They subsequently placed special emphasis in personnel moral-political and psychological training, on coordinating the actions of the soldiers in behalf of the overall training mission, on developing mutual aid and support, on

conducting lessons in a complex situation, and on nurturing boldness, decisiveness, and an unshakable will for victory in the soldiers.

Developing psychological stability is a difficult and important task. It requires all commanders and political workers to display initiative, creativity, professional skill, and a pedagogical tactfulness, and to rely extensively on party and Komsomol organizations, and on the strength and influence of military collectives.

It is the will of the motherland that soldiers be steadfast and decisive. The better the combat training and the more the daily training satisfies the requirements of modern combat, the better this need is filled.

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#### POLITICAL TRAINING: 'POLITICAL DAY' ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 79 signed to press 18 Oct 79 pp 45-50

[Article by Colonel V. Khrobostov, Deputy Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Section, Propaganda and Agitation Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate: "The All-Forces Political Day"]

[Text] Commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy have many means at their disposal for instilling firm communist conviction and a sense of high responsibility for one's duty to the motherland in the soldiers. Now that the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" has been published, these means have become even more substantial, sophisticated, and effective. One such means is the political day, which represents a higher level of organization of political indoctrination, and a stronger tie between our Leninist party and the masses. All-forces political days, it was noted at the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers recently held in Moscow, make a major contribution to the effectiveness of indoctrination.

V. I. Lenin emphasized that word and deed are one. He attached tremendous significance to oral presentations by important party and Soviet government officials to the laborers on political topics. Vladimir Il'ich himself always found the time to speak at meetings and conferences, to meet with the common laborers, to delve into their needs and demands, and to provide the necessary assistance.

Displaying constant concern for implementing a Leninist style of work, the Communist Party is doing a great deal to raise the aggressiveness executives display in indoctrination of the masses. The need for an all-forces political day was deeply grounded in the CPSU Central Committee decree on ideological indoctrination. "Every communist, no matter where he labors," this party Central Committee decree states, "must be a propagandist and disciple of the ideals of the Leninist party, and devote all of his knowledge and all of his strength of spirit to this extremely important work."

The experience of the first political days in the troops offers persuasive evidence that the functions, in which communist executives took part, are a new step forward in raising the effectiveness of ideological and political indoctrination, intensifying its concreteness and aggressiveness, and strengthening its ties with the life and missions of the soldiers.

Being one of the forms of participation of executives in oral political propaganda and agitation, the all-forces political day is becoming an important inherent part of political guidance of the soldier masses, and of their ideological, moral, military, and legal indoctrination.

In the conditions of developed socialism, the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" states, Lenin's premise that a state gains its strength from the consciousness of the masses, that it is strong when the masses know everything and when they are able to judge all that goes on and to approach everything consciously, is gaining more importance than ever before. In this aspect it would be difficult to overstate the significance of all-forces political days, during which we in a sense broaden the framework of information provided to the personnel of the units and subunits in relation to a broad range of problems of interest to them, and during which the personnel gain a correct understanding of these problems. Speeches by executives of republic and local party and soviet organs and by all communist executives help the soldiers to orient themselves in life at home and in international events, and they elicit the desire to make a maximum contribution to higher combat readiness. Senior commanders, chiefs, and staff and political organ officers participating in political days have the possibility for acquiring information firsthand, so to speak, on the state of affairs and on the morale of army and navy collectives, and for considering suggestions from the soldiers in their work.

Political days that have been held in a number of formations of the National Air Defense Troops, the Strategic Missile Forces, the Soviet Air Force, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Red Banner Northern Fleet, and some others are deserving of attention.

Here, for example, is the way political day proceeded in one of the units of the Red Banner Far East Military District. It began with a speech to the soldiers by a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the first secretary of an oblast CPSU committee. The soldiers listened with interest to a narration of what the laborers were doing in the socialist competition for early attainment of the state's targets for the 10th Five-Year Plan. The facts and figures presented in the speech to describe the selfless struggle of the leading collectives of the factories, plants, coal mines, fields, farms, logging areas, and fishing grounds were persuasive evidence that the laborers of this remote area were successively implementing



the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, and they evoked a sense of pride in the soldiers for our motherland and its successes.

Speeches by executive officers were listened to with great interest in the units and subunits of one of the district's garrisons. They typically geared the subject matter of their talks to the different categories of servicemen. As an example Communist Yu. Gusev talked with the unit's officers on the military-political situation in the Far East and in Southeast Asia, and on the tasks they were to perform in the summer training period. Prior to this Yuriy Aleksandrovich thoroughly studied the progress the officers were making in their official and social duties and their socialist pledges, and the state of combat and political training in the subunits. His talk was interesting, and it was saturated with concrete facts. He spoke for example about Senior Lieutenant A. Palychev and his achievements. What did the officer do to make his an excellent company? The senior lieutenant regularly concerns himself with raising his ideological-political and military-professional level. He takes an integrated approach to solving the problems of personnel training and indoctrination. He is persistent in seeing that every enlisted man and sergeant would do as he promises.

Executive officers speaking to enlisted men, sergeants, laborers, and office workers of the Soviet Army also held thorough discussions as well. Speaking about political day as a whole, we can confidently say that the day's high effectiveness was predetermined by good preparation. The future audiences were studied beforehand, and concern was shown for preparing the technical propaganda resources, for placing the visual agitation materials in good order, and for bringing the necessary information and facts from the life of the subunits to the soldiers comprehensibly and persuasively.

CPSU Central Committee Politburo Candidate, Georgian SSR  
Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary E. A. Shevardnadze took part in political day proceedings in units and subunits of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District. He spoke to soldiers of one of the units. In his substantial, thoroughly grounded report, Comrade E. A. Shevardnadze revealed to his audience the results of the USSR's economic and social development in the first half of 1979, and he presented detailed arguments in support of the objective need for the measures being implemented by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government to improve control over the national economy.

E. A. Shevardnadze devoted significant room in his speech to problems upon which the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the scientists, engineers, and technicians of the republic are working with persistence and inspiration. In conclusion E. A. Shevardnadze appealed to the commanders, political workers, and all soldiers in the unit to increase their effort in the struggle to raise the subunit's combat readiness and complete the present training year successfully.

A rayon party Committee first secretary, the deputy chairman of a rayon executive committee of peoples deputies, and the first secretary of the Georgian SSR Komsomol Committee gave political reports to other units of one of the garrisons. These meetings with the soldiers helped to strengthen the ties of the military units with the local party and soviet organizations.

Lieutenant General A. Overchuk, a military council member and the chief of the district's political directorate, spent political day in the Nakhichevan' Garrison. His report on the results of the USSR's economic and social development in the first half of 1979 was saturated with clearly understandable figures and persuasive examples, and the soldiers listened with great interest. He induced their desire to master military affairs and their own specialties better.

The practice of conducting all-forces political days that has gelled in the army and navy foresees a system of monthly concurrent speeches by executives of the military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and formations to personnel of companies, batteries, and squadrons, and to officers and warrant officers of regimental and battalion staffs, and elements equal to them at unit and ship level. Communist executives in military educational institutions as a rule give speeches at the class and training battalion level and, where possible, at the training company (battery) level. Speeches for Soviet Army and Navy laborers and office workers are organized in institutions, directorates, laboratories, enterprises, and shops. Experience has shown that limitation of the audience in this way makes it possible not only to insure that all personnel would attend but also, and most importantly, to really raise the impact personal communication between executives and the soldiers, laborers, and office workers has, to study their moods and demands deeper and more concretely, to effectively influence the formation of public opinion, to create a healthy morale in army, navy, and labor collectives, and to influence the quality with which tasks are completed more successfully.

The military councils and political organs of the military districts, groups of forces, fleets, formations, military educational institutions, scientific research institutes, commanders, chiefs, and political workers of USSR Ministry of Defense units and institutions organize the all-forces political days. Practice has shown the suitability of scheduling political days regularly. When planning a political day, it is at the same time important to consider the unique features of the area in which the troops and the naval forces are deployed and based, their purpose, and the sort of training missions in which they are engaged. Experience has shown that officers of the political directorates of the districts, groups of forces, and fleets, and of formation political organs should take an active part in the planning of political day and determination of its topics. As a rule the plan for the political day is written by the formation political section jointly with the commander

and staff, in coordination with the political organ next up the chain of command. This practice has fully justified itself.

Ideological indoctrination conducted on political days now centers mainly on deep explanation of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee, the successes the Soviet people have enjoyed in their implementation, the pressing problems in the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the military-political situation in the world, the tasks of the armed forces in the present stage, and the most important problems of ideological, political, moral, military and legal indoctrination of military servicemen.

This work principally takes the form of reports, discussions, political briefings, and question-and-answer evenings. The topics of the first political days held in the districts, groups, and fleets included ones such as "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Struggle Against Bourgeois Ideology Today, and the Need for Raising the Political Alertness of the Personnel," "Service in the Army and Navy--a School of Labor and Military Skill, Moral Purity and Courage, Patriotism and Comradeship," "The Important Front for the Struggle for Communism (On the CPSU Central Committee Decree on Ideological Work)," "Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on the Tasks of the Armed Forces in the Present Stage (Based on Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's Book "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (Standing Guard Over Peace and Socialism)), and others.

The experience of planning all-forces political days persuades us that when we determine the topic to be covered within a particular training period, we should foresee a possibility for making changes in the tasks of the troops. It has also been found to be unsuitable to make the topics the same for all of the districts, groups of forces, and fleets. At the same time it has now become obvious that the political day topic of the formation (or separate unit) must be the same throughout. It would hardly be justified, as an example, for communist executives to speak on several topics in one garrison of the Southern Group of Forces on the same political day. This would make the preparations too complex, and it would reduce the possibilities for going deeply into the topics planned.

It should be noted that political days significantly raise the responsibility of political organs and party organizations for the ideological-theoretical level of the planned measures, and that they require clear organization and interaction at all levels, and practical assistance to speakers. Many districts and fleets have developed the practice of briefing these comrades and of organizing reference materials. This work is competently organized, for example, in the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District. The district and formation communist executives take an active part in regular briefings and orientation lessons. The libraries, the information and propaganda centers, and the instructor training offices are brought into play during

preparations for the all-forces political day. The speakers are given reference materials 10-15 days early, and the briefings are organized a week before the function. When necessary, orientation lessons are given on the eve of the political day. Special attention is turned in the briefings to the need for creating an atmosphere for free exchange in the lecture halls, such that every soldier could state his opinion and ask questions about any topic of interest to him. Political organs and political workers at all levels provide individual assistance to speakers in adapting their materials to the specific features of the audience, with a consideration for the real state of affairs in the given military collective.

The political organs of many districts, groups of forces, and fleets conducting all-forces political days have tried to integrate the efforts of ideological units and the forms and methods of the work so as to achieve the fullest possible discussion of political day's topics. Technical propaganda resources, libraries, and visual agitation materials are used effectively for these purposes. During the time preceding the political day literature is exhibited on the appropriate topics, documentary films and newsreels are shown, radio news programs are carried, visual agitation is conducted, catalogs and collections of articles and journals are prepared, and so on. Thus the documentary films "My Fatherland," "We Are Building the Baykal-Amur Rail Trunkline," "Quality Problems," "The Day's News," and others were shown in the clubs of many units of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District during preparations for and in the course of an all-forces political day. Local radio broadcasting centers have organized special radio news broadcasts on the topic "Following the Course Charted by the 25th CPSU Congress." Discussions entitled "The Map of the Motherland" were held in Lenin rooms, quizzes were held, and newspaper and journal articles on the successes of the Soviet people in attaining their targets in the 10th Five-Year Plan were discussed. Displays and book exhibits were set up on the topics "The Party is Leading us to Communism," "Up the Steps of the Five-Year Plan," and "What the 10th Five-Year Plan Means to the Region in Which We Serve."

The experience of organizing speeches for the first political days showed how important the methodological aspect is. When a communist executive gives a speech in the course of a political day, he communicates directly with the people, and usually right in their subunit. The first part of this communication entails a speech on a prepared topic. The second part consists of a lively discussion, answers to questions, and parting words on how to best serve in the army, perform one's military duty, surmount difficulties, and structure mutual relationships within the collective. This form of communication is extremely effective and fruitful, but it requires meticulous preparation, considerable pedagogical tactfulness, and the ability to create a real atmosphere of free exchange and converse with the soldiers in a tone that elicits the trust of the soldiers. Much depends here, the experience shows, on the political organs, on their capability for preparing the speakers for a sincere conversation with



the audience, and for arming them with a knowledge of the real state of affairs and with thorough and effective arguments concerning all of the complex and "critical" problems of domestic and international life.

As an example Communist Officer G. Pavlov's meeting with soldiers of one of the outstanding motorized rifle companies of the Red Banner Far East Military District was interesting. At first the soldiers listened to a thoroughly substantiated report on the international situation, on the successes of the peaceful foreign policy of the Communist Party and Soviet government, on the intrigues of reactionary imperialist forces, on their aggressive desires, on the anti-Soviet hegemonic policy of the present leaders of Beijing, and on their complicity with the enemies of peace and socialism. Then the discussion turned to the affairs of the subunit, and to the successes and shortcomings in summer combat training. The officer listed the outstanding soldiers of combat and political training--senior driver-mechanic M. Fedorov, machinegunner M. Romanov, assistant grenade thrower I. Arslanov, and driver-mechanic S. Domkov. He described the ways they attained their successes in their work, and he advised the listeners what they should do to eliminate the existing shortcomings and improve the quality of combat and political training. The general opinion is that such meetings make a noticeable contribution to mobilizing the military collectives for the struggle to maintain constant combat readiness and strengthen military discipline.

At the same time shortcomings do exist in the way political days are organized in some places. Certain comrades place too much emphasis on political training lessons conducted by executives, visits to party and Komsomol meetings, and work on problems associated with inspection functions. Efficient summarization of the results, collection and classification of questions, and provision of information to the personnel on steps taken to implement their suggestions have not as yet become mandatory components of measures associated with the all-forces political day. Not all party and Komsomol organizations display sufficient activity in political day preparations yet.

All-forces political days in the army and navy evoke considerable interest and satisfaction in all servicemen, and they have a most beneficial influence upon development of their high sociopolitical activity and personal responsibility for exemplary performance of one's military duty. Ways to improve preparations for and the conduct of all-forces political days are being actively sought in the troops and in the fleets. Active steps are being taken to generalize and introduce the best experience. The latter is thoroughly illuminated in army and naval press. Good initiative has been displayed in this regard by the newspapers SLAVA RODINY of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District, NA STRAZHE of the Red Banner Baku Antiaircraft District, SUVOROVSKIY NATISK of the Red Banner Far East Military District, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA of the Southern Group of Forces, and others that have published a number of substantial articles on the experience of conducting political days.



Life persuasively assures us that the most important thing to do today when generalizing the best experience is to find ways to improve the methods followed and preparations made by executives for the speeches, analyze the questions and suggestions from the servicemen, and create an efficient system for reacting to critical remarks. It would be a very good thing if steps taken to improve all of this work would be examined thoroughly at meetings and conferences of commanders, political workers, ideological workers, and active party and Komsomol members. As an example a discussion of the experience of conducting an all-forces day by the political directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, held during a regular 2-day conference of ideological workers, was instructive. Its value lay in the fact that all present had recently participated in an all-forces day in one of the formations. The discussion of its conduct was interesting, and it evolved into a lively, creative dialogue on ways for improving all of this work.

All-forces political days have become an effective form of participation by executive staff in oral political propaganda and agitation, and they actively promote growth in the scientific level, concreteness, effectiveness, relevance, and aggressiveness of all ideological work. This is precisely why all that is associated with their organization must be constantly within the field of vision of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations.

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## OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON COMBAT MATERIEL

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[Lesson outline "for instructors of group political classes" prepared by Engr-Lt Col I. Ivanov, Candidate of Technical Sciences: "Persistently Master Combat Equipment and Weapons"]

[Excerpts] Study of this topic is intended to help privates and seamen gain a better realization of the constant concern displayed by the Communist Party and Soviet government for the availability of equipment in our armed forces, equipment being the material foundation of their defensive power and invincibility, and to deeply sense the need for persistently mastering combat equipment and weapons, to maintain them in high combat readiness, to service them well, and to care for them with concern. It is important for the students to firmly assimilate the requirements imposed on the personnel by the CPSU, the Soviet government, and the USSR minister of defense in relation to mastering modern combat equipment and weapons, and to gain an understanding of military affairs more diligently, so that each soldier at his post would do everything depending upon him for an honorable welcome to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Four hours are allotted to the subject. It would be best to distribute this time as follows: two hours of lecture (narration) and 2 hours of seminar (discussion). Preparations for the seminar (discussion) may be made in the evening.

It would be desirable to concentrate the attention of the students on the following problems in the lecture (narration): 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on equipment availability as the material foundation of the army's and navy's fighting power. 2. The party's concern for supplying modern weapons and combat equipment to the Soviet Armed Forces. 3. Persistently learning military affairs, and achieving perfect mastery of one's military specialty.

It would be important to note in a brief introduction that the Communist Party and Soviet government display constant concern for equipment availability in our army and navy. "No one must doubt the fact," the 25th CPSU Congress emphasized, "that our party will do everything to see that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union will continue to possess everything they need to complete their important mission--standing guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and serving as the bulwark of universal peace" ("Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS" (Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress), p 83). This premise is reflected in the USSR Constitution, which states that the state insures the security and defense capabilities of the country and outfits the USSR Armed Forces with everything they need.

It would also be suitable to note in the introduction that the CPSU and Soviet government combine their concern for strengthening the motherland's defensive power and raising the combat readiness of the army and navy with a successive and persistent struggle for peace and broad international cooperation, with an effort to avert the threat of thermonuclear war. Declaring peace to be the supreme goal of their policy, the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity invariably favor reinforcing political relaxation by military relaxation, and the limitation and reduction of arms, mainly strategic arms, to be followed in the future by total and universal disarmament. Important in this regard was the meeting last year in Vienna between CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter. This meeting resulted in the signing of the Soviet-American Treaty on Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT-2).

The program for relaxing international tension outlined in a speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the GDR is a new important step that may lead to serious improvement of the political climate in Europe and in the entire world. However, there are still forces on the planet which clearly disfavor relaxation of tension. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies cannot ignore the fact that some states continue to make military preparations and accelerate their pace. Under these conditions we are forced to show concern for our security. "The defensive potential of the Soviet Union," noted Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "must be sufficient to insure that no one would risk disturbing our peaceful life. Our policy is the reduction of arms, a weakening of military confrontation, and not superiority in arms."

Army and navy soldiers avidly approve and unanimously support this policy line of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. They deeply recognize and honorably perform their constitutional duty of defending the socialist fatherland, directing all of their efforts at raising their alertness and combat readiness, and improving the quality of their military skills.

## 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU On Equipment Availability as the Material Foundation of the Army's and Navy's Fighting Power

The victory of Great October, which initiated an era of universal revolutionary renewal of the world, elicited the class hatred of imperialist predators and their aggressive efforts against the world's first labor state. The Soviet Armed Forces were created with the purpose of protecting the socialist fatherland under the guidance of the Communist Party. The birth of our army and navy and their heroic history are inseparably associated with the name of V. I. Lenin, a political and military genius. The Red Army, M. V. Frunze noted, is the best offspring and legacy left by Comrade Lenin, and it is the main force insuring our peaceful Communist development.

## 2. The Party's Concern For Supplying Modern Weapons and Combat Equipment to the Soviet Armed Forces

During the prewar five-year plans remarkable personnel with high proficiency in the handling of military equipment developed in our army. "Not a single army in the world," PRAVDA wrote, "possesses personnel such as those in our Workers and Peasants Army. The people of the Red Army are people of a special sort. Their supreme devotion to the motherland is united with boldness and valor, multiplied by knowledge and the ability to make perfect use of modern combat equipment."

As we know, we were unable to fully implement the party's measures for rearming the army and navy--fascist Germany's treacherous attack upon the Soviet Union interfered. The Great Patriotic War was the hardest and cruellest of all wars ever endured by our motherland. Hitler's Germany, which had the economic and military resources of almost all of West Europe at its disposal, had mobilized and concentrated a troop grouping of tremendous strength, in both men and equipment, in the frontier zones. As was noted in the article "The Arms Industry in the Patriotic War," published in the journal *PLANOVYE KHOZYAYSTVO* (No 3, 1944), by D. F. Ustinov, who was the peoples commissar of armament during that war and who is now a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the USSR minister of defense, and a marshal Soviet Union: "The historically unprecedented length of the front, the great scope of the encounters, and the use of large numbers of modern types of weapons in battles and in operations, weapons which had never been known to any war or any army, necessitated a tremendous increase in war production."

Many defense industry plants had to be hurriedly evacuated east. The Communist Party, which transformed the country into a single military camp, did everything to correct the serious situation as quickly as possible, and to provide sufficient quantities of armament and ammunition to the troops. By as early as the end of 1941 many of the evacuated enterprises began producing weapons and combat equipment. And by June 1942 the Soviet economy was fully converted to a war footing. By utilizing

industrial resources strictly for the needs of defense, with the goal of defeating the enemy, we were able to organize production of military equipment in quantities significantly exceeding the enemy's weapon production. Confirmation of this statement may be found in the following figures: During the war, the USSR's mean annual production exceeded fascist Germany's production 1.5-2 times in relation to field guns (75 mm and above), tanks, self-propelled guns, and airplanes, and by almost five times in relation to mortars and light machineguns.

It should also be noted that our defense industry managed to surpass the enemy not only in quantity but also in quality of the armament produced. Soviet defense enterprises constantly increased their production volume during the war, and they successfully assimilated production of large series of new, more sophisticated models of armament. Thus in 1942-1944 they organized mass production of 57-mm, 76-mm and 100-mm guns, which proved themselves well against enemy tanks. In 1943-1944 more than 100 plants and dozens of scientific-technical centers worked on the creation of new models of infantry weapons, automatic ones primarily. The BM-13 rocket launchers, which came to be called the Katyushas, appeared in the troops early in the war. Production of more-sophisticated models of warplanes, tanks, guns, ammunition, and rocket weapons was assimilated, and development of radar was started.

The Great Patriotic War ended with the total defeat of Hitler's Germany and its allies. Under the guidance of the Communist Party, which remained faithful to V. I. Lenin's commandments, the Soviet people and their armed forces demonstrated to all the world the indestructible power of socialism.

In addition to those who defended the liberty and independence of our motherland with arms in mortal combat, those who forged the weapons, smelted the steel, turned the shells, and built the tanks and airplanes made an honorable contribution to an earlier victory. Our war economy ended up more powerful than the war economy of the fascist bloc. And it is no wonder that after the victory T-34's, Yaks, guns, and patrol boats were raised aloft on pedestals. They were raised aloft as symbols of the military and labor valor of the army and people, as a symbol of the freedom to live, work, and build a glorious future, defended in battles.

The Soviet Armed Forces emerged from the mortal engagement with fascism much stronger, enriched by a tremendous amount of military experience. In the postwar years, having assimilated the latest achievements of scientific-technical progress, they became even more powerful, transforming into the indestructible bulwark of universal peace and the security of nations, and a mighty deterrent to the aggressive intrigues of imperialism.

The Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy is directed at creating the conditions permitting peaceful and creative construction, and at protection of our motherland. The Soviet Union has never been a proponent of the arms race. Our peaceful foreign policy is universally known.



The "cold war" started by the imperialists caused dramatic aggravation of the international situation. Aggressive imperialist circles would not abandon their hopes of blocking the course of social progress by force of arms, or of depriving the people of their revolutionary achievements, and they unleashed an unprecedented arms race. The cutting edge of their military preparations is turned primarily at the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries. Under these conditions the USSR and other countries that took the path of socialist construction were forced to spend considerable amounts on defense, despite the highly acute need for restoration and for development of the local national economies.

Owing to the untiring concern of the party, today's USSR Armed Forces fully satisfy the modern requirements of military science in terms of their equipment, organization, the combat skills of the personnel, and their political training, and they are capable of successfully completing all missions, no matter how complex. Especially large qualitative changes occurred in recent years. These changes were founded on the economic power of the country, which had increased by several orders of magnitude, the achievements of scientific-technical progress, and the profound transformations that occurred in the spiritual countenance of the Soviet people following the Soviet Union's attainment of developed socialism. "The Soviet Union's economy, science, and technology," notes USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. P. Ustinov, "are at such a high level today that we are in a position to create, within the shortest time, any type of weapon upon which the enemies of peace and socialism may lay their hopes."

The Strategic Missile Forces are rightfully called the nuclear missile shield of our state. Creation of the Strategic Missile Forces was announced in January 1960 at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This act was especially strong evidence of the great foresight of our party and government, of the responsible approach they had taken to raising the country's capabilities in modern conditions. The birth of this new branch of the armed forces was made possible by the tremendous potentials of the socialist economy, the extremely high level of domestic science and technology, and the selfless labor of scientists, designers, engineers, technicians, and laborers. Prominent political, state, and military officials guided the work of creating and developing the Soviet nuclear missile armament and missile formations.

Presently the Strategic Missile Forces are armed with intercontinental and medium-range missiles, capable of delivering high-power warheads dependably to their targets. Missilemen serve combat duty day and night, and they are capable of immediately making an annihilatory blow on any enemy who would dare to attack our motherland.

The numerically largest and most diverse branch of the Soviet Armed Forces in relation to armament and equipment availability is the ground troops. They include modern arms and services--rocket troops, artillery,

motorized rifle and tank troops, and air defense troops. Their composition includes special troops--engineering, chemical, radio-technical, signal, motor transport, and road maintenance and construction, as well as various rear services, subunits and units.

The equipment and armament possessed by the ground troops permits them to make powerful strikes on the move. The fluidity and swiftness of their actions have been increased by adding more tanks and armored personnel carriers to the assault echelon. The high maneuverability of the units and formation makes it possible to instantaneously transfer effort from one sector to another, and to swiftly increase it wherever the success is greatest.

The party and government devote a great deal of attention to developing and improving the country's air defense forces. They are outfitted with highly effective detection and guidance systems, and antiaircraft weapons, to include qualitatively new resources--improved antiaircraft missile complexes. The country's air defense forces include the antiaircraft missile troops, the fighter missile aviation, and radio-technical and special units. The combat equipment and weapons of this branch of the armed forces can insure annihilation of practically all of the enemy's aerial attack resources at maximum range, at high and low altitudes, at supersonic speeds, and in any weather, irrespective of the time of day and year.

Our air force is a menacing and powerful branch of the armed forces. The air force's power is founded on missile-carrying airplanes outfitted with the most sophisticated armament, enemy detection resources, fire control systems, and the latest navigation apparatus. Multipurpose variable-wing airplanes and vertical takeoff and landing craft have been created. Owing to its new equipment, aviation has acquired high qualities such as all-weather and year-round combat capabilities. Development and extensive introduction of new types of aircraft engines, stronger and heat-resistant materials, the latest navigation apparatus for airplanes, and many other items has brought our aviation equipment up to the highest level in the world, and it has created all of the conditions permitting the air force to honorably perform its missions.

The navy dependably insures the security of our motherland. It has confidently mastered the seas and oceans, and it is now a combination of carefully balanced arms and services--submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal rocket-artillery troops, and marine infantry. Its power is founded on submarines equipped with atomic power plants and missile armament; aviation capable of operating from airfields and aircraft carriers; surface ships, to include the antisubmarine cruisers Kiyev, Minsk, Moskva, and Leningrad, and missile cruisers, one of which has been named the Varyag. The navy possesses modern technical navigation, communication, and control resources. Our people rightfully call the creation of an oceanic navy one of the outstanding successes of their labor.

The fleets were proud to receive the message that on 7 July of this year, during his visit to the Hero City of Sevastopol', Comrade L. I. Brezhnev expressed his gratefulness to the personnel of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet and other subunits that are dependably maintaining the security of the Soviet fatherland's borders.

Mention should be made of the airborne troops, the role of which has grown significantly today. Outfitted with special self-propelled guns, armored transporters, dependable antitank and antiaircraft resources, conventional and rocket artillery, powerful automatic weapons, and communication and control apparatus, the airborne troops can be landed by military transport aircraft in the close and deep rear of the enemy, and successfully perform their missions both independently and in interaction with other arms and branches of the armed forces.

The USSR Armed Forces rear services are qualitatively new. A typical feature of the modern rear is the high degree of motorization and mechanization, and its mobility and maneuverability.

The class instructor would best concentrate his attention mainly on his own service of the armed forces and branch of troops, and use concrete examples to demonstrate the growth of its equipment availability, and of the combat capabilities of the weapons and military equipment.

Summarizing his presentation of the material on the second problem, it is important for the instructor to once again emphasize that the Central Committee of our party, the Soviet government, and personally Comrade L. I. Brezhnev are constantly concerned for keeping the equipment availability, mechanization level, and combat qualities of the army and navy high enough to permit successful completion of all missions facing them. The military-technical policy of the CPSU has acquired an international nature due to growth in the political, economic, and military unity of fraternal socialist countries, and due to the objective need for their collective protection against the intrigues of international imperialism. Standing in a unified combat formation together with troops of the Warsaw Pact, personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces are persistently mastering terrifying weapons and military equipment, and they are in constant combat readiness. This would be a proper time to recall what Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in his speech on the event of the 30th anniversary of the GDR. "As far as the USSR is concerned," Leonid Il'ich said, "let me repeat again and again: We are not striving for military superiority. Our intentions have never included and will never include threatening any state or group of states at all. Our strategic doctrine has a purely defensive orientation."

3. Persistently Learning Military Affairs, and Achieving Perfect Mastery of One's Military Specialty.

Army service imposes high requirements upon the soldier today, demanding that he devote all of his strength, knowledge, and abilities

to military labor. It demands greater exertion of effort by those who launch missiles, stand at the helm of atomic submarines, or intercept airplanes. "Today's Soviet Army is a mighty, menacing, insurmountable force," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "It is armed with the best weapons in the world. Soviet soldiers--from privates to marshals and from seamen to admirals--are true masters of military affairs who have an excellent mastery of military science and of the superior equipment entrusted to them; they are people who are limitlessly devoted to our party and communism!"

The level of general education enjoyed by young people entering the army and navy has risen noticeably in recent years. This makes it easier to train competent and dependable defenders of our motherland. However, a secondary or even a higher education does not by itself make a young person a good soldier. The needed moral-political and combat qualities are not developed in just a single day. We cannot do here without high awareness, a deep understanding of the purpose of our armed forces and the noble mission it bears, and personal responsibility for protecting one's motherland; we cannot do without persistent labor, and the desire to utilize every minute of training time with full application of effort, to fully assimilate one's combat specialty in short time.

In this, we must keep sight of the main thing: Service in the Soviet Army and Navy is an honorable obligation, the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. And no matter what your combat specialty is, no matter what obligations you perform, you are called upon to make your contribution to the motherland's protection, and you must labor conscientiously, as would a true patriot, an internationalist, and a Soviet citizen.

Our army has become the most educated in the world. While at the eve of the Great Patriotic War the proportion of servicemen with a higher and secondary education was 12 percent, today this proportion is as much as 80 percent. The number of military specialists has grown noticeably in the postwar years owing to scientific-technical progress. We can cite the following figures: There were 15-20 of them in World War I, about 160 in World War II, and today there are almost 2,000 combat occupations. And each one is important, each one is necessary to victory in modern combat.

We have true masters of combat specialties in every subunit, in every unit, and aboard every ship. It would be pertinent for the propagandist to describe some of them in greater detail, to reveal the secrets of their military proficiency, and to recall how they mastered difficult military science step by step. He must also encourage the young soldiers to identify with the best workers, to learn from them persistently, bit by bit, and try to catch up and surpass the best specialist in comradely rivalry.

Modern combat imposes increasingly higher requirements on the field, aerial, and naval skills of every private and seaman, and especially his weapon handling skills. Victory would be impossible in combat if the enemy cannot be struck dependably and effectively with all forms of fire. Much here depends on the ability to use one's weapon artfully, to do maximum harm to the enemy from maximum range, with the least amount of ammunition. The greater combat capabilities of weapons and equipment, the availability of more-sophisticated sighting devices, and growth in the firing rate, range, and ammunition power make it urgently necessary to strike the target with the first round, shot, launch, or pass.

During the Great Patriotic War we expended an average of a few dozen, and sometimes even a few hundred rounds to knock down each airplane. Today, meanwhile, missilemen as a rule destroy an airborne target with one missile. And consider the target! It is swift, small in size, and it protects itself behind interference. If just one specialist of a missile complex makes even the slightest mistake, forgets something, or does something late, the target could penetrate untouched to the objective being defended and do considerable harm. This is why every soldier simply must be a master of his specialty today, why he must know his weapon down to the finest detail and capitalize fully upon its specifications and combat properties.

It is not easy to become proficient in anything, in the military in particular. After all, the conditions under which you must act are usually very complex, the "enemy" is active and stubborn, and he is unforgiving of all delays and indecisiveness, no matter how slight. This is why you must act in every exercise as if you were in real battle, without simplifications and relaxation, why you must display initiative and tactical boldness, and why you must try to impose your own will, your persistent desire to win on the opposing side.

The combat readiness of armament and equipment depends in many ways on the quality with which it is maintained, and on whether or not the rules and schedules of operation and repair are complied with. This is why it is very important to comply strictly with the requirements of the manuals, instructions, and other documents regulating equipment maintenance and operation, and to deviate from them not even a single step.

The high qualifications of army and navy specialists and their rich experience in operating the equipment in the most diverse conditions make it possible for them to find new, more-effective ways to service the equipment and apply it in combat. A creative attitude toward one's responsibilities generates valuable efficiency proposals aimed at reducing the time required to make equipment combat ready, at raising its reliability, and at improving its operating characteristics.

Socialist competition is a powerful resource for raising the aggressiveness of privates and seamen in combat training, and in their efforts to master their military specialties. It has become an inseparable part of all of



combat and political training, and it entails full revelation, by both the individual and the entire collective, of one's capabilities and best qualities. Stand an alert guard over the achievements of socialism, and do everything to raise combat readiness and the level of military proficiency--such is the slogan of the socialist competition in the army and navy. What this means to every person in the military is to treasure training time, apply full effort to drills, exercises, flights, and long sea cruises, utilize the capabilities of equipment and weapons proficiently, and subordinate one's day-to-day affairs to the common goal--raising the combat readiness of the subunits, units, and ships. Following the initiative of the collectives of the best units in the services of the armed forces and a certain atomic submarine, the personnel adopted high pledges, and honorably satisfied them. Last training year the number of outstanding soldiers of combat and political training, classed specialists, and outstanding subunits, units, and ships grew, and the combat readiness of the army and navy rose to a higher level. It is with complete justification that Soviet soldiers can now report to the motherland in the words of the soldier's song: "Our Hearts and Missiles Are in Stage One Readiness."

It would be important to note that the army gives a lot to young people: It tempers the character of the young, helps them understand the value of real friendship, and makes them courageous and capable of carrying the responsibility of protecting the motherland. Many privates and seamen acquire specialties in the army which later transform into careers for them in the national economy, at the construction projects of the five-year plans. But what is most important is that they become true soldiers, capable of sacrificing their lives to protect their fatherland at any moment that the hour of reckoning tolls. "Our military labor," noted Comrade I. Brezhnev, "is labor in the name of peace. After all, our power has never and will never be turned against other nations. It is a menacing deterrent to those who covet that which is not theirs, those who wish to transgress upon the interests of our country and the interests of the entire socialist fraternity. Inasmuch as the adventurists are still active, peace on earth still depends upon the combat readiness and battleworthiness of our armed forces. A peace to which the Country of the Soviets has dedicated its thoughts and concerns since Lenin's first decree."

Completing his presentation of the material on this subject, it is important for the instructor to emphasize that Soviet soldiers deeply recognize the tremendous responsibility laid upon them by the party, government, and people. They spare no effort or labor to master their combat specialties and the menacing weapons and equipment that the Soviet people have entrusted to their faithful defenders. Soldiers of the army and navy are standing an alert guard over the great achievements of socialism, prepared to honorably perform their patriotic and international duty at any moment.

The following publications may be recommended to the students as reading in preparation for a class on this subject: V. I. Lenin's article "The Fall of Port Arthur" ("Poln. sobr. soch" (Complete Collected Works), Vol 9, pp 155-156); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "The CPSU Central Committee's Report and the Party's Present Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" (Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress), pp 75-76,83); the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (articles 31,32,62,63); USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov's report "Sixty Years on Guard Over the Achievements of Great October" (PRAVDA, 23 February 1978). It would also be desirable to make use of the visual aids album "XXV s"yezd KPSS ob ukreplenii oborony SSSR" (The 25th CPSU Congress on Strengthening the USSR's Defenses) (Voyenizdat, 1976). A showing of the documentary films "Always Be On Guard" and "I Serve the Soviet Union" may be organized.

Discussion of the following questions would be suitable in a seminar:

1. What commandments did V. I. Lenin address to the Soviet troops concerning study of military affairs and maintenance of constant combat readiness?
2. In what does the CPSU manifest its concern for strengthening the material foundation of the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces?
3. Why are the requirements imposed on a private's (seaman's) combat skills rising in modern conditions?
4. What tasks face the personnel of the subunit, unit, or ship in relation to the study of weapons and combat equipment?

#### Literature For Propagandists

1. Lenin, V. I., "Concluding Remarks on a Report on Ratification of the Peace Treaty of 15 March," in "Poln. sobr. soch" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 116.
2. Lenin, V. I., "The Fall of Port Arthur," in "Poln. sobr. soch," Vol 9, pp 155-156.
3. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112.
4. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], articles 31,32,62,63.
5. "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination," Decree of the CPSU Central Committee, 26 April 1979, Politizdat, 1979.
6. Brezhnev, L. I., "The CPSU Central Committee's Report and the Party's Present Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy," in "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 75-76,83.

7. Brezhnev, L. I., "Speech in Berlin on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the German Democratic Republic," PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
8. Ustinov, D. F., "Sixty Years on Guard Over the Achievements of Great October," in "Izbrannye rechi i stat'i" (Selected Speeches and Articles), Politizdat, 1979, pp 22-40.
9. Yepishev, A. A., "Partiya--organizator nashikh pobed" [The Party--the Organizer of Our Victories], Voenizdat, 1976.

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#### BOOK ON SOVIET MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 79 signed to press 18 Oct 79 pp 92-93

[Review by Engr-Maj A. Kaz'min of the book "Voennyye chekisty" (Military Counterspies) by S. Ostryakov, Voenizdat, 1979, 320 pages, price 63 kopecks: "Dedicated to Army Counterspies"]

[Text] The book "Military Counterspies" is devoted to the heroic history of Soviet military counterintelligence. The book's author, S. Ostryakov, who participated in a number of the events described therein, describes the hard work of army counterspies interestingly and, at the same time, with strict documentation.

The origin, development, and combat activities of Soviet military counterintelligence are inseparably associated with the glorious history of our armed forces. Employing extensive factual materials, the author inspects this relationship and informs us about the military counterspies, who honorably performed the important missions of defending the achievements of the socialist revolution and protecting the Soviet Army against intelligence and other subversive activities of our state's enemies.

Successful completion of such important missions would have been impossible without the continuous guiding and directing activities of the Communist Party. The quality of the work done by the extraordinary sections, the book emphasizes, depended mainly on personnel selection. The party Central Committee and military party-political organs devoted and continue to devote unweakening attention to this problem. As an example several thousand communists, party workers, and servicemen served in frontline extraordinary organs during the Civil War. They instilled a sense of party responsibility for assigned work to the then-young generation of army counterintelligence agents, and they taught them to fight the enemy fearlessly, maintain a tactful relationship to Soviet people, and comply strictly with the revolutionary laws of the proletarian state. The readers are presented dynamic picture of the struggle fought by army counterspies against nationalists kulaks and White Guards bands and kulak-S<sup>o</sup> rebellions.

Such were that heroic days of military counterintelligence workers in the years when the young Soviet republic was healing the wounds of the Civil War. But the enemies made an effort to change their tactics, and so the party supplemented the current functions of the extraordinary sections with the responsibility of protecting the borders of the Soviet state. The author thoroughly describes how as a result of the implemented measures thousands of foreign intelligence agents, White Guard emissaries, saboteurs, and contrabandists were detained in their attempts at violating our motherland's orders.

After initiating their effort to implement Lenin's plan for the country's socialist industrialization, our people united themselves even more closely about the Communist Party. These years were a time of growing enthusiasm among the laborers, peasants, and the Soviet intelligentsia. However, the world bourgeoisie saw a real threat to the existence of the capitalist system in the Soviet Union's growing economical and political strength. English imperialists, it is obvious from the book, were the leaders of the savage anti-Soviet campaign of those days. They organized a number of attacks upon Soviet embassies abroad, and they made attempts on the lives of diplomats. Enemy intelligence agents performed sabotage, and terrorist groups were sent into the USSR. The antiparty Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc intensified its subversive activities within the country. The book informs us through large numbers of facts that the Communist Party and the Soviet people decisively repulsed all antiparty elements. Owing to the unmasking of enemy underground organizations by organs of the United State Political Administration of the Council of Peoples Commissars, to include extraordinary sections, the party and government were able to foil the anti-Soviet designs of international reaction.

The Great Patriotic War was a severe trial for military counterintelligence. In the third and most significant and memorable chapter of the book the author persuasively demonstrates how Soviet state security organs not only successfully opposed fascist intelligence activities but also helped the Soviet Army to destroy the enemy. The sections "The Duel With the Arwehr" and "From Defense to Offense" make especially interesting reading. We know that fascist army reconnaissance utilized not only its own capabilities but also those of the intelligence services of other countries allied with German imperialism in its struggle against the Red Army. However, actions by army counterspies and the measures implemented by extraordinary sections at the front caused the failure of operations planned by the enemy, and decay of the mechanism of German military intelligence from within.

In decisions of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars military counterintelligence organs were transferred to the USSR Peoples Commissariat of Defense, where they came to be called "Smert' shpionam" ("Death to the Spies," or Smersh). Their main mission became that of fighting subversive activities by foreign intelligence services. In this period of the war fascist intelligence, retreating in the face of the onslaught by Soviet



troops, began sending large espionage-sabotage groups more and more frequently across the front line; the core of these groups almost always consisted of anti-Soviet elements, traitors, and criminals. Actions by army counterspies and local state security organs to neutralize these unwanted "guests" are described interestingly and thoroughly.

Frontal counterspies lived in a single combat family with commanders and political workers of the Soviet Armed Forces. They helped them to strengthen order and discipline in the troops, and to instill a spirit of high political alertness in the personnel. In turn, the commanders and political workers did everything to help the military counterspies in their difficult work. The author cites a recollection of the 18th Assault Army's extraordinary section chief that Comrade L. I. Brezhnev often participated in the operational conferences of the section's personnel, teaching them the art of combining counterintelligence work with work on combined arms tasks and the tasks of party-political work.

Much changed in the world in recent years. Owing to the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union we have witnessed a turn in international relations from "cold war" to peaceful coexistence, a turn from tension to relaxation and mutually beneficial cooperation. However, the reactionary circles of the imperialist powers still contain many people who are constantly involved in various anti-Soviet provocations. The methods and resources of subversive activities against the Soviet Union and its armed forces by intelligence and propaganda services have become even more sophisticated than before. In addition to the spies that are still being sent more than occasionally into our country, one of the main areas of activities by Western reactionary circles is ideological sabotage.

The book presents data on various anticommunist centers for the conduct of "psychological warfare," and it describes the resources and methods the centers employ to market their products. The author cites examples where some politically immature people, including servicemen, do fall within the influence of bourgeois propaganda. As a rule, following a certain amount of preventive indoctrination they begin to understand that they had become sacrifices to ideological sabotage, and with the help of party and Komsomol organizations they once again return to the normal life of Soviet citizens. Prevention of crimes that do harm to our armed forces is the principal direction of work done today by counterspies.

No matter what mask our class enemies hide behind and no matter what resources they use to halt relaxation of international tension, they will always be opposed by the indestructible unity of our party, the Soviet people, and their armed forces. Counterintelligence agents stand dependably in this same formation, on guard over the combat readiness of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Without a doubt the book will evoke the reader's interest. It appeals to the Soviet people, including soldiers, to raise their political alertness, and it arms them with the ability to recognize our class enemies.

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## MILITARY SCHOOLS: ADMISSION ANNOUNCEMENTS

### General Admission Information

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Military schools, institutes, and the bandmaster school accept male young civilians, enlisted men, seamen, sergeants, and petty officers of all arms and services, irrespective of their military specialty and time of service, having completed their secondary education, being suited to training in military training institutions by state of health, and having successfully passed competitive entrance examinations. Applicants may be from 17 to 21 years of age (as of 1 September of the year of admission). Extended service servicemen are accepted for training after 2 years of extended service, and at ages up to 23 years.

Warrant officers are entitled to enrollment in higher military training institutions after 2 years of service at warrant officer posts or at officer posts, if not older than 25 years; such applicants to higher flight schools must not be older than 23 years.

First-term and extended service servicemen desiring to enroll must submit an application up the chain of command to the unit commander prior to 25 February, young civilians must submit a declaration to the rayon military commissariat at their place of residence prior to 30 April of the year of admission, and warrant officers must submit their applications prior to 1 December of the year preceding the year of admission.

The servicemen's application must indicate: rank, last name, first name, patronymical, position, date of birth, general and military education, and the name of the military training institution to which admittance is desired. The following are attached to the application: secondary education certificate (copy of the attestation [attestat], record [svidetel'stvo], certificate [udostovereniye], diploma), party or Komsomol performance report, and three certified photographs (without headwear,

4.5 x 6 cm). In addition first-term and extended servicemen must attach the following to the application: autobiography, service performance report, record of service card, and a copy of the birth certificate.

Young civilians indicate the following in the declaration: last name, first name, and patronymical, date of birth, home address, and the name of the military educational institution they wish to enter. The following are attached to the declaration: autobiography, performance report from place of work or study, party or Komsomol performance report, a copy of the secondary education document (secondary school students submit their current academic record), a copy of the birth certificate, and three certified photographs (without headwear, 4.5 x 6 cm).

The applicant presents his passport, military card or draft registration card, and original copies of his secondary education documents and birth certificate to the admissions commission upon arrival at the school.

Komsomol members recommended for training by rayon (city) Komsomol committees attach their all-union Komsomol pass to the declaration.

Most military schools give entrance examinations in mathematics (oral and written), physics (oral), and Russian language and literature (written).

Warrant officers entering higher military schools take entrance examinations in armament materiel, mathematics (oral), physics, and general military regulations.

In addition, to permit determination of physical fitness, military applicants must undergo practical testing in exercises of the USSR Armed Forces Military-Sports Complex, and young civilians must be tested in exercises of the All-Union "Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR" Physical Education Complex.

Persons awarded USSR orders and medals for personal acts of heroism or for high results in combat and political training, and first-term and extended service servicemen who qualified as outstanding soldiers of combat and political training for not less than 1 year, as announced in an order published by the military unit, are accepted ahead of competing applicants if they receive passing grades in the entrance examinations.

Persons who have graduated from secondary school with a medal, or from a secondary special educational institution with honors, are enrolled in secondary military schools without taking the entrance examinations; persons applying to higher military educational institutions must take an examination only in one of the disciplines, which is announced to the candidate together with the decision permitting him to take the examination. If such persons pass the examination with an "excellent" grade, they are released from subsequent examinations, and if they receive grades of "good" or "satisfactory" they must take examinations in the other disciplines tested by the entrance examinations.

Graduates of a secondary school of general education who have earned the "For Extraordinary Successes in the Study of Individual Subjects" certificate of honor and who seek admission to secondary military schools are relieved from the entrance examination in the discipline for the successful study of which they earned the certificate, if this discipline is tested by the entrance examinations.

Military educational institutions give entrance examinations from 15 July to 5 August (warrant officers may take them from 20 July to 20 August), and traveling admissions commissions give entrance examinations to servicemen from 5 June to 5 July.

Moscow command schools--the all-services and the road and engineering troop schools, the Military Institute, and the bandmaster school give entrance examinations from 18 August to 5 September.

Military commissariats and unit commanders must send applicants to places of entrance examinations at the request of the school chiefs. Applicants travel free, and on arriving at the school they are given free meals and quarters.

All graduates of military schools, institutes, and the bandmaster school are awarded the rank of lieutenant, engineer-lieutenant, or lieutenant of technical service, and they are issued an all-union diploma of higher or secondary military-special education, and a chest badge of completion of a military educational institution.

Details on the rules of admission may be obtained in the military commissariats or unit staffs.

#### Military-Political Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Rizhskoye vyssheye voeynno-politicheskoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo soyuza S. S. Biryuzova [Riga Higher Military-Political Red Banner School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov] (226028, Riga, 28);

Novosibirskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye obshchevoyskovoye uchilishche imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya [Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School imeni 60-Letiye Velikogo Oktyabrya] (530103, Novosibirsk, 103);

Minskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye obshchevoyskovoye uchilishche [Minsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School] (220067, Minsk, 67);



Sverdlovskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye tanko-artilleriyskoye uchilishche [Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Tank-Artillery School] (620108, Sverdlovsk, I-108);

Leningradskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye uchilishche protivivozdushnoy oborony [Leningrad Higher Military-Political School of Air Defense Troops] (198324, Leningrad, L-324);

Kurganskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche [Kurgan Higher Military-Political Aviation School] (640025, Kurgan, 25, Oblast);

Kiyevskoye vyssheye voyenno-morskoye politicheskoye uchilishche (Kiev Higher Naval Political School] (252145, Kiev, 145);

Donetskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye uchilishche inzhenernykh voysk i voysk svyazi [Donetsk Higher Military-Political School of Engineering Troops and Signal Troops] (340090, Donetsk, 90);

Simferopol'skoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye stroitel'noye uchilishche [Simferopol' Higher Military-Political Construction School] (333037, Simferopol', 37);

Tallinskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye stroitel'noye uchilishche [Tallin Higher Military-Political Construction School] (203010, Yagala Post Office, Khar'yuskiy Rayon, Estonian SSR);

L'vovskoye vyssheye voyenno-politicheskoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche [L'vov Higher Military-Political Order of the Red Star School] (290028, L'vov, 28).

Military-political schools train officers with a higher military-political education for all armed forces arms and services (the L'vov school trains officers with a higher military-political education serving as military journalists and cultural-educational workers). Term of study--4 years.

The schools accept CPSU members, CPSU candidates, and Komsomol members who have displayed an interest in political work, upon recommendation by political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy or rayon (city) Komsomol committees.

Entrance examinations cover the secondary school program in USSR history, geography, mathematics (oral), and Russian language and literature (written).

Applicants to the L'vov school must take examinations in USSR history, geography (oral), and Russian language and literature (written and oral), and they are interviewed in their selected specialty--journalism or cultural-educational work.

## Combined Arms, Tank Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Alma-Atinskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza I. S. Koneva [Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev] (480094, Alma-Ata, 94);

Bakinskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni Verkhovnogo Soveta Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR [Baku Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR] (370128, Baku, 128).

Dal'nevostochnoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza K. K. Rokossovskogo [Far East Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy] (675021, Blagoveshchensk, 21, Amurskaya Oblast);

Kiyevskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni M. V. Frunze [Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command Twice-Awarded Red Banner School imeni M. V. Frunze] (252066, Kiev, 66);

Leningradskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni S. M. Kirova [Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command Twice-Awarded Red Banner School imeni S. M. Kirov] (198903, Leningrad-Petrodvorets, 3);

Moskovskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye ordenov Lenina, Oktyabr'skoy Revolyutsii, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR [Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution Red Banner School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR] (109380, Moscow, Zh-380);

Omskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni M. V. Frunze [Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command Twice-Awarded Red Banner School imeni M. V. Frunze] (644004, Omsk, 4);

Ordzhonikidzevskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza A. I. Yeremenko [Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined Arms Command Twice-Awarded Red Banner School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A. I. Yeremenko] (362006, Ordzhonikidze, 6);

Tashkentskoye vyssheye obshchevoyskovoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye, ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni V. I. Lenina [Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Red Banner Order of the Red Star School imeni V. I. Lenin] (700023, Tashkent, 23);

Blagoveshchenskoye vyssheye tankovoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuz K. A. Meretskova [Blagoveshchensk Higher Tank Command Red Banner School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov] (675018, Blagoveshchensk, 18, Amurskaya Oblast);

Kazanskoye vyssheye tankovoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilitshe imeni Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Tatarskoy ASSR [Kazan' Higher Tank Command Red Banner School imeni Prezidium Verkhovnogo Soveta Tatarskoy ASSR] (420046, Kazan', 46);

Tashkentskoye vyssheye tankovoye komandnoye ordena Lenina uchilishche imeni dvazhdy Geroya Sovetskogo Soyuz marshala bronetankovykh voysk P. S. Rybalko [Taskent Higher Tank Command Order of Lenin School imeni Twice-Awarded Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Armored Troops P. S. Rybalko] (702115, Chirchik, 15, Tashkentskaya Oblast);

Ul'yankovskoye gvardeyskoye vyssheye tankovoye komandnoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye, ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni V. I. Lenina [Ul'yankovsk Guards Higher Tank Command Twice-Awarded Red Banner Order of the Red Star School imeni V. I. Lenin] (432014, Ul'yankovsk, 14);

Khar'kovskoye gvardeyskoye vyssheye tankovoye komandnoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni Verkhovnogo Soveta Ukrainskoy SSR [Khar'kov Guards Higher Tank Command Order of the Red Star School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet Ukrainskoy SSR] (310097, Khar'kov, 97);

Chelyabinskoye vyssheye tankovoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni 50-letiya Velikogo oktyabrya [Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School imeni 50-letiya Velikogo oktyabrya] (454030, Chelyabinsk, 30);

Kiyevskoye vyssheye tankovoye inzhenernoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuz I. I. Yakubovskogo [Kiev Higher Tank Engineering Order of the Red Star School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy] (252063, Kiev, 63);

Omskoye vyssheye tankovoye inzhenernoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuz P. K. Koshevogo [Omsk Higher Tank Engineering Order of the Red Star School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union P. K. Koshevoy] (644098, Omsk, 98).

The term of study is 4 years in command schools and 5 years in engineering schools. Warrant officers are accepted by the Omsk Higher Combined Arms and the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command schools. Term of study--3 years.

## Aviation Schools

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Kachinskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche letchikov imeni A. F. Myasnikova (Kacha Higher Military Aviation Order of Lenin Red Banner Pilot School imeni A. F. Myasnikov] (400010, Volgograd, 10);

Yeyskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye ordena Lenina uchilishche letchikov imeni dvazhdy Geroya Sovetskogo Soyuz a letchika-kosmonavta SSSR V. M. Komarova [Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Order of Lenin Pilot School imeni Twice-Awarded Hero of the Soviet Union USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut V. M. Komarov] (353660, Yeysk, 7, Krasnodarskoy Kray);

Chernigovskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche letchikov imeni Leninskogo komsomola [Chernigov Higher Military Aviation Pilot School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] (250003, Chernigov, 3);

Khar'kovskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche letchikov imeni dvazhdy Geroya Sovetskogo Soyuz a S. I. Gritsevets [Khar'kov Higher Military Aviation Order of the Red Star Pilot School imeni Twice-Awarded Hero of the Soviet Union S. I. Gritsevets] (310028, Khar'khov, 28);

Borisoglebskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche letchikov imeni V. P. Chkalova [Borisoglebsk Higher Military Aviation Order of Lenin Red Banner Pilot School imeni V. P. Chkalov] (397140, Borisoglebsk, 2, Voronezhskaya Oblast);

Tambovskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche letchikov imeni M. M. Raskovoy [Tambov Higher Military Aviation Pilot School imeni M. M. Raskovoy] (392004, Tambov, 4);

Orenburgskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche letchikov imeni I. S. Polbina [Orenburg Higher Military Aviation Red Banner Pilot School imeni I. A. Polbin] (460014, Orenburg, 14);

Barnaul'skoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche letchikov imeni glavnogo marshala aviatsii K. A. Vershinina [Barnaul Higher Military Aviation Pilot School imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation K. A. Vershinin] (656018, Barnaul, 18);

Balashovskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche letchikov imeni glavnogo marshala aviatsii A. A. Novikova [Balashov Higher Military Aviation Pilot School imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov] (412340, Balashov, 3, Saratovskaya Oblast);

Syzranskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche letchikov  
[Syzran' Higher Military Aviation Pilot School] (446007, Syzran', 7,  
Kuybyshevskaya Oblast);

Saratovskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche letchikov  
[Saratov Higher Military Aviation Pilot School] (410601, Saratov, 1);

Voroshilovgradskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche  
shturmanov imeni Proletariata Donbassa [Voroshilovgrad Higher Military  
Aviation Navigator School imeni Proletariat Donbassa] (348004,  
Voroshilovgrad, 4);

Chelyabinskoye vyssheye voyennoye uchilishche shturmanov imeni 50-letiya  
VLKSM [Chalyabinsk Higher Military Aviation Red Banner Navigator School  
imeni 50-Letiye VLKSM] (454015, Chelyabinsk, 15);

Kiyevskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye inzhenernoye uchilishche  
[Kiev Higher Military Air Engineering School] (252043, Kiev, 43);

Rizhskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye inzhenernoye uchilishche imeni  
Yakova Alksnisa [Riga Higher Military Air Engineering School imeni Yakov  
Alksnis] (226031, Riga, 31);

Voronezhskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye inzhenernoye uchilishche  
[Voronezh Higher Military Air Engineering School] (394064, Voronezh, 64);

Irkutskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye inzhenernoye ordena Krasnoy  
Zvezdy uchilishche imeni 50-letiya VLKSM [Irkutsk Higher Military Air  
Engineering Order of the Red Star School imeni 50-Letiye VLKSM]  
(664036, Irkutsk, 36);

Tambovskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye inzhenernoye ordena Lenina,  
Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo [Tambov Higher  
Military Air Engineering Order of Lenin Red Banner School imeni F. E.  
Dzerzhinskiy] (392006, Tambov, 6);

Khar'kov vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye inzhenernoye Krasnoznamennoye  
uchilishche [Khar'kov Higher Military Air Engineering Red Banner School]  
(310048, Khar'kov, 48);

Khar'kovskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye komandnoye uchilishche  
svyazi imeni Leninskogo komsomola Ukrainy [Khar'kov Higher Military  
Air Command Signal School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol Ukrainy] (310165,  
Khar'kov, 165);

Kaliningradskoye voyennoye aviatsionno-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche  
[Kaliningrad Military Air-Technical School] (236044, Kaliningrad, 44,  
Oblast);



Vasil'kovskoye voyennoye aviatsionno-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche imeni 50-letiya Leninskogo komsomola Ukrainy [Vasil'kov Military Air-Technical School imeni 50-Letiye Leninskogo Komsomola Ukrainy] (255130, Vasil'kov, 3, Kiev Oblast);

Permskoye voyennoye aviatsionno-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche imeni Leninskogo komsomola [Perm' Military Air-Technical School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] (614049, Perm', 49);

Achinskoye voyennoye aviatsionno-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche imeni 60-letiya VLKSM [Achinsk Military Air Technical School imeni 60-Letiye VLKSM] (662100, Achinsk, 1, Krasnoyarskiy Kray);

Kirovskoye voyennoye aviatsionno-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche (Kirov Military Air Technical School] (610041, Kirov, 41, Oblast).

The terms of study are 4 years in higher flight and navigator schools, the Khar'kov Command Signal School, and the Voronezh Engineering School, 5 years in higher engineering schools and in the Voronezh school (in the meteorology specialty) and 3 years in secondary schools.

#### Artillery Schools

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Penzenskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye inzhenernoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni glavnogo marshala artillerii N. N. Voronova [Penza Higher Artillery Engineering Order of the Red Star School imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov] (440005, Penza, 5);

Tul'skoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye inzhenernoye ordenov Lenina i Oktyabr'skoy Revolyutsii uchilishche imeni Tul'skogo proletariata [Tula Higher Artillery Engineering Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution School imeni Tul'skiy Proletariat] (300029, Tula, 29);

Kazanskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye uchilishche (Kazan' Higher Military Engineering School] (420025, Kazan', 25);

Saratovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye, ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni Geroya Sovetskogo Soyuza general-mayora A. I. Lizyukova [Saratov Higher Military Command Red Banner Order of the Red Star School imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Major-General A. I. Lizyukov] (410082, Saratov, 82, Oblast);

Kolomenskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye komandnoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii [Kolomna Higher Artillery Command Order of Lenin Red Banner School imeni Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya] (140403, Kolomna, 3);

Leningradskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye komandnoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni Krasnogo Oktyabrya [Leningrad Higher Artillery Command Order of Lenin Red Banner School imeni Krasnyy Oktyabr'] (198052, Leningrad, L-52);

Odesskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye komandnoye ordena Lenina uchilishche imeni M. V. Frunze [Odessa Higher Artillery Command Order of Lenin School imeni M. V. Frunze] (270087, Odessa, 87);

Sumskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye komandnoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni M. V. Frunze [Sumy Higher Artillery Command Twice-Awarded Red Banner School imeni M. V. Frunze] (244001, Sumy, 1);

Tbilisskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni 26 Bakinskikh komissarov [Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command Red Banner School imeni 26 Bakinskiye Komissary] (330084, Tbilisi, 84);

Khmel'nitskoye vyssheye artilleriyskoye komandnoye uchilishche [Khmel'nitskiy Higher Artillery Command School] (280003, Khmel'nitskiy, 3).

The term of study is 5 years at the Penza, Tula, Kazan' and Saratov schools. It is 4 years at the Kolomna, Leningrad, Odessa, Sumy, Tbilisi, and Khmel'nitskiy schools.

#### Naval Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Vyssheye voyenno-morskoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye, ordena Ushakova uchilishche imeni M. V. Frunze [Higher Naval Order of Lenin Red Banner Order of Ushakov School imeni M. V. Frunze] (199162, Leningrad, V-162);

Vyssheye voyenno-morskoye uchilishche podvodnogo plavaniya imeni Leninskogo komsomola [Higher Naval Submarine School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] (198093, Leningrad, L-93);

Tikhookeanskoye vyssheye voyenno-morskoye uchilishche imeni S. O. Makarova [Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov] (690006, Vladivostok, 6);

Kaspiyskoye vyssheye voyenno-morskoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni S. M. Kirova [Caspian Higher Naval Red Banner School imeni S. M. Kirov] (370018, Baku, 18);

Chernomorskoye vyssheye voyenno-morskoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni P. S. Nakhimova [Black Sea Higher Naval Order of the Red Star School imeni P. S. Nakhimov] (335035, Sevastopol', 35);

Kalinigradskoye vyssheye voyenno-morskoye uchilishche [Kaliningrad Higher Naval School] (236026, Kaliningrad, 26, Oblast);

Vyssheye voyenno-morskoye uchilishche radioelektroniki imeni A. S. Popova [Higher Naval Radio-Electronics School imeni A. S. Popov] (198135, Leningrad-Petrodvorets, 4);

Vyssheye voyenno-morskoye inzhenernoye ordena Lenina uchilishche imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo [Higher Naval Engineering Order of Lenin School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy] (190195, Leningrad, F-195);

Leningradskoye vyssheye voyenno-morskoye inzhenernoye uchilishche imeni V. I. Lenina [Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering School imeni V. I. Lenin] (188620, Leningrad-Pushkin, 4);

Sevastopol'skoye vyssheye voyenno-morskoye inzhenernoye uchilishche [Sevastopol' Higher Naval Engineering School] (335033, Sevastopol', 33).

The term of study is 5 years.

#### Air Defense Schools

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Armavirskoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche letchikov protivovozdushnoy oborony [Armavir Higher Military Air Red Banner Pilot School of Air Defense Troops] (352918, Armavir);

Stavropol'skoye vyssheye voyennoye aviatsionnoye uchilishche letchikov i shтурманов protivovozdushnoy oborony [Stavropol' Higher Military Air Pilot and Navigator School of Air Defense Troops] (355021, Stavropol', Kray);

Daugavpilsskoye vyssheye aviatsionnoye inzhenernoye uchilishche protivivozdushnoy oborony imeni Yana Fabritsiusa [Daugavpils Higher Air Engineering School of Air Defense Troops imeni Yan Fabritsius] (228402, Daugavpils, 2);

Vil'nyusskoye vyssheye komandnoye uchilishche radioelektroniki protivovozdushnoy oborony [Vil'nyus Higher Command Radio-Electronics School of Air Defense Troops] (232003, Vil'nyus, 3);

Krasnoyarskoye vyssheye komandnoye uchilishche radioelektroniki protivovozdushnoy oborony [Krasnoyarsk Higher Command Radio-Electronics School of Air Defense Troops] (660053, Krasnoyarsk, 53);

Zhitomirskoye vyssheye ordena Oktyabr'skoy Revolyutsii, Krasnoznanennoye uchilishche radioelektroniki protivovozdushnoy oborony imeni Leninskogo komsomola [Zhitomir Higher Order of the October Revolution Red Banner Radio-Electronics School of Air Defense Troops imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] (262023, Zhitomir, 23);

Pushkinskoye vyssheye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche radioelektroniki protivovozdushnoy oborony [Pushkin Higher Order of the Red Star Radio-Electronics School of Air Defense Troops] (188620, Pushkin, Leningrad Oblast);

Gor'kovskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye uchilishche protivovozdushnoy oborony [Gor'kiy Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School of Air Defense Troops] (603023, Gor'kiy, D-23);

Dnepropetrovskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye uchilishche protivovozdushnoy oborony [Dnepropetrovsk Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School of Air Defense Troops] (320093, Dnepropetrovsk, 93);

Ordzhonikidzevskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye uchilishche protivovozdushnoy oborony imeni generala armii I. A. Pliyeva [Ordzhonikidze Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School of Air Defense Troops imeni Army General I. A. Pliyev] (362012, Ordzhonikidze, 12);

Engel'sskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye uchilishche protivovozdushnoy oborony [Engel's Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School of Air Defense Troops] (413109, Engel's 9, Saratovskaya Oblast);

Yaroslavskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye uchilishche protivovozdushnoy oborony imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya [Yaroslavl' Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command School of Air Defense Troops imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya] (150016, Yaroslavl', 16, Oblast);

Kiyevskoye vyssheye inzhenernoye radiotekhnicheskoye uchilishche protivovozdushnoy oborony [Kiev Higher Engineering Radio-Technical School of Air Defense Troops] (252064, Kiev, 64);

Minskoye vyssheye inzhenernoye zenitnoye raketnoye uchilishche protivovozdushnoy oborony [Minsk Higher Engineering Antiaircraft Missile School of Air Defense Troops] (220057, Minsk, 57).

The term of study is 5 years in the Kiev, Minsk, and Daugavpils schools and in the engineering departments of the Zhitomir and Pushkin schools, and it is 4 years in the other schools, as well as in the command departments of the Zhitomir and Pushkin schools.

#### Antiaircraft Missile Schools

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Kiyevskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye inzhenernoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni S. M. Kirova [Kiev Higher Antiaircraft Missile Engineering Order of Lenin Red Banner School imeni S. M. Kirov] (252048, Kiev, 48);

Smolenskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye inzhenernoye uchilishche [Smolensk Higher Antiaircraft Missile Engineering School] (214027, Smolensk, 27);

Orenburgskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni G. K. Ordzhonikidze [Orenburg Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command Red Banner School imeni G. K. Ordzhonikidze] (470010, Orenburg, 10);

Leningradskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya [Leningrad Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command Order of the Red Star School imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya] (197061, Leningrad, P-61);

Poltavskoye vyssheye zenitnoye raketnoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni generala armii N. F. Vatutina [Poltava Higher Antiaircraft Missile Command Red Banner School imeni Army General N. F. Vatutin] (314000, Poltava),

The term of study is 5 years in engineering schools and 4 years in command schools.

#### Signal Schools

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Kemerovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche svyazi [Kemerovo Higher Military Command Signal School] (650020, Kemerovo, 20);

Novocherkasskoye vyssheye voyennoye uchilishche svyazi imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza V. D. Sokolovskogo [Novocherkassk Higher Military Command Red Banner Signal School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy] (346418, Novocherkassk, 18);



Poltavskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche svyazi [Poltava Higher Military Command Signal School] (314008, Poltava, 8);

Ryazanskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche svyazi imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuz M. V. Zakharova [Ryazan' Higher Military Command Signal School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov] (390032, Ryazan', 32);

Tomskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche svyazi [Tomsk Higher Military Command Order of the Red Star Signal School] (634056, Tomsk, 56);

Ul'yanovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche svyazi imeni G. K. Ordzhonikidze [Ul'yanovsk Higher Military Command Signal School imeni G. K. Ordzhonikidze] (432013, Ul'yanovsk, 13);

Kiyevskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche svyazi imeni M. I. Kalinina (Kiev Higher Military Engineering Twice-Awarded Red Banner Signal School imeni M. I. Kalinin] (252149, Kiev, 149);

Leningradskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye uchilishche svyazi imeni Lensoвета [Leningrad Higher Military Engineering Signal School imeni Lensovet] (193316, Leningrad, 316).

The term of study is 4 years in command schools and 5 years in engineering schools. Graduates of signal schools may be given service assignments in all branches of the USSR Armed Forces.

#### Command Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Permskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche [Perm' Higher Military Command School] (614015, Perm', 15);

Rostovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni glavnogo marshala artillerii M. I. Nedelina [Rostov Higher Military Command School imeni Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin] (344027, Rostov-on-Don, 27);

Serpukhovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni Leninskogo komsomola (Serpukhov Higher Military Command School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] (142202, Serpukhov, 2);

Khar'kovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza N. I. Krylova [Khar'kov Higher Military Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union N. I. Krylov] (310056, Khar'kov, 56).

The term of study is 5 years.

#### Military-Engineering Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Kaliningradskoye vyssheye inzhenernoye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche inzhenernykh voysk imeni A. A. Zhdanova [Kaliningrad Higher Engineering Order of Lenin Red Banner School of Engineering Troops imeni A. A. Zhdanov] (236022, Kaliningrad, 22, Oblast);

Kamenets-Podol'skoye vyssheye voyenno-inzhenernoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni marshala inzhenernykh voysk V. K. Kharchenko [Kamenets-Podol'skiy Higher Military Engineering Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Troops V. K. Kharchenko] (281900, Kamenets-Podol'skiy);

Tyumenskoye vyssheye voyenno-inzhenernoye komandnoye uchilishche imeni marshala inzhenernykh voysk A. I. Proshlyakova [Tyumen' Higher Military-Engineering Command School imeni Marshal of Engineering Troops A. I. Proshlyakov] (625028, Tyumen', 28, Oblast).

The term of study is 4 years (5 in years in the Kaliningrad school).

#### Rear Services Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Vol'skoye vyssheye voyennoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche tyla imeni Leninskogo komsomola [Vol'sk Higher Military Order of the Red Star Rear Services School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] (412680, Vol'sk, 3, Saratovskaya Oblast).

The term of study is 4 years.

Gor'kovskoye vyssheye voyennoye uchilishche tyla (Gor'kiy Higher Military Rear Services School] (603125, Gor'kiy, D-125).

The term of study is 4-5 years depending on the chosen specialty.

Ul'yanovskoye vyssheye voyenno-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche imeni Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo [Ul'yanovsk Higher Military-Technical School imeni Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy] (432050, Ul'yanovsk, 50).

The school trains engineers in the use, storage, and transportation of liquid fuel. The term of study is 4-5 years depending on the chosen specialty.

Moskovskoye vyssheye komandnoye uchilishche dorozhnykh i inzhenernykh voysk [Moscow Higher Command School of Road and Engineering Troops] (143909, Balashikha, 9).

The term of study is 4 years.

Yaroslavskoye vyssheye voyennoye finansovoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche imeni generala armii A. V. Khruleva [Yaroslavl' Higher Military Financial Order of the Red Star School imeni Army General A. V. Khrulev] (150038, Yaroslavl', 38).

The term of study is 4 years.

Leningradskoye vyssheye ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche zheleznodorozhnykh voysk i voyennykh soobshcheniy imeni M. V. Frunze [Leningrad Higher Order of Lenin Red Banner School of Railroad Troops and Military Communications imeni M. V. Frunze] (190000, Leningrad, Center).

The term of study is 4 years in command departments and 5 years in the engineering department.

Applicants to the Vol'sk and Gor'kiy rear services schools as well as the Ul'yanovsk Higher Military-Technical School must take examinations in mathematics, physics, chemistry (oral), and Russian language and literature (written); applicants to the Yaroslavl' Higher Financial School take examinations in mathematics (written and oral), Russian language and literature (written), and geography (oral).

#### Construction Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Leningradskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye stroitel'noye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni generala armii A. N. Komarovskogo [Leningrad Higher Military Engineering Construction Red Banner School imeni Army General A. N. Komarovskiy] (192185, Leningrad, D-185);

Pushkinskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye stroitel'noye uchilishche  
[Pushkin Higher Military Engineering Construction School] (188620,  
Leningrad-Pushkin, 2);

Kamyshinskoye vyssheye voyennoye stroitel'noye komandnoye uchilishche  
[Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Command School] (403850, Kamyshin,  
10, Volgogradskaya Oblast);

Gor'kovskoye vyssheye voyennoye stroitel'noye komandnoye uchilishche  
[Gor'kiy Higher Military Construction Command School] (606200, Kstovo-4,  
Gor'kovskaya Oblast);

Tol'yattinskoye vyssheye voyennoye stroitel'noye komandnoye uchilishche  
[Tol'yatti Higher Military Construction Command School] (445681, Tol'yatti,  
GSP-681).

The term of study is 5 years in engineering schools and 4 years in command schools.

#### Motor Vehicle Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Ryazanskoye vyssheye voyennoye avtomobil'noye inzhenernoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche [Ryazan' Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering Order of the Red Star School] (390014, Ryazan', 14);

Chelyabinskoye vyssheye voyennoye avtomobil'noye inzhenernoye uchilishche [Chalyabinsk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School] (545029, Chalyabinsk, 29);

Ussuriyskoye vyssheye voyennoye avtomobil'skoye komandnoye uchilishche [Ussuriysk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Command School] (692521, Ussuriysk, 21, Primorskiy Kray);

Samarkandskoye vyssheye voyennoye avtomobil'noye komandnoye uchilishche imeni Verkhovnogo Soveta Uzbekskoy SSR [Samarkand Higher Military Motor Vehicle Command School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet Uzbekskoy SSR] (703056, Samarkand, 56, Uzbek SSR).

The term of study is 5 years in engineering schools and 4 years in command schools.

### Chemical Defense Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Saratovskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye uchilishche khimicheskoy zashchity [Saratov Higher Military Engineering School of Chemical Defense] (410037, Saratov, 37);

Tambovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche khimicheskoy zashchity [Tambov Higher Military Command Red Banner School of Chemical Defense] (392011, Tambov, 11);

Kostromskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche khimicheskoy zashchity [Kostroma Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense] (156015, Kostroma, 15).

The term of study is 5 years in the engineering and 4 years in the command schools.

Applicants to military schools of chemical defense must take entrance examinations in Russian language and literature, mathematics (written), and physics and chemistry (oral).

### Other Schools

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Stavropol'skoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye uchilishche zvyazi imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Oktyabrya [Stavropol' Higher Military Engineering Signal School imeni 60-Letiye Velikogo Oktyabrya] (355028, Stavropol', 28, Kray).

The term of study is 5 years.

Leningradskoye vyssheye voyenno-topograficheskoye komandnoye Krasnoznamennoye ordena Krasnoy Zvezdy uchilishche [Leningrad Higher Military-Topographical Command Red Banner Order of the Red Star School] (197042, Leningrad, P-42).

The term of study is 4 years.

Ryazanskoye vyssheye vozdushnodesantnoye komandnoye dvazhdy Krasnoznamennoye uchilishche imeni Leninskogo komsomola [Ryzan' Higher Airborne Command Twice-Awarded Red Banner School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] (390031, Ryzan', 31).



The term of study is 4 years.

Volzhskoye voyennoye stroitel'no-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche [Volga Military Construction-Technical School] (141980, Dubna, 2).

The term of study is 3 years. Entrance examinations are given from 10 to 30 July in Russian language and literature (written), and in mathematics (oral).

Cherepovetskoye vyssheye voyennoye inzhenernoye uchilishche radio-elektroniki [Cherepovets Higher Military Engineering Radio-Electronics School] (162608, Cherepovets, 8).

The term of study is 5 years.

Orlovskoye vyssheye voyennoye komandnoye uchilishche svyazi imeni M. I. Kalinina [Orel Higher Military Command Signal School imeni M. I. Kalinin] (302034, Orel, 34).

The term of study is 4 years. Entrance examinations are given to military servicemen beginning on 1 July, and to young civilians beginning 10 July.

#### Military Institutes

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 4

[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Voyennyy inzhenernyy Krasnoznamennyy institut imeni A. F. Mozhayskogo [Military Engineering Red Banner Institute imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy] (197082, Leningrad, P-82).

Graduates of the institute are issued an all-union diploma and awarded the qualifications of a military engineer-mechanic, a military engineer-electrician, a military engineer-hydrometeorologist, a military engineer-builder, a military engineer-mathematician, a military engineer in radio-technical specialties, and a military engineer in electronics and radio-electronics.

The term of study is 5 years.

Voyennyy institut [The Military Institute] (109033, Moscow, Zh-33).

The following departments are accepting applications: translation, military law, and military-political.

Applicants to all departments take entrance examinations in Russian language and literature (written and oral), foreign language (oral), and USSR history (oral).

The term of study is 5 years.

Voyenny dvazhdy Krasnoznamenny institut fizicheskoy kul'tury [Military Twice-Awarded Red Banner Institute of Physical Culture] (194044, Leningrad, K-44).

The institute accepts warrant officers, first-term and extended service servicemen, and young civilians with a complete secondary education having a sports rank not below the second (civilian youth--not below the first youth rank) in one of the forms of sports.

Warrant officers and first-term and extended service servicemen bearing the titles "USSR Master of Sports," "USSR Master of Sports, International Class," or "USSR Distinguished Master of Sports" are accepted by the institute at ages up to 27 years.

Entrance examinations are given in Russian language and literature (written), biology (oral), chemistry (oral), and physical culture and sports (practical performance of gymnastic exercises, light athletics, and swimming, and testing of technical preparedness for the chosen form of sports).

The term of study in the institute is 4 years.

#### Military Bandmaster School

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[Military school admission announcements for officer candidates "published at the request of readers"]

[Text] Voyenno-dirizherskiy fakul'tet pri Moskovskoy gosudarstvennoy ordena Lenina konservatorii imeni P. I. Chaykovskogo [Military Bandmaster School of the Moscow State Order of Lenin Conservatory imeni P. I. Chaykovskiy] (119021, Moscow, G-21).

The school trains military bandmaster officers with a higher military musical education. The term of study is 5 years.

The school accepts: warrant officers and extended service servicemen not older than 25 years; first-term servicemen and young civilians not older than 23 years. Applicants to the school must have a secondary musical education, and they must be able to play a brass band instrument.

Entrance examinations cover the secondary school program in Russian language and literature (written), USSR history (oral), and music: harmony and solfeggio, military band instruments, and conducting.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

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